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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON NATIONWIDE
PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS
Maryelen Fullerton *
I. INTRODUCTION
If a former employee of a mom-and-pop grocery store in Florida
files suit in federal court in Alaska, where she currently resides, alleg-
ing that her former employer violated the federal minimum wage
laws, I can the employer claim any constitutional protection against liti-
gating that claim in Alaska? If a corporation headquartered in Guam
whose total operation consists of manufacturing beach umbrellas that
are sold locally is sued by the United States Consumer Product Safety
Commission in federal court in New Hampshire for allegedly selling a
defective product, 2 does the Constitution provide the defendant with
any protection from litigation in New Hampshire? In short, what are
the constitutional limitations on the assertion of personal jurisdiction3
by federal courts?
In 1877, in the legendary Pennoyer v. Neff4 opinion, the Supreme
Court held the enforcement of a judgment entered by a state court that
lacked jurisdiction over the defendant unconstitutional. Since Pen-
noyer, the Supreme Court has on numerous occasions employed the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment 5 to limit the exercise
of personal jurisdiction by state courts over out-of-state defendants.6
Associate Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School; B.A. Duke University; J.D., Antioch
School of Law; The author wishes to thank Dean David G. Trager for the Brooklyn Law School
Research Stipend that aided in the preparation of this Article.
I The Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982), prescribes the minimum wage
for employees of enterprises engaged in commerce and sets the maximum number of hours that
employees can be required to work at the base rate of pay. See id. §§ 206, 207.
2 The Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2083 (1982), grants the Consumer
Product Safety Commission the power to prosecute manufacturers who produce products in viola-
tion of established safety standards. See id § 2076.
3 Personal jurisdiction is a threshold issue in every case. Personal jurisdiction refers to the
power of a court to enter a binding judgment against a defendant. It must be distinguished from
service of process, which refers to the mechanism for notifying a defendant that he has been sued.
Service of process "provide[s] a ritual that marks the court's assertion of jurisdiction over the
defendant." 4 C. WRirHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1063 (1969).
4 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
5 Section I of the fourteenth amendment provides in pertinent part: "No State shall...
deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without ilue process of law . U.S. CoNs-.
amend. XIV, § 1.
6 E.., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Kulko v. Superior
Court, 436 U.S. 84, reh'g denied, 438 U.S. 908 (1978); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
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The Supreme Court, however, has never defined the limitations, if any,
that the due process clause of the fifth amendment 7 places on the exer-
cise of personal jurisdiction by federal courts.
This Article concludes that the Constitution does limit the exercise
of personal jurisdiction by federal courts and that Congress does not
have unlimited power to authorize litigation at any location in the
United States. Accordingly, a nationwide personal jurisdiction statute
providing that a defendant located in or having minimum contacts8
with the United States can be sued on a federal question 9 in any federal
court in the country would be unconstitutional. Even though a defend-
ant is present in or has minimum contacts with the United States, re-
quiring him to litigate a case in a particular location within the United
States may be an unreasonable burden. In those instances, the due pro-
cess clause of the fifth amendment should prevent a federal court from
asserting personal jurisdiction. In sum, the due process clause of the
fifth as well as the fourteenth amendment requires courts to examine
the unfairness to defendants caused by the location of litigation.
Despite the due process constraints on personal jurisdiction that
should apply to federal question cases, Congress has enacted a number
of statutes authorizing nationwide personal jurisdiction. While the first
few nationwide personal jurisdiction statutes only applied in narrow
circumstances, '0 in recent years Congress has permitted nationwide ju-
risdiction in a much broader array of cases."I Indeed, one commenta-
tor has even interpreted the 1983 congressional revision of Rule 4 of the
7 The fifth amendment provides in pertinent part: "No person shall be.. .deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law .. " U.S. CONST. amend. V.
8 For a discussion of the minimum contacts doctrine, see infra text accompanying notes 32-
36.
9 Congress has authorized federal district courts to adjudicate "all civil actions. . aris[ing]
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1982). In
addition to this federal question jurisdiction, Congress has authorized federal district courts to
adjudicate cases based on state law when the parties are citizens of different states. Id. § 1332(a).
In these diversity cases, federal courts generally apply the jurisdictional standard of the state in
which they are located. See, e.g., Arrowsmith v. UPI, 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963). There is
general agreement that this practice is not constitutionally mandated, however, id. at 226, and it
has been criticized. Eg., 2 J. MOORE, J. LUCAS, H. FINK & C. THOMPSON, MOORE's FEDERAL
PRACTICE 4.2517], at 4-288 to 4-290 (2d ed. 1983). The applicability of the Erie doctrine, which
applies in diversity cases but not in federal question cases, to the issue of personal jurisdiction is
beyond the scope of this Article.
10 For example, the first nationwide personal jurisdiction statutes were enacted in the nine-
teenth century as part of the early federal antitrust legislation and were generally limited to suits
brought by the United States against nationwide business enterprises. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 253-67.
11 For example, nationwide personal jurisdiction provisions now appear in a wide variety of
federal securities laws, in federal antitrust legislation, in the Bankruptcy Rules, in the Federal
Interpleader Act, and in legislation regulating suits against federal officials. See infra text accom-
panying notes 258-81.
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure' 2 as an authorization of nationwide
personal jurisdiction in all federal court cases arising under federal
law.13 As a result, federal courts are increasingly faced with constitu-
tional challenges to their assertion of personal jurisdiction over defend-
ants in federal question cases.' 4 These challenges, although still novel,
cannot be dismissed as meritless. In fact, at least two of the current
nationwide personal jurisdiction provisions, the bankruptcy' 5 and in-
terpleader16 statutes, contain the potential for unconstitutional asser-
tions of personal jurisdiction. Accordingly, the number of defendants
protesting nationwide personal jurisdiction is sure to grow.
Although a number of federal courts have wrestled with due pro-
cess challenges to their exercise of personal jurisdiction, the case law to
date sets forth perfunctory and contradictory analyses of the constitu-
tional dimension of this issue. While occasionally federal trial courts
have refused to exercise jurisdiction over defendants who lacked any
connection with the part of the country where the suit was filed,' 7 a
majority of the appellate courts that have considered these challenges
has decided that the Constitution imposes no impediment to the asser-
tion of personal jurisdiction by federal courts over such defendants.' 8
This conclusion is incorrect. The courts that resolve the personal
12 Rule 4(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was amended February 26, 1983 to pro-
vide service of process by first-class mail. Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) states:
(C) A summons and complaint may be served upon a defendant of any class referred to in
paragraph (1) or (3) of subdivision (d) of this rule-
(ii) by mailing a copy of the summons and of the complaint (by first-class mail, postage
prepaid) to the person to be served, together with two copies of a notice and acknowledge-
ment conforming substantially to form 18-A and a return envelope, postage prepaid, ad-
dressed to the sender. If no acknowledgement of service under this subdivision of this rule is
received by the sender within 20 days after the date of mailing, service of such summons and
complaint shall be made under subparagraph (A) [service by a person 18 years or older] or
(B) [service by federal marshal or person specially appointed by court] of this paragraph in
the manner prescribed by subdivision (d)(1) or (d)(3).
FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2)(C)(ii). See 51 U.S.L.W. 202 (March 22, 1983).
13 See Berger, Acquiring In Personam Jurisdiction in Federal Question Cases: Procedural Fras-
tration Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4, 1982 UTAH L. REV. 285.
14 Defendants have mounted substantial constitutional challenges to assertions of nationwide
personal jurisdiction by federal courts in a wide variety of cases, including suits involving the
collection of assets by a court-appointed receiver, see infra notes 69-72 and accompanying text,
suits against federal officials, see infra notes 73-77 & 138-42 and accompanying text, suits involv-
ing federal securities law, see infra notes 74-81 and accompanying text, and suits arising under or
related to the bankruptcy laws, see infra note 279. The number of personal jurisdiction challenges
in bankruptcy-related cases appears to have increased significiantly since the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978, with its broad grant of subject matter jurisdiction, was enacted. See infra note 277.
15 See infra notes 277-81 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 258-62 and accompanying text.
17 Eg., Briggs v. Goodwin, 384 F. Supp. 1228 (D.D.C. 1974), rev'd, 569 F.2d I (D.C. Cir.
1977), rev'don other grounds sub nom. Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527 (1980); Mariash v. Morrill,
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,149 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 1973), rev'd, 496 F.2d 1138 (2d Cir. 1974).
18 See infra notes 69-81 & 138-42 and accompanying text.
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jurisdiction issue solely on the basis of whether the defendant is present
in, or has a significant connection with, some part of the United States
ignore the Supreme Court's repeated holdings that protect a defendant
from litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum. 19 Federal courts
should not presume that it is reasonable to assert personal jurisdiction
over a defendant merely because the defendant is located in, resides in,
or has minimum contacts with the United States. Rather, the courts
should examine the circumstances of each case to determine whether
the place of trial is unreasonably burdensome for the defendant. This
Article proposes that federal courts should balance three factors in
evaluating the constitutionality of an assertion of personal jurisdiction:
(1) the severity of any inconvenience to the defendant; (2) the reason-
able anticipation by the defendant of litigation at the challenged loca-
tion; and (3) the degree to which the legitimate interests of the United
States will be thwarted if litigation is not allowed to proceed at the
challenged location. Pragmatic application of this balancing test, with
an eye toward the real burdens imposed by litigation at a distant locale,
will ensure litigants in federal court the due process protection to which
they are entitled under the fifth amendment.
This Article first examines the three arguments generally cited to
support th. proposition that federal courts can, consistent with the due
process clause, exercise personal jurisdiction over all defendants pres-
ent in or having minimum contacts with the United States and dis-
cusses the insufficiencies of each argument. The Article then develops
a standard that federal courts can apply when faced with constitutional
challenges to personal jurisdiction. The Article also explores the prac-
tical difficulties that courts will encounter in applying the proposed test,
noting particularly the difficulties entailed in defining the appropriate
geographical scope of the pertinent forum. Finally, this Article ad-
dresses the implications of the proposed test on the application of cur-
rent nationwide personal jurisdiction statutes and regulations. After
pointing out the potential for unconstitutional assertions of jurisdiction
under the current bankruptcy and interpleader schemes, and under the
1983 revisions to Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this
Article concludes by recommending that Rule 4 be interpreted to avoid
such results.
II. THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE AND THE PLACE OF TRIAL
Much of the current authority examining the constraints that the
due process clause places on the location of trial in the federal court
system has concluded that the Constitution does not restrict the loca-
tion of litigation so long as a defendant is located in or has minimum
contacts with the United States. Three arguments are often proffered
19 See infra text accompanying notes 32-58.
Personal Jurisdiction
to support this contention: (1) the sovereignty of the federal govern-
ment over all people within its territory permits Congress to authorize
suit in any district against anyone in the United States; (2) the language
of article III of the United States Constitution recognizes Congress's
power to authorize suit in any district; and (3) the availability of trans-
fer within the federal court system is an adequate remedy for any un-
fairness to the defendant caused by the location of the suit. Scrutiny of
these three arguments reveals, however, that they inadequately support
the contention that so long as a defendant can be sued in a federal
court somewhere in the United States he can be sued anywhere in the
country.
A. Sovereignty
The most frequently proffered justification for the view that the
Constitution does not limit the place of trial within the United States in
federal court cases arising under federal law is that the federal govern-
ment has sovereign power over everyone within the United States. 20 A
corollary of this postulate is that the federal government cannot exer-
cise power over a defendant beyond the boundaries of the United
States but may require any defendant within those boundaries to ap-
pear before any of its courts. This view of federal court jurisdiction has
developed from the Supreme Court's analysis of state court jurisdic-
tion. Therefore, a brief review of the seminal personal jurisdiction cases
is necessary in order to explore the strengths and weaknesses of the
argument that sovereign power authorizes nationwide personal
jurisdiction.
1. The Development of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Limits on the Exercise of Jurisdiction- Since 1877 the Supreme Court
has utilized the due process clause to limit the exercise of personal ju-
risdiction by the states. Yet over the years there has been a fundamen-
tal shift in the theoretical underpinnings of the Court's due process
analysis. Initially, the Court focused on whether the exercise of per-
sonal jurisdiction over a defendant was consistent with the notion that
a state, as a sovereign, could exert certain powers over people within its
borders. Later the focus shifted and the element of fairness to the de-
fendant became an indispensable ingredient. While the Court has not
discarded the concept of sovereignty, the recent ascendancy of fairness
concerns has reduced the importance of sovereignty in jurisdictional
due process cases.
In Pennoyer v. Neff,2 the United States Supreme Court constitu-
tionalized the law of personal jurisdiction in its decision that a judg-
20 See infra text accompanying notes 63-81.
21 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
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ment entered by a state court against a defendant neither present in nor
a resident of that state was invalid. 22 While holding that it was a viola-
tion of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment for a state
court to enter a judgment against a defendant over whom it had no
personal jurisdiction, the Court did make it clear, however, that a state
could constitutionally exercise jurisdiction over persons within its bor-
ders. Justice Field, writing for the Court, based his opinion on the
"well established [principle]. . . that every State possesses exclusive ju-
risdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its terri-
tory." 23 Justice Field derived this conclusion from Justice Story's
treatise on the Conflict of Laws,24 which, in turn, was based on princi-
ples of international law that had been formulated largely by European
scholars on the continent.25 The jurisdictional principles developed in
the international law context were generally designed to resolve con-
flicts among nations. The enforceability of judgments-particularly
the ability and right of sovereigns to take action affecting people within
their territory and the corresponding inability of sovereigns to act effec-
tively and avoid interfering with the rights of other nations when tak-
ing action against people outside their borders-was also central to the
development of these principles. 26
Justice Field did not explain why these principles of international
law should apply in the context of disputes arising within a single na-
tion,27 nor did he elucidate the relationship between these jurisdictional
principles derived from international law and the constitutional guar-
antee of due process. 28 This failure is curious since the jurisdictional
22 Prior to Pennoyer, some courts had refused on the basis of unfairness to enforce judgments
entered by courts of sister states against nonresident defendants who had been unable to defend in
the original forum. They did not base these decisions on the due process clause (the fourteenth
amendment was not ratified until 1868) or on any other constitutional provision. Rather they
viewed their denials of enforcement as justifiable exceptions, based on principles of international
comity, to the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution. E.g., D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S.
(II How.) 165, 175-76 (1850). See Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and Personal Jurisdiction: A
Theoretical Evaluation, 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 1112, 1123-24 (1981).
23 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. at 722.
24 J. STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS ch. 2 (1834). See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. at 722.
25 See Hazard,A General Theory of State Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. 241, 258-59.
26 Id. at 259-60.
27 While acknowledging that the states that comprise the United States are not independent
nations with the rights and powers that nationhood entails, Justice Field stated that "except as
restrained and limited by [the federal constitution, the states] possess and exercise the authority of
independent States, and the principles of public law to which we have referred are applicable to
them." Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. at 722.
28 Justice Field stated that the term "due process of law" was incapable of precise definition,
but that at the very least required valid judicial proceedings when courts resolved disputes involv-
ing private parties. Judicial proceedings, he asserted, were not valid unless the court had been
granted power "to pass upon the subject-matter of the suit; and, if that involves merely a determi-
nation of the personal liability of the defendant, he must be brought within its jurisdiction by
service of process within the State, or his voluntary appearance." Id. at 733. Justice Field made
Personal Jurisdiction
concerns important in the international law context had played no part
in the development of the Anglo-American concept of "due process."
From its origin in the Magna Carta29 through its expansion in post-
Civil War America, the concept of "due process" had focused on the
protection of an individual from government oppression, rather than
on the proper sphere for adjudicating conflicts between sovereigns. 30
Notwithstanding this fundamental difference, the Pennoyer opinion im-
planted the sovereignty analysis of jurisdiction into the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Under this rationale, the due pro-
cess clause prohibited a state court from exercising personal jurisdic-
tion over a defendant located beyond state borders, but placed no
bounds on a state court's exercise of jurisdiction over a defendant pres-
ent in the state.
In the following decades courts struggled to define those circum-
stances in which a defendant was deemed "present" within a state for
purposes of personal jurisdiction.3' Sixty-eight years after Pennoyer,
the United States Supreme Court significantly expanded the Pennoyer
holding when it enunciated the "minimum contacts" doctrine in Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. Washington.32 International Shoe was the culmi-
nation of a line of cases that attempted to formulate standards to
determine when a corporation that was neither incorporated in nor had
its principal place of business within a state was "present" within the
state under the Pennoyer rationale. Recognizing that the concept of
corporate "presence" in a state had become analytically bankrupt, the
Court in International Shoe jettisoned that test, noting that the term
"'presence' [is] used merely to symbolize those activities . . . within
the state which courts will deem to be sufficient to satisfy the demands
of due process. '33 The Court reiterated its view that the due process
clause limits the power of a state court to exercise jurisdiction over out-
of-state defendants, 34 but set a new standard for determining the con-
no attempt to explain this assertion about personal jurisdiction, nor to relate it to the origins of the
due process clause as an instrument to secure individuals from arbitrary government action. See
infra note 29 for a discussion of the origin of due process.
29 The pledge in chapter 39 of the Magna Carta that the king would not deprive his subjects of
life, liberty, or property except according to "the law of the land"--'oer legem terrae"-is the
origin of the "due process of law" guarantee in the United States Constitution. Corwin, The Doc-
trine of Due Process Before the Civil War, 24 HARv. L. REv. 366, 368-69 (1911).
30 Corwin, supra note 29, at 369; Redish, supra note 22, at 1121-22.
31 E.., Philadelphia & Reading R.R. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264, 265 (1917) ("A foreign cor-
poration is amenable to process to enforce a personal liability . . . only if it is doing business
within the State is such a manner and to such extent as to warrant the inference that it is present
there."); Green v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry., 205 U.S. 530 (1907) (mere solicitation of passengers and
freight by employee in district where railroad did not operate does not constitute "doing business"
such that railroad company in amenable to jurisdiction there).
32 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
33 Id. at 316-17.
34 Id. at 319.
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stitutional exercise of personal jurisdiction: a state court could enter a
valid judgment against those corporate defendants that had sufficient
connections with the forum state so that forcing them to defend a suit
in that state did not offend "traditional notions of fair play and sub-
stantial justice. '35 In such circumstances, the Supreme Court stated,
defendants are deemed to have "minimum contacts" with a state, and
can be required to appear and defend in that state.36
Although the Court in International Shoe asserted that the concept
of "presence" is not helpful in determining whether a court can exercise
jurisdiction over a non-resident corporation, it did not reject the hold-
ing in Pennoyer that service of process on an individual physically pres-
ent in the forum state is a constitutional basis for the exercise of
personal jurisdiction. Rather, it modified Pennoyer by allowing juris-
diction over out-of-state defendants who have minimum contacts with
the forum as well as over those physically "present within the territory
of the forum. ' 37 Only if a defendant's connection with a state is insub-
stantial-if the defendant neither possesses "minimum contacts" nor is
physically present-would forcing the defendant to litigate in the state
be unfair and violate due process. 38
The Supreme Court in International Shoe did not explicate the
theoretit..' basis of its due process approach. Its only reference to the
sovereign power rationale espoused in Pennoyer was a glancing one,39
overshadowed by its emphasis on fair play. While it did not repudiate
the theory that a sovereign can exercise jurisdiction over entities lo-
cated within its territory, the Court in International Shoe elevated fair-
ness to the defendant in determining the appropriate site of litigation to
a constitutional concern.40 Furthermore, the Court expressly directed
that an "'estimate of the inconveniences' which would result to the [de-
fendant] from a trial away from its 'home' or principal place of busi-
ness" 4t should be made as a part of a court's evaluation of the
35 Id. at 316 (citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
36 Id. A defendant lacking "minimum contacts" could of course voluntarily appear and
litigate.
37 Id.
38 Thus, at its inception the minimum contacts doctrine allowed states to expand their jurisdic-
tion over out-of-state defendants. Subsequently, however, the doctrine functioned to restrict state
courts' jurisdiction over such defendants. See infra text accompanying notes 45-51.
39 "Historically the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment inpersonam is grounded on their
de facto power over the defendant's person. Hence his presence within the territorial jurisdiction
of a court was prerequisite to its rendition of a judgment personally binding him." International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (italics in original).
40 The majority's references to fairness to defendants were not unwitting. Justice Black, in his
separate opinion, severely chastised the majority for imposing "this Court's notions of 'natural
justice' on the reach of the Washington state courts." Id. at 324. He decried the "elastic stan-
dards" of "fair play," "justice," and "reasonableness" that the majority read into the due process
clause. Id. at 324-25.
41 Id. at 317.
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reasonableness of the exercise of personal jurisdiction. In this regard
the Court stressed that when a suit is based on the defendant's isolated
activities within the state, or on the "casual presence" 42 of his agent,
requiring the defendant to litigate "away from [his] home or other ju-
risdiction where [he] carries on more substantial activities has been
thought to lay too great and unreasonable a burden on the [defendant]
to comport with due process. '43 Thus, the Court injected the tradi-
tional Anglo-American concept of due process as a protection of indi-
viduals44 from governmental oppression and unfairness into the due
process analysis of state courts' assertions of personal jurisdiction over
defendants.
Both ideas-sovereign power and fairness-have continued to
play a role in the Supreme Court's pronouncements regarding the due
process limitations on state court jurisdiction. On occasion the two ra-
tionales have come into conflict. In Shaffer v. Heitner,4 5 a case in which
a state court asserted jurisdiction based on the attachment of the de-
fendants' property within the state,46 the emphasis on fairness to the
defendant reached its zenith. The Court in Shaffer reasoned that al-
lowing the exercise of jurisdiction over an individual who owned prop-
erty within the forum state but lacked a substantial connection with the
state would be unfair to the defendant. The Court rejected the notion
that the mere presence of a defendant's property within a state provides
a basis for jurisdiction. Instead, the Court explicitly extended the
"minimum contacts" analysis developed in personal jurisdiction cases
to quasi-in-rem suits brought in state courts.47 Having adopted a fair-
ness standard for quasi-in-rem cases, the Court ruled that the Delaware
state court's exercise of jurisdiction over nonresidents of Delaware
based solely on attachment of shares of stock they owned in a Dela-
ware corporation was unconstitutional. 48
As in International Shoe, the Supreme Court shed little light in
Shaffer on the theoretical underpinnings of its due process approach.
In its emphasis and reasoning, however, the Court elevated concerns
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 International Shoe set forth the minimum contacts analysis in the context of a corporate
defendant. Many state long-arm statutes have extended this analysis to defendants who are natu-
ral persons, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 302(a) (McKinney 1983), and the Supreme Court also
applied it to private individuals in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), a suit in which individ-
ual directors of a corporation challenged the jurisdiction of a Delaware state court. See infra text
accompanying notes 45-51.
45 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
46 The plaintiff, owner of one share of Greyhound stock, filed a shareholder's derivative suit
against a corporation incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in Arizona, a
wholly-owned subsidiary incorporated in California with its principal place of business in Ari-
zona, and 28 present or former officers or directors of the corporations. Id. at 189.
47 Id. at 212.
48 Id. at 216-17.
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for fairness above concerns for sovereign power, and clearly revealed
that the sovereignty approach to jurisdiction was no longer sacrosanct.
Indeed, the Court's only reference to sovereignty announced its demise
as a consideration in due process analysis: "Thus, the relationship
among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation, rather than the mu-
tually exclusive sovereignty of the States on which the rules of Pen-
noyer rest, [has become] the central concern of the inquiry into
personal jurisdiction. '49
In fact, the fairness aspect of the due process analysis achieved
such ascendancy in Shaffer that it limited a state's traditional power
over property within its borders. The minimum contacts doctrine,
which in International Shoe functioned to extend states' sovereign
power over defendants, 50 now served to restrict states' power. Indeed,
the strong emphasis on fairness in Shaffer has led a number of com-
mentators to conclude that it bars a state court from exercising jurisdic-
tion over persons actually located within, but lacking significant
connection with, the state.5'
Shortly after Shaffer, the Supreme Court in World- Wide Volk-
swagen Corp. v. Woodson 52 once again explored the limits the due pro-
cess clause imposes on personal jurisdiction. The Court enunciated a
two-fold aue process limitation on state court jurisdiction:
The concept of minimum contacts, in turn, can be seen to perform two
related, but distinguishable, functions. It protects the defendant against
the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum. And.it acts to
ensure that the States, through their courts, do not reach out beyond the
limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal
system.5 3
Although World- Wide Volkswagen ascribed greater weight to the "sov-
ereignty" concerns of sister states than had Shaffer, the Court explicitly
reaffirmed that one of the primary functions of the due process clause is
49 Id. at 204.
50 As Justice Marshall noted in Shaffer, "'The immediate effect of [International Shoe's] depar-
ture from Pennoyer's conceptual apparatus was to increase the ability of the state courts to obtain
personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants." Id.
51 See, e.g., Bernstine, Shaffer v. Heitner: A Death Warrantfor the Transient Rule of In Per-
sonam Jurisdiction?, 25 VILL. L. REV. 38 (1979) (jurisdiction based solely on service of process on
an individual temporarily present within the state may be unconstitutional); Silberman, Shaffer v.
Heitner: The End ofan Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 33 (1978).
52 444 U.S. 286 (1980). Plaintiffs moving from New York to Arizona had a car accident as
they passed through Oklahoma. They later brought a products liability suit in state court in
Oklahoma against the automobile manufacturer, importer, regional distributor, and retail dealer.
The retailer and the distributor, both New York corporations who did no business in Oklahoma,
challenged the personal jurisdiction of the state court. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma upheld
the court's exercise of jurisdiction, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 585 P.2d 351
(Okla. 1979), but the Supreme Court of the United States reversed. World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 291.
53 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 291-92.
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to serve as a "guarantor against inconvenient litigation." 54 Further-
more, the Court relied on both aspects of the due process analysis to
strike down the state court's assertion of jurisdiction.55
The most recent Supreme Court pronouncement on the constitu-
tional limitations on personal jurisdiction occurred in Insurance Corpo-
ration of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee.5 6 Although not
a full exposition of the subject,5 7 this opinion supports the assertion
that a concern for fairness has replaced principles of sovereignty in per-
sonal jurisdiction analysis. Focusing on the rights of the defendant
rather than the sovereign powers of states, the Court stated:
The requirement that a court have personal jurisdiction flows . . . from
the Due Process Clause. The personal jurisdiction requirement recog-
nizes and protects an individual liberty interest. It represents a restriction
54 Id. at 292. The Court noted that "[t]he protection against inconvenient litigation is typically
described in terms of 'reasonableness' or 'fairness.'" Id.
55 In reversing the Oklahoma state court's exercise of personal jurisdiction, the Court empha-
sized that the defendants were located far from Oklahoma, that they engaged in absolutely no
commercial activity in Oklahoma, and that they did not seek to serve the Oklahoma market indi-
rectly. Id. at 295. These facts highlighted the inconvenience of the site. Further, the Court
stressed that the plaintiffs had been New York residents when they bought the car and had merely
been passing through Oklahoma when the accident occurred. Id. at 288, 292. In short, the de-
fendants' connection with Oklahoma was isolated and totally fortuitous. Thus, Oklahoma's inter-
est in the litigation was minimal, and Oklahoma's exercise of jurisdiction over out-of-state
defendants triggered interstate federalism concerns. Id. at 295, 298.
56 456 U.S. 694 (1982). As this Article went to press, the Supreme Court issued three opinions
examining the due process limits on state court jurisdiction: Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 52
U.S.L.W. 4346 (U.S. March 20, 1984) (upholding jurisdiction of New Hampshire court in libel
suit brought by nonresident against national magazine with 10,000 monthly circulation in New
Hampshire); Calder v. Jones, 52 U.S.L.W. 4349 (U.S. March 20, 1984) (upholding jurisdiction of
California court in libel suit filed by California resident against Florida reporter and Florida
editor of national newspaper with 600,000 weekly circulation in California); and Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 52 U.S.L.W. 4491 (U.S. April 24, 1984) (reversing Texas court's
assertion of jurisdiction over South American corporation in wrongful death action brought by
non-domiciliaries of Texas based on helicopter crash in Peru). Each of these decisions relied on
the analysis discussed in the text; they did not enunciate new jurisdictional principles. Although
none of the opinions analyzed the relationship of sovereignty to the notions of fairness injected by
International Shoe into the constitutional evaluation of state court jurisdiction, in Keelon Justice
Brennan reiterted the Court's statement in Compagnie des Bauxites that the personal jurisdiction
restriction on judicial power exists to protect defendants' liberty interests, not state sovereignty.
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 52 U.S.L.W. 4346, 4349 (U.S. March 20, 1984) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
57 The discussion of personal jurisdiction arose in the context of a discovery dispute in a diver-
sity case. A Delaware corporation whose principal place of business was the Republic of Guinea
filed suit in the Western District of Pennsylvania against numerous insurance companies organ-
ized in England, Japan, Israel, the United States, Switzerland, Ireland, and Belgium. Some of the
insurers filed motions to dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction. After the insurers had
repeatedly failed to comply with discovery requests regarding their activities in Pennsylvania, the
district court relied on the sanction provisions of FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A) and found the insur-
ers subject to personal jurisdiction based on their business contacts with Pennsylvania. The
Supreme Court affirmed. Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456
U.S. at 709.
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on judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of indi-
vidual liberty. Thus, the test for personal jurisdiction requires that "the
maintenance of the suit . . . not offend traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice." 58
As the historical development of the due process limitations on
state court jurisdiction illustrates, the questionable injection of con-
cerns regarding sovereign power into the due process clause has been
ameliorated by a shift in the underlying conceptual framework of juris-
dictional analysis. Sovereignty is no longer the only touchstone. Fair-
ness to defendants has become a permanent concern, as has the
location of litigation. Contemporary constitutional analysis of state
court personal jurisdiction is now much more congruent with the his-
tory of the due process clause as a bulwark to protect individuals
against government oppression.
2. The Applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment Analysis to the
Federal Courts-The Supreme Court precedents defining due process
limitations on personal jurisdiction all have arisen in the state court
context. In each case a defendant who was a nonresident of the forum
state alleged that the state had overreached itself in attempting to draw
the defendant within the power of that state's courts and had thus vio-
lated the defendant's rights under the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment to the United States Constitution.59 Although the
fourteenth amendment is inapplicable to the federal government, a liti-
gant in federal court defending a federal question claim should be able
to assert the same constitutional protection against litigation in an in-
58 Id. at 702-03 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). In
a footnote the Court attempted, not very successfully, to perpetuate the grafting of ideas of sover-
eignty and federalism onto the due process clause:
The restriction on state sovereign power in World- Wide Volkswagen Corp., however, must be
seen as ultimately a function of the individual liberty interest preserved by the due process
clause. That clause is the only source of the personal jurisdiction requirement and the clause
itself makes no mention of federalism concerns. Furthermore, if the federalism concept oper-
ated as an independent restriction on the sovereign power of the court it would not be possi-
ble to waive the personal jurisdiction requirement: Individual actions cannot change the
powers of sovereignty, although the individual can subject himself to powers from which he
may otherwise be protected.
Id. at 702 n.10.
59 See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (New York corpora-
tions challenged jurisdiction of Oklahoma state courts); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977)
(nonresidents of Delaware protested jurisdiction of Delaware courts); International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (Missouri corporation challenged the jurisdiction of Washington
state court); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877) (California resident challenged jurisdiction of
Oregon state courts). See also Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978) (New York resident
challenged jurisdiction of California state courts); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S.
228 (1957) (Texas company challenged jurisdiction of California state courts). Although in Insur-
ance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982), European com-
panies challenged the jurisdiction of a federal court, the federal court was sitting in diversity and
following the jurisdictional law of the state of Pennsylvania. See supra note 9.
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convenient forum as he can in state court. In its personal jurisdiction
cases the Supreme Court has heavily emphasized the burdens that dis-
tant litigation imposes on defendants. These burdens are not any
smaller when a party is sued in the federal court across the street from
a distant state court. The New York defendants in Volkswagen would
have faced the same inconveniences whether their suit was filed in fed-
eral or state court in Oklahoma.60
Furthermore, in language virtually identical to the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment, 6' the due process clause of the
fifth amendment circumscribes the actions of the federal government.
On many occasions the Supreme Court has interpreted the two clauses
as imposing similar restraints on actions taken by either federal or state
governments against individuals.62 Thus, the fact that the Supreme
Court's personal jurisdiction cases have not interpreted the fifth
amendment is, in itself, of little significance.
Some lower courts and commentators have acknowledged that the
due process analysis of personal jurisdiction developed in the four-
teenth amendment context may apply to defendants in federal court
but assert that the analysis does not protect defendants from the bur-
dens imposed by suits at distant sites within the United States.63 They
assert that the due process clause permits courts to exercise personal
jurisdiction over any defendant who is located within or has minimum
contacts with the forum creating the court. Since federal courts are
created by the federal government, the pertinent forum is the entire
nation. Supporters of this popular approach contend that so long as a
defendant in federal court has a significant connection with any part of
60 Although the distance from New York to Oklahoma, with the concomitant extra costs to the
New York defendants that litigation far from home entails, remains the same whether the suit is
filed in federal or state court in Oklahoma, it is possible that the defendants might have felt more
comfortable litigating in the Oklahoma federal court which, of course, follows the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure rather than the state procedural law. The uniformity of federal procedural law
across the nation is one factor that might make it somewhat easier-at least for those with federal
litigation experience-to defend lawsuits in distant federal courts rather than in distant state
courts. Even if the uniform federal procedural law ameliorates to some extent the burden im-
posed by litigation at distant locations, the extra expense and dislocation caused by transcontinen-
tal litigation may still be extremely burdensome. See infra text accompanying notes 183-87.
61 Compare supra note 5 with supra note 7.
62 E.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976) (in discussing procedural due process
constraints on federal government, reliance is placed on cases interpreting the fourteenth amend-
ment-Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971),
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)--as well as on cases interpreting the fifth amendment-
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971)).
63 E.g., Haile v. Henderson Nat'l Bank, 657 F.2d 816 (6th Cir. 1981) cert. denied 455 U.S. 949
(1982); Fitzsimmons v. Barton, 589 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1979); Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d 147 (1st
Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527 (1980); Mariash v.
Morrill, 496 F.2d 1138 (2d Cir. 1974). See also Green, Federal Jurisdiction In Personam of Corpo-
rations and Due Process, 14 VAND. L. REV. 967 (1960-1961); Note, Alien Corporations andAggre-
gate Contacts: A Genuinely Federal Jurisdictional Standard, 95 HARV. L. REv. 470 (1981).
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the United States, the due process clause requires only that such a de-
fendant be accorded notice and an opportunity to be heard.64
Either explicitly or implicitly, those who espouse this view focus
solely on the sovereignty theory of personal jurisdiction. They adopt
the international law principle discussed in Pennoyer v. Ne7- 5 that a
sovereign has jurisdiction over persons and property located within its
borders. They assert that the United States as sovereign has power
over all individuals and entities found within its borders, and that the
United States may authorize all of its courts to exercise jurisdiction
over all such defendants. 6 They contend that whenever a federal court
exercises jurisdiction over a defendant located within the borders of the
United States the circumstances are analogous to those presented when
a state exercises jurisdiction over one of its residents.6 7 Since in such
situations the defendant is physically present within the pertinent terri-
tory, the minimum contacts standard enunciated in International Shoe
concerning jurisdiction over defendants beyond the territorial limits of
the state does not even come into play. Accordingly, they assert, a fed-
eral court need only consider the minimum contacts doctrine when per-
sonal jurisdiction is challenged by defendants who are served outside
the United States.68 Adherents to this view presume that the fairness
standard miorporated in the minimum contacts analysis activates the
fifth amendment due process safeguard against litigation at a distant
location only when federal courts attempt to exercise jurisdiction over
defendants located beyond the borders of the United States. Because
they disregard inconvenience and distance within the United States,
these courts and commentators countenance requiring defendants to
appear in federal court in circumstances in which the Supreme Court
has expressly ruled that the distance from the defendant's home to the
state court is so great as to preclude a constitutional assertion of per-
sonal jurisdiction.
3. The Faulty Analogy. State Borders and National Borders. -
The flaws in the analysis that condones the exercise of personal juris-
diction by federal courts over all defendants located in or having mini-
mum contacts with the United States can be seen by examining its
recent application in the case law. A number of appellate courts have
explicitly adopted the sovereignty approach described above in review-
ing federal trial court decisions concerning the exercise of personal ju-
risdiction over out-of-state defendants. The appellate opinions evince a
common disregard for the burdens that distant litigation can impose on
64 E.g., Haile v. Henderson Nat'l Bank, 657 F.2d at 826; Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d at 157.
65 95 U.S. 714 (1877). See supra text accompanying notes 21-28.
66 E.g., Mariash v. Morrill, 496 F.2d at 1143.
67 Id
68 Id. at 1143 n.9.
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defendants. In Haile v. Henderson National Bank,69 the Sixth Circuit
rejected the defendants' protest that the due process clause protected
them from litigation initiated by a court-appointed receiver in the fed-
eral district court in Tennessee. 70 Although the activity that tied the
defendants to the suit had taken place in Alabama and the defendants
had no contacts with Tennessee, the Sixth Circuit stated that the de-
fendants could constitutionally be required to appear and defend in
Tennesse. Reasoning that the minimum contacts doctrine had been de-
veloped to prevent a state from reaching beyond its borders, the court
concluded that this personal jurisdiction doctrine was inapposite to fed-
eral courts' attempts to reach defendants within the United States bor-
ders.71 Whether defendants had a significant connection, or any
connection at all, with the state where the litigation took place was ir-
relevant in the Sixth Circuit's view. Similarly, the inconvenience to
defendants of litigation in a particular state was deemed unimportant.
So long as the defendants were present within the United States, there
were no due process restrictions on the location of the suit.72
The Sixth Circuit did not develop the analytical basis for its con-
clusions but instead relied on Driver v. Helms,73 a First Circuit case,
69 657 F.2d 816 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 949 (1982).
70 Halle, in his capacity as court-appointed receiver, had depended on 28 U.S.C. §§ 754 and
1692 to institute several ancillary proceedings in federal court in the Middle District of Tennessee
against the defendants, none of whom resided in Tennessee. He relied upon 28 U.S.C. § 754
(1976), which provides in pertinent part: "[A receiver] shall have [the] capacity to sue in any
judicial] district without ancillary appointment," and upon 28 U.S.C. § 1692 (1976):
In proceedings in a district court where a receiver is appointed for property. . . situated in
different districts, process may issue and be executed in any such district as if the property lay
wholly within one district, but orders affecting the property shall be entered of record in each
of such districts.
The district court found that John Barber, an itinerant evangelist, had appointed himself Bishop
of the Apostolic Church of God Life Forever, Inc., and engineered a fraudulent bond issuance
scheme:
The place of incorporation for the Apostolic Faith Church of God Live Forever. Inc. was a
matter of some dispute. . . .The Church was founded in Louisville, Kentucky sometime in
the early 1960's. It was later chartered as a non-profit religious corporation under the laws of
the State of Kentucky . . . .In 1970, the Church's headquarters were moved to Decatur,
Alabama, and it was later incorporated in Colbert County, Alabama. In 1971, the Church
obtained a certificate to do business in the State of Georgia.
Haile v. Henderson Nat'l Bank, 657 F.2d at 818. The district court had found that related corpo-
rations were "all alter egos of John H. Barber and Apostolic Faith Church of God Live Forever,
Inc., [existing]. . .only on paper" and thus were properly subject to receivership. Id. Nonethe-
less, the lower court dismissed these actions because the defendants did not have sufficient "mini-
mum contacts" with the state of Tennessee. After reversing the district court, the Sixth Circuit
remanded the case for a determination as to "whether the service was reasonably calculated to
inform the defendants of the pendency of the proceedings against them in order that they might
take advantage of the opportunity to be heard in their defense." Id. at 826.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 577 F.2d 147 (1st Cir. 1978), rev'don other grounds sub nom. Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527
(1980).
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which in turn relied on Mariash v. Morrill,74 a Second Circuit case. In
each of these federal question cases the defendants were served under
federal nationwide service of process statutes,75 were non-residents of
the state in which the federal district court was located, and challenged
the court's personal jurisdiction on due process grounds. Both courts
rejected the challenges, concluding that Congress had expressly author-
ized personal jurisdiction over defendants located anywhere in the na-
tion and could constitutionally exercise power over all those within the
territory governed by the federal government. 76 Consistent with the
sovereignty theory, both courts stated that the only constitutional limits
on the exercise of personal jurisdiction by the federal courts over de-
fendants present in the United States are those applicable to state
courts' exercise of jurisdiction over defendants located within that state:
notice reasonably calculated to inform the defendant of pending litiga-
tion and a reasonable opportunity to be heard.77
The Seventh Circuit arrived at the same result based on a more
convoluted analysis. In Fitzsimmons v. Barton ,78 a federal securities
fraud action, a defendant from Oklahoma was sued in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. 79 In examin-
74 496 F.2d 1138 (2d Cir. 1974).
75 In Driver, the plaintiffs relied on 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (1976) in filing a class action suit in
federal court for the District of Rhode Island. They alleged that former and current federal offi-
cials had violated their constitutional rights by illegally intercepting their mail. The section relied
on by plaintiffs provides in pertinent part:
The summons and complaint in such an action shall be served as provided by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure except that the delivery of the summons and complaint to the officer
or agency as required by the rules may be made by certified mail beyond the territorial limits
of the district in which the action is brought.
28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (1976). The defendants argued that since they had no contact with Rhode
Island, the court had no personal jurisdiction over them. The district court denied defendants'
motion to dismiss on these grounds. Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d at 149.
In Mariash, the plaintiff brought an action in the Southern District of New York against
Massachusetts residents for violation of the Securities Act of 1934. The plaintiffs argued that the
court could exercise personal jurisdiction over the Massachusetts residents pursuant to what is
now 15 U.S.C. § 78aa, which provides:
Any suit or action to enforce any liability or duty created by this chapter or rules and regula-
tions thereunder, or to enjoin any violation of such chapter or rules and regulations, may be
brought in any such district or in the district wherein the defendant is found or is an inhabit-
ant or transacts business, and process in such cases may be served in any other district of
which the defendant is an inhabitant or wherever the defendant may be found.
15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1982).
The lower court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint, holding that the statute did not provide the
court with jurisdiction. Mariash v. Morrill, 496 F.2d at 1140.
76 Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d at 156-57; Mariash v. Morrill, 496 F.2d at 1142-43.
77 Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d at 157; Mariash v. Morrill, 496 F.2d at 1143.
78 589 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1979).
79 The plaintiffrelied upon 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1982), seesupra note 75, to argue that the district
court in Illinois had personal jurisdiction over the defendants. The lower court had dismissed the
suit against an Oklahoma defendant for lack of personal jurisdiction since he lacked "minimum
contacts" with Illinois. Fitzsimmons v. Barton, 589 F.2d at 331.
Personal Jurisdiction
ing the fifth amendment due process restrictions on the exercise of fed-
eral court jurisdiction, the court expressly acknowledged that Shaffer
and International Shoe had shifted the due process analysis of personal
jurisdiction from a focus on sovereignty to a focus on fairness to the
defendant.8 0 The Seventh Circuit adopted the fairness approach as a
limitation on the exercise of personal jurisdiction by federal courts, but
redefined fairness to mean sovereignty:
[Tihe fairness standard imposed by Shaffer relates to the fairness of
the exercise of power by a particular sovereign, not the fairness of impos-
ing the burdens of litigating in a distant forum. Applying this standard of
fairness, it is clear that this instance of personal service satisfies Due Pro-
cess. Here the sovereign is the United States, and there can be no ques-
tion but that the defendant, a resident citizen of the United States, has
sufficient contacts with the United States to support the fairness of the
exercise of jurisdiction over him by a United States court.8'
Under this definition of fairness, of course, the burdens imposed on the
defendant by requiring him to litigate in a distant state were irrelevant.
The courts that follow the sovereignty analysis analogize the bor-
ders of the United States to the borders of a state and conclude that any
defendant physically present within or having minimum contacts with
the United States constitutionally can be required to litigate in any fed-
eral court. While the argument has the appeal of symmetry, it is unsat-
isfactory for two reasons. First, the sovereignty approach ignores the
concern for fairness to defendants that the Supreme Court has consist-
ently displayed since International Shoe, and disregards International
Shoe's express requirement that before a court can constitutionally ex-
ert power over a defendant the court must make an "estimate of the
inconveniences which would result to the [defendant] from a trial away
from [his] home or principal place of business. '8 2 By focusing solely on
the boundaries of the forum and evaluating the burdens on defendants
only when they are located beyond the borders of the United States,
this approach necessarily countenances many instances of distant liti-
gation in which a defendant may be seriously inconvenienced.8 3
Second, the analogy ignores the huge difference in size between
the territory of one state and the territory of the entire country. While
it is undoubtedly true that the distance between courts within a vast
state such as Texas or California may be great, the problem that'-,-...
raphy can impose in terms of distant litigation is greatly r,;, . .'
80 Id. at 332.
81 Id. at 333.
82 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 317.
83 The author does not contend that the particular facts in Haile, Driver, Marias,. and lizsim-
mons necessarily lead to the conclusion that a due process violation occurred in any of ,hose cases.
It would be essential to have a more complete understanding of all the surrounding ci-rcumstances
in each case, see infra text accompanying notes 176-79, before one could determine whther any of
these assertions of personal jurisdiction were unconstitutional.
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when the courts of the sovereign literally span the continent and be-
yond. 84 In terms of due process analysis, this difference in degree is
significant. 85
Moreover, this sovereignty approach cannot be justified on the
ground that it greatly simplifies litigation over the constitutional limits
on the federal courts' exercise of personal jurisdiction. The Supreme
Court in Shaffer warned that when "the cost of simplifying the litiga-
tion by avoiding the jurisdictional question may be the sacrifice of 'fair
play and substantial justice,' [t]hat cost is too high."' 86
In addition, a pure sovereignty approach to personal jurisdiction
in the federal courts invites harassment of defendants, since it is not
unknown for plaintiffs to file suit "at a most inconvenient place for an
adversary, even at some inconvenience to [themselves]."' 87 The sover-
eignty approach renders this practice constitutionally permissible, so
long as the defendant is located within or has minimum contacts with
the United States. Thus, a whole new dimension of forum shopping
could result.
Although they have not articulated their reasons, three federal
courts of appeals have indicated a general reluctance to adopt the sov-
ereignty approach to personal jurisdiction. In Fraley v. Chesapeake and
Ohio Ra.Iway Company,88 the plaintiff, a West Virginia resident injured
84 If due process is concerned with fairness to the defendant in terms of the site of the litiga-
tion, then the fact that the continental United States spans nearly 3,000 miles from east to west,
1,500 miles from north to south, and that Hawaii is 5,000 miles from Florida, canfiot be ignored.
In addition, some federal territory, such as Guam, lies many thousands of miles beyond the conti-
nental borders.
85 Although the test proposed in this Article, see infra text accompanying notes 176-82, in
some circumstances may preclude federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over United States
domiciliaries located within the borders of the United States whereas state courts can generally
exercise jurisdiction over state domiciliaries who are beyond the state borders, Milliken v. Meyer,
311 U.S. 457 (1940), this anomaly does not invalidate the suggested approach. Underlying the
principle that state courts can assert personal jurisdiction over absent domiciliaries is the idea that
the domiciliary has a significant connection with his "home" state, benefits from the laws of that
state, and can reasonably be required to litigate in the state with which he has the most permanent
attachment. Id. Additionally, there is a sense that there should be at least one state in which a
defendant can be sued, and that the state of domicile-which is voluntarily chosen and can be
changed-provides a good touchstone. These considerations also apply in the federal context and
can be satisfied under the proposed test. United States domiciliaries would still be subject to suit
in the United States, but would not necessarily be subject to suit in every single judicial district
within the United States. Because the geographical vastness of the United States is a factor that
differentiates the federal territory from the state territory, the distance between the federal judicial
district chosen by the plaintiff and the one in which the defendant resides and works must be
considered in an investigation of the due process constraints on federal government action.
86 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 211.
87 Gulf Oil v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947).
88 397 F.2d I (3d Cir. 1968). The suit was based on what is now codified at the Federal
Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1982). Plaintiff, an employee of defendant's rail-
road, instituted this suit after suffering injuries during the course of employment. Plaintiff sued in
federal court in the Western District of Pennsylvania, relying on section 56, which provides:
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while employed in West Virginia, commenced his action in the West-
ern District of Pennsylvania. The defendant was incorporated in Vir-
ginia, but maintained an office in the Western District of Pennsylvania.
Concluding that the principles enunciated in International Shoe are ap-
plicable in federal question cases, the Third Circuit stated that "'the
question of whether [claims arising under federal law] are to be tried in
one locality or another is now to be tested. . . simply by basic princi-
ples of fairness.' "89 Because the record had not been developed re-
garding what inconvenience, if any, litigation in Pennsylvania would
impose on the defendant, the court remanded the case with directions
for further discovery.
The two other circuits that have addressed the issue have used a
cursory fairness analysis. In Lone Star Package Car Co. v. Baltimore &
Ohio Railroad Co. ,90 a district court in Texas had dismissed a claim
"Under this chapter an action may be brought in a district court of the United States, in the
district of the residence of the defendant, or in which the cause of action arose, or in which the
defendant shall be doing business at the time of commencing such action.' 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1982).
The plaintiff argued that the defendant was doing business in the Western District of Penn-
sylvania and was therefore subject to the jurisdiction of the court. The district court disagreed,
finding that the defendant was not doing business in the Western District of Pennsylvania, and
dismissed the suit for lack of personal jurisdiction. Fraley v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 397 F.2d at
2.
89 Id. at 3 (quoting Lone Star Packaging Car Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 212 F.2d 147, 155
(5th Cir. 1954)). The Third Circuit has also stated this view in Hartley v. Sioux City & New
Orleans Barge Lines, 379 F.2d 354, 356 (3d Cir. 1967) and DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, 654
F.2d 280, 284, 286 n.3 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1085 (1981), both of which relied on a state
long-arm statute as a basis for personal jurisdiction. In addition, Oxford First Corp. v. PNC
Liquidating Corp., 372 F. Supp. 191 (E.D. Pa. 1974), see infra notes 243-49 and accompanying
text, has addressed this fairness standard.
90 212 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1954). In Lone Star the defendant brought a third-party complaint
against the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad in a suit filed in the Southern District of Texas. The
defendant argued that the district court had jurisdiction over the third-party defendant railroad
since the original suit was based on federal law regulating interstate carriers, 49 U.S.C. § 20 (re-
pealed 1978), as well as on diversity of citizenship. Therefore, the defendant argued, the court
should not apply the state jurisdictional law. The district court dismissed the third-party com-
plaint based on its lack of personal jurisdiction over the third-party defendant, ruling that the
railroad lacked sufficient contacts with the judicial district or the State of Texas. The Fifth Circuit
reversed, finding sufficient contacts between the third-party defendant and Texas. Lone Star
Package Car Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 212 F.2d at 155.
In DeMelo v. Toche Marine, Inc., 711 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1983), the Fifth Circuit recently
reviewed its holding in Lone Star. Without repudiating the "basic fairness" test of Lone Star, the
court concluded that Congress intended that federal courts exercising personal jurisdiction pursu-
ant to state long-arm statutes should be guided by state, rather than general, standards of amena-
bility to jurisdiction. In its review of prior Fifth Circuit decisions construing Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)
and 4 (e), the court in DeMelo discovered conflicting statements on a number of issues affecting
personal jurisdiction in federal question cases. One opinion had stated that in suits initiated pur-
suant to nationwide personal jurisdiction statutes the fifth amendment requires minimum contacts
with the United States, not with the forum state, Federal Trade Commission v. Jim Walter Corp.,
651 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1981), but a later Fifth Circuit case questioned the validity of that assertion.
Burstein v. State Bar of California, 693 F.2d 511, 515 n.8 (5th Cir. 1982). Without deciding the
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against a railroad company that allegedly had damaged some machin-
ery it had transported. The court had concluded that it lacked personal
jurisdiction because the railroad was incorporated in Maryland, had no
track west of St. Louis, and had only two agents with limited authority
in Texas.91 The Fifth Circuit stated that Congress could provide for
nationwide service of process in cases arising under federal law,92 but
concluded that the policies expressed in International Shoe mandated
that the location of litigation must be governed by "basic principles of
fairness." 93 Applying the "[test] of fairness" 94 to these facts, the Fifth
Circuit ruled that the district court could constitutionally exercise juris-
diction. In Chem Lab Products, Inc. v. Stepanek,95 the Ninth Circuit
dismissed a patent claim filed in federal court in California against a
New York resident.96 The plaintiff, a California resident, asserted that
a letter sent by the defendant charging the plaintiff with patent in-
fringement demonstrated that the defendant carried on activity in Cali-
fornia. The court rejected this argument. Ruling that the letter alone
was not sufficient to establish minimum contacts with California, the
court held that its exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant would
"violate 'federal due process.' ,,97
In light of the historical use of the due process clause as a shield to
protect ilkd4viduals from burdensome government action, an assertion
that a federal court can exercise jurisdiction over all defendants located
in or having minimum contacts with the United States is unwarranted.
The declining influence of the sovereignty principles derived from in-
ternational law on the constitutional analysis of personal jurisdiction
further undercuts the approach that looks solely to the defendant's con-
nection with any part of the United States to determine whether a fed-
eral court can exercise jurisdiction. Moreover, the Supreme Court's
increasing emphasis on evaluating whether the assertion of personal
jurisdiction is fair to the defendant demonstrates that the sovereignty
analysis is an inadequate approach to defining the due process limits on
personal jurisdiction in the federal courts.
issue, the court in DeMelo emphasized the decline in sovereignity analysis in personal jurisdiction
doctrine and the rise in concern for fairness. DeMelo v. Toche Marine, Inc., 711 F.2d at 1270-72.
91 Id. at 149.
92 Id. at 154.
93 Id. at 155.
94 Id.
95 554 F.2d 371 (9th Cir. 1977).
96 Plaintiff brought suit in the Central District of California to have a patent registered to the
defendant declared invalid. The plaintiff relied solely on a letter written by defendant to plaintiff
charging it with patent infringement as establishing the necessary contacts that would allow the
district court in California to exercise personal jurisdiction over the New York defendant. The
district court ruled that the defendant lacked sufficient contacts with the State of California and
therefore dismissed the suit for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Id. at
372.
97 Id.
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B. Article III and Personal Jurisdiction
Another rationale sometimes advanced to justify the view that
there is no constitutional protection regarding the place of trial within
the federal court system focuses on article III of the United States Con-
stitution. Some courts and commentators argue that article III provides
Congress with totally unfettered power to authorize federal courts to
exercise nationwide personal jurisdiction.98 They support their view
with a textual argument, bolstered by dicta from a sextet of venerable
cases written by Supreme Court Justices. 99
1. The Textual Argument-Article III provides that the federal
judicial power be vested in the Supreme Court and in "such inferior
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."'' 00
Article III makes no mention of geographical constraints on the power
of Congress to organize these lower federal courts. Thus, the congres-
sional decision to organize federal judicial districts along state lines is
not mandated by the Constitution, and can be changed. Indeed, the
text of the Constitution does not prohibit Congress from creating one
federal judicial district covering the entire country. Accordingly, some
argue, if Congress can create a single federal district court and require
all defendants to appear in that ccurt, surely Congress has the power to
authorize each federal court to exercise personal jurisdiction over all
defendants located in or having minimum contacts with any portion of
the United States.' 0 t
2. The Early Cases-In addition to making a textual argument,
those who assert that article III gives Congress unfettered power to au-
98 Eg., Fitzsimmons v. Barton, 589 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1979); Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d 1
(D.C. Cir. 1978), rev'don other grounds sub nom. Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527 (1980). See also
Green,supra note 63, at 985-86; Note, supra note 63, at 482-86. See supra note 63;infra notes 138-
42.
99 Mississippi Publ. Co. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 43 (1946); Robertson v. Railroad Labor Bd.,
268 U.S. 619 (1925); United States v. Union Pac. RR., 98 U.S. 569 (1878); Toland v. Sprague, 37
U.S. (12 Pet.) 300 (1838); Picquet v. Swan, 19 F. Cas. 609 (C.C. Mass. 1828) (No. 11,134); Exparte
Graham, 10 F. Cas. 911 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1818) (No. 5,657). See infra text accompanying notes 103-
35. All six of the cases were written by members of the United States Supreme Court. The oldest
two, however, see infra notes 103-15, were each written by a Supreme Court Justice sitting as a
federal circuit court judge. The later four, see infra notes 116-35, were decided by the full
Supreme Court.
100 Article III, section 1 of the Constitution provides:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges,
both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and
shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be dimin-
ished during their Continuance in Office.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
101 See, e.g., United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 98 U.S. 569, 602-04 (1878), discussed infra text
accompanying notes 120-27.
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thorize nationwide personal jurisdition frequently cite six opinions au-
thored by members of the Supreme Court. None of the cases is recent;
only one is less than 50 years old. Each provides some support for the
belief that Congress can authorize federal courts to issue "process to
.. .run into every state in the Union."' 0 2
The earliest case, Exparte Graham, 03 was decided in 1818 by the
Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The Rhode Is-
land federal court had issued a writ of attachment authorizing the ar-
rest of Graham, a Philadelphia merchant, and the seizure of $2,000 of
his goods. t 4 The writ, signed by John Marshall, 05 was executed by a
federal marshal in Pennsylvania. After his arrest, Graham immediately
petitioned the federal court in Pennsylvania for a writ of habeas
corpus.
Graham's challenge was jurisdictional. He asserted that a federal
court lacked the power to issue process effective in another federal judi-
cial district. Accordingly, he argued that the federal court in Rhode
Island had no power to compel him to appear in Pennsylvania. Justice
Washington,106 sitting as a circuit judge, agreed. He ordered Graham
discharged from custody, ruling that Congress had limited the scope of
the process of federal courts to the territory of their own district. In
addition to interpreting the federal jurisdictional statute, 07 Justice
102 Picquet v. Swan, 19 F. Cas. 609, 611 (C.C.D. Mass. 1828) (No. 11,134).
103 10 F. Cas. 911 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1818) (No. 5,657). This may not be the earliest decision on the
topic, but it is the earliest case upon which a Supreme Court case relied.
104 The case arose because some cargo that had been captured during the War of 1812 was
mistakenly given to the wrong person who departed with it. In the November, 1813 term the
Federal Circuit Court for the District of Rhode Island ordered the person who had received the
cargo to show cause why the merchandise should not be returned. When the defendant failed to
appear, a writ of attachment was issued against him. Three years later the court was informed
that the merchandise had been delivered to Peter Graham, who resided in Philadelphia. The
Rhode Island Court granted an order to show cause why an attachment should not enter against
Graham. When Graham did not appear in Rhode Island, a writ of attachment was issued, which
provided that if Graham could not be found then up to two thousand dollars of Graham's prop-
erty should be seized. This writ was not only directed to the federal marshal for Rhode Island, but
to marshals for other judicial districts as well. Id. at 911-12.
105 John Marshall was acting as circuit judge of the District of Rhode Island. See id. at 912.
The writ was directed to the United States Marshals of New York, the Eastern and Western Dis-
tricts of Pennsylvania, and the District of Rhode Island.
106 Bushrod Washington was an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court from
1789 to 1829.
107 Section 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 provided:
That the circuit courts shall have original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the sev-
eral states of all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute
exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum or value of five hundred dollars, and the United States are
plaintiffs, or petitioners; or an alien is a party, or the suit is between a citizen of the State
where the suit is brought, and a citizen of another State. And shall have exclusive cognizance
of all crimes and offenses cognizable under the authority of the United States, except where
this act otherwise direct . . . . But no person shall be arrested in one district for trial in
another in any civil action before a circuit or district court. And no civil suit shall be brought
before either of said courts against an inhabitant of the United States by any original process
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Washington reviewed common law principles and concluded that even
in the absence of the express congressional limitation, federal courts
would have had no power to issue process effective in other federal
districts, because Congress had organized federal courts into districts
along geographical lines. He stated that the local character of the fed-
eral judicial districts and their local boundaries were significant, and
that limits on process would serve to avoid clashes among various fed-
eral courts seeking jurisdiction over the same individual or property.10 8
Moreover, he believed that unlimited process by the federal courts
would lead to "an oppression upon suitors, too intolerable to be
endured." 0 9
Washington did not discuss the constitutional limits on the asser-
tion of personal jurisdiction by federal courts. Rather, he referred to
the advisability of limiting federal courts' exercise of personal jurisdic-
tion. While Washington may have believed that Congress lacked au-
thority to allow federal courts to issue process effective beyond the
district boundaries,1 0 it appears that he believed Congress could or-
ganize the federal courts into districts larger than states. Whether he
believed that there are any geographical limits on Congress' power to
restructure the federal judiciary is unclear, however.
Ten years later, Justice StoryI" sitting as a circuit judge for the
Circuit Court in Massachusetts, relied on Exparte Graham in deciding
a jurisdictional challenge raised by a nonresident defendant. In Picquet
. Swan," 1 2 a United States citizen who owned real estate in Boston but
had resided in Paris for 20 years was sued in federal court in Boston.
When Swan did not appear, the plaintiff sought the entry of a default
judgment. Story denied the request and seized the opportunity to ex-
pound on the scope of process issued by federal courts. At bottom, his
conclusion that the defendant was beyond the personal jurisdiction of
in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant, or in which he shall be found at the
time of serving the writ ....
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78-79 (1789). The portion of section 11 dealing with
the limits on a federal district court's process is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1693 (1982): "Except as
otherwise provided by Act of Congress, no person shall be arrested in one district for trial in
another in any civil action in a district court."
108 Exparle Graham, 10 F. Cas. at 912.
109 Id. It is important to note that Graham was not protesting the site of the litigation. He was
from Philadelphia and appeared before the federal court in Philadelphia, not before the federal
court in Rhode Island. Rather, he contested the power of the Rhode Island federal court to issue
process effective beyond Rhode Island. The thesis of this Article would not lead to the conclusion
that a violation of due process had occurred if process were nationwide but the place of trial were
convenient to the defendant. Thus, to the extent Graham mounted a constitutional challenge, this
paper would not support him.
110 Justice Washington's opinion did refer, however, to federal statutes authorizing the issuance
of subpoenas beyond the district in certain instances. Id.
I11 Joseph P. Story was an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court from 1811 to
1845.
112 19 F. Cas. 609 (C.C.D. Mass. 1828) (No. 11,134).
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the federal court rested on statutory analysis. 13 Yet he also reviewed
general jurisdictional principles, case law, and statutes. Like Washing-
ton in Exparte Graham, he found it significant that Congress had cho-
sen to organize federal courts essentially along state lines. He, too,
asserted that, aside from any statutory restrictions on the scope of pro-
cess issued by federal courts, "general principles" of law compelled the
conclusion that "[w]hatever might be the extent of their jurisdiction
over the subject matter of suits, in respect to persons and property, that
jurisdiction is available only within the limits of the district."' 14 In dic-
tum, Story stated that "[i]t was doubtless competent for congress to
have authorized original as well as final process, to have issued from
the circuit courts and run into every state in the Union."' 1 5 No amplifi-
cation or explanation was provided for this assertion. Thus, it is unclear
whether Story meant that a federal court in Massachusetts could au-
thorize process to reach a defendant in Pennsylvania and compel that
defendant to appear before a federal court in Pennsylvania (as at-
tempted in Graham) or whether he meant that the Massachusetts court
could compel the Pennsylvania defendant to appear in Massachusetts.
Nonetheless, Story's words have been cited to support the proposition
that article III permits nationwide personal jurisdiction.
Justice Story's statement that Congress possessed the power to au-
thorize federal courts to issue nationwide process was repeated in 1838
in Toland v. Sprague,'"6 the first Supreme Court opinion to address the
issue. Providing neither support for Story's assertion nor an analysis of
its import, the Court quickly turned to the case at hand, a diversity suit
brought in federal court in Pennsylvania by a Philadelphia merchant
against a United States citizen residing abroad.' 17 Merely noting that
Congress had limited the process of a federal court to the boundaries of
113 See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78-79, reproduced supra note 107.
114 Picquet v. Swan, 19 F. Cas. at 611.
115 Id.
116 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 300 (1838).
117 Toland, the plaintiff, claimed that Sprague owed him money for an unsettled account. Be-
cause Sprague was then living in Gibraltar, the plaintiff commenced a suit in federal court in the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania by way of a foreign attachment. Under the laws of Pennsylvania,
a foreign attachment allowed a creditor to attach any of the debtor's property found in Penn-
sylvania in order to force the debtor to appear and respond to the suit. Id. at 327.
Because Toland was based on diversity of citizenship rather than on federal question jurisdic-
tion, the opinion is not directly applicable to this Article's thesis that the due process clause limits
the power of Congress to authorize litigation in federal question cases at any location in the
United States. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, the dictum in Toland is
often cited to support the proposition that Congress can authorize nationwide personal jurisdic-
tion in cases arising under federal law. Similarly, statements in Mississippi Publ. Co. v. Mur-
phree, 326 U.S. 438 (1946) and Picquet v. Swan, 19 F. Cas. 609 (C.C. Mass. 1828) (No. 11,134),
both of which were diversity cases, are often cited for the same proposition. See supra text accom-
panying notes 112-15 and infra text accompanying notes 131-35.
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its judicial district," 18 the Supreme Court held that the federal court in
Pennsylvania lacked the power to compel the defendant's appearance,
and that the attachment of his property in Pennsylvania was invalid."l 9
The Supreme Court next examined the geographical limits on fed-
eral court personal jurisdiction in United States v. Union Pacific Rail-
road Company,120 in which it reviewed a federal court's attempt to
exercise personal jurisdiction over many defendants who did not reside
in its judicial district. This case, an outgrowth of the Credit Mobilier
scandal,' 2 1 was authorized by special legislation,122 passed in 1873, per-
mitting the Attorney General of the United States to sue the Union
Pacific Railroad and persons who had defrauded the United States
through various manipulations of Union Pacific and Credit Mobilier
stock. Relying on this statute, which also authorized a federal circuit
court to serve process on defendants beyond its district,123 the Attorney
General of the United States filed a suit in federal court in Connecticut
naming as defendants the Union Pacific Railroad Company, the Credit
Mobilier Company, the Wyoming Coal Company, and 150 individuals.
118 The Court did recognize three instances in which process could extend beyond the judicial
district boundaries, however. One exception involved subpoenas for witnesses. The other two
involved writs of execution after a judgment is entered. See Toland v. Sprague, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.)
at 328-29.
119 Nonetheless, holding that Sprague had waived his objection to jurisdiction, the Supreme
Court went on to consider the merits. Ultimately, the Court ruled for the plaintiff, affirming the
lower court. Id. at 335-36.
120 98 U.S. 569 (1878).
121 Credit Mobilier of America was a construction and finance company that helped finance
the building of the Union Pacific Railroad from 1865 to 1869. Oakes Ames and other men who
controlled the Union Pacific Company used the Credit Mobilier Company to enrich themselves
from construction contracts awarded to build the railroad. Credit Mobilier became a public scan-
dal in 1867 when Ames, who also served as a congressman from Massachusetts, in an attempt to
win influence sold shares of its stock at discount prices to members of Congress. The House of
Representatives in 1873 censured Ames and James Brooks, a congressman from New York. The
House took no action against the men who bought the discount shares, however. These men
included Vice President Schuyler Colfax and Representative James Garfield who seven years later
would become the twentieth president of the United States. 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 716
(14th ed. 1969). For a more detailed history of the Credit Mobilier scandal, see J. CRAWFORD,
THE CREDIT MOBILIER OF AMERICA (1880); R. FOGEL, THE UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD: A CASE
IN PREMATURE ENTERPRISE 17, 53 (1960); N. TROTTMAN, HISTORY OF THE UNION PACIFIC: A
FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC SURVEY 30-54, 71-91 (1923); H. WHITE, HISTORY OF THE UNION
PACIFIC RAILWAY 21-32, 73-76 (1895).
122 Act of March 3, 1873, ch. 226, § 4, 17 Stat. 485, 509 (1873). This statute specifically author-
ized the Attorney General to sue the Union Pacific Railroad in federal circuit court.
123 Section 4 provided in pertinent part:
Said suit may be brought in the circuit court in any circuit and all said parties may be made
defendants in one suit. . . . The court where said cause is pending may . . . issue such
process as it shall deem necessary to bring in new parties or the representatives of parties
deceased, or to carry into effect the purposes of this act. On filing the bill writs of subpoena
may be issued by said court against any parties defendant, which writ shall run into any
district, and shall be served, as other like process, by the marshal of such district.
Id.
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Many of the defendants were nonresidents of Connecticut and chal-
lenged the personal jurisdiction of the court. Without deciding the ju-
risdictional issues, the trial court dismissed the entire suit.' 24 The
Supreme Court affirmed. 125
In passing, however, the Supreme Court discussed jurisdiction.
Because article III of the Constitution gives Congress discretion to cre-
ate inferior courts without territorial restrictions, the Court reasoned
that Congress could vary the geographical boundaries of the lower fed-
eral courts, and could even create one federal trial court with nation-
wide jurisdiction.126 Accordingly, the Court concluded that Congress
could, as "a matter of legislative discretion, which ought to be governed
by considerations of convenience [and] expense,"' 127 authorize federal
courts to exercise jurisdiction beyond the borders of the judicial district
in which they are located.
In 1925, in Robertson v. Railroad Labor Board, 28 the Supreme
Court sustained the jurisdictional challenge of a defendant from Ohio
to a suit filed in federal court in Illinois to enforce a subpoena issued by
the Railroad Labor Board. The Court concluded that Congress had
not authorized federal courts to assert personal jurisdiction over de-
fendants beyond the lines of their judicial districts in enforcement ac-
tions brought by the Railroad Labor Board.' 29 Citing Union Pacfc
124 United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 28 F. Cas. 333, 341 (C.C.D. Conn. 1873) (No. 16,598).
The Circuit Court for the District of Connecticut ruled that it was improper for Congress to make
the United States the plaintiff in this suit. The court rejected the theory that the United States by
granting land to Union Pacific became a trustee for the proper exercise of that land. The court
held that either Union Pacific Railroad itself could bring suit against the defendants or, if the
railroad refused to sue, then shareholders of the railroad could do so.
125 United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 98 U.S. at 620. The Court affirmed based on the same
rationale as the circuit court below. In analyzing relief available under the statute, the Court
found that the United States was not entitled to any relief in its own right. Because the Supreme
Court agreed with the lower court that the United States was not a trustee, see supra note 124, it
held that the United States was an improper plaintiff.
126 United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 98 U.S. at 603.
127 Id. at 604.
128 268 U.S. 619 (1925).
129 Id. at 627. The Railroad Labor Board had relied on the Transportation Act of 1920,
§ 310(a) & (b) to subpoena the defendant, a citizen of Cleveland, Ohio, to appear at the Labor
Board's office in Chicago, Illinois. Section 310 of the Transportation Act provided in part:
For the efficient administration of the functions vested in the Labor Board by this title, any
member thereof may require, by subpoena issued and signed by himself, the attendance of
any witness.. . from any place in the United States at any designated place of hearing, and
the taking of a deposition before any designated person having power to administer oaths.
Transportation Act of 1920, ch. 91, § 310(a), 41 Stat. 456, 472, repealed by Act of May 20, 1926, ch.
347, § 14, 44 Stat. 587. The statute also provided:
In case of failure to comply with any subpoena [to testify] or in case of the contumacy of any
witness appearing before the Labor Board, the Board may invoke the aid of any United
States District Court. Such court may thereupon order the witness to comply with the require-
ments of such subpoena, or to give evidence touching the matter in question, as the case may
be.
Id. § 308(b). The Board interpreted these paragraphs as authorization of enforcement by any
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and Toland, the Court observed in dictum that Congress has the power
to provide for nationwide service of process and to authorize federal
question suits to be filed in any federal district court.' 30
Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree,13' the case most fre-
quently cited for the proposition that there are no limits on Congress's
power to authorize nationwide personal jurisdiction, was decided in
1946. A diversity action, 132 Murphree featured an attack by the defend-
ants on Rule 4(f)1 33 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
permits federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over defendants in other
judicial districts of the same state. The Supreme Court upheld the au-
thorization of statewide personal jurisdiction. Applying a statutory
analysis, the Court overruled the defendants' objection that they should
not be required to leave the Southern District of Mississippi in order to
defend a suit ified in the Northern District of that state. 34 Although the
Murphree opinion did not mention the constitutional constraints on
personal jurisdiction, it cited Robertson, Union Pacfic, and Toland for
the proposition that Congress could provide for nationwide service of
process.1 35
Surprisingly, although the line of cases ending with Murphree has
been cited time and again as authority for the view that Congress has
unlimited power to authorize nationwide personal jurisdiction, the six
opinions do not support such a sweeping assertion. Exparte Graham,
Picquet v. Swan, Toland v. Sprague, and Robertson v. Railroad Labor
Board all ruled that process served by a federal court beyond its district
district court. The Supreme Court, reading these paragraphs more narrowly, ruled that Congress
had only authorized enforcement by any district court of competent jurisdiction. Robertson v.
Railroad Labor Bd., 268 U.S. at 627.
130 Id. at 622.
'3' 326 U.S. 438 (1946).
132 Murphree, a resident of the Northern District of Mississippi, filed a suit in that district for
libel. The defendant, Mississippi Publishing Corporation, was incorporated in the State of Dela-
ware but maintained an office and place of business in the Southern District of Mississippi. The
defendant protested the location of the suit on venue grounds. The district court agreed with the
defendant and dismissed the suit. The Fifth Circuit reversed in Murphree v. Mississippi Publish-
ing Corp., 149 F.2d 138 (5th Cir. 1945). It held that venue was proper under section 51 of the
Judicial Code of 1911, then codified at 28 U.S.C. § 112, currently codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1391
(1982). It further held that Rule 4(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorized service in
the Southern District of Mississippi of summons issued by the federal court in the Northern Dis-
trict of Mississippi. Id. at 140. The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court. Mississippi
Publ. Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 446 (1946). For a discussion of the relevance of opinions
in suits based on diversity to the analysis of constitutional limits on nationwide personal jurisdic-
tion in federal question cases, see supra notes 9-117.
133 FED. R. CIv. P. 4(f) provides in pertinent part: "All process other than a subpoena may be
served anywhere within the territorial limits of the state in which the district court is held ....
134 Defendants had objected on appeal that Rule 4(f) exceeded the scope of the Rules Enabling
Act of 1934, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982)). See Mississippi
Publ. Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. at 443.
135 Mississippi Publ. Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. at 442.
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is invalid. United States v. Union Pacifc Railroad Co. precluded a fed-
eral court from proceeding against defendants scattered across the na-
tion. Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, while it upheld process
served by a federal court beyond its judicial district, merely dealt with
process served in another district within the same state. Thus, although
five of the opinions state in dicta that there are no geographical limits
on the power of Congress to authorize the service of process by federal
courts, none of the rulings allowed a federal court to force a defendant
to litigate at a place far from his residence or place of business. To the
contrary, each opinion adopted a narrow, pro-defendant view of fed-
eral courts' power. Rather than supporting an expansive view of the
power of the federal courts, the court's reluctance in all six cases to
uphold a broad exercise of personal jurisdiction indicates a sensitivity
to the burdens of litigating in a distant forum. Furthermore, the failure
of these opinions to address the distinction between nationwide per-
sonal jurisdiction and nationwide process issued in conjunction with
geographical limits on the place of trial undercuts their support for the
view that the assertion of nationwide personal jurisdiction by federal
courts is unfettered.
More important, in terms of the constitutional dimension of the
problem under investigation, the dispositive issue in each of the six
cases was one of statutory construction. None of the opinions analyzed
the relationship of the due process clause to the powers granted to Con-
gress under article III. Furthermore, three of the opinions were written
before Pennoyer recognized due process constraints on personal juris-
diction, 36 and all but one of the cases antedate International Shoe and
its elevation of fairness to the defendant with respect to the place of
trial to a constitutional concern. 137 In light of the great changes
wrought in constitutional analysis of personal jurisdiction by Pennoyer
and International Shoe, the dicta in these older cases lose much of the
persuasive power they might otherwise have had.
3. Disregard of Due Process-The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia recently adopted the textual argu-
ment based on article III in Briggs v. Goodwin. 38 The defendants, who
resided in Florida, challenged the personal jurisdiction of the federal
court in the District of Columbia in a suit based on actions taken and
statements made during grand jury proceedings in Florida. 139 The ap-
136 See supra text accompanying notes 21-23.
137 See supra text accompanying notes 32-44.
138 569 F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'don other grounds sub noma. Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527
(1980).
139 The defendants who challenged jurisdiction included the United States Attorney for the
Northern District of Florida, an Assistant United States Attorney for the Northern District of
Florida, and an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation stationed in Florida. A fourth de-
fendant, an attorney with the Department of Justice, resided in and was served in Washington
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pellate court rejected the defendants' argument that their lack of mini-
mum contacts with the District of Columbia precluded litigation there.
The court characterized the defendants' contention as one based on
fourteenth amendment due process clause cases limiting state court ju-
risdiction, and accordingly paid it no heed.' 40 The court instead em-
phasized that the text of the Constitution did not restrict federal courts'
power to the boundaries of the states. 141 The court paid no attention to
the due process clause of the fifth amendment. 42
Such disregard of the due process clause is not unusual. Adherents
to the view that article III gives Congress unfettered power to authorize
nationwide personal jurisdiction either ignore the due process clause of
the fifth amendment or presume that it does not modify article III.
They mistakenly read article III in isolation. Although other provi-
sions of the Constitution limit action taken by the federal government,
the fact that article III contains no limits on the power of Congress to
organize the lower federal courts does not mean that Congress has to-
tally unrestrained power in this matter. Rather, article III must be read
as part of a unified document, and interpreted, to the extent possible, to
be in harmony with other constitutional provisions, including the due
process clause. 143
In fact, if the due process clause and article III conflict, the fifth
amendment, the more recent part of the Constitution, takes precedence
D.C.. He did not raise a jurisdictional objection. The plaintiffs, members of Vietnam Veterans
Against the War/Winter Soldier Organization, alleged that the defendants committed perjury
when questioned in court about the presence of a government informer in the "defense camp."
The plaintiffs alleged that the perjury violated their constitutional rights, for which they were
entitled to declaratory relief and damages. The three defendants in Florida were served process
via 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (1970). Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d at 2-3. See supra note 75.
140 Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d at 8-9.
141 Id. at 9.
142 Although the Supreme Court reversed this case on non-jurisdictional grounds, Justices
Stewart, Brennan, and Marshall dissented. They concluded that jurisdiction, as well as venue, did
exist. In analyzing the due process constraints on jurisdiction, the dissent explicitly rejected any
concern for the fairness or unfairness of requiring the defendant to bear the burden of defending
suit in a distant, inconvenient forum. Instead the dissent adopted a sovereignty rationale, looking
solely to whether the court was created by a sovereign with power over the defendant. As the suit
involved citizens of the United States, the dissent reasoned that the due process requirements of
minimum contacts between the defendant and the pertinent sovereign had been satisfied. Stafford
v. Briggs, 444 U.S. at 553-54 (Stewart, J., dissenting). It is interesting to note that Justice Marshall,
who authored Shaffer v. Heitner, which injected fairness standards into quasi in rem jurisdiction
analysis, see supra text accompanying notes 45-51, adopted a sovereignty analysis in the Stafford
dissent.
On the other hand, Justice Brennan, who joined in the sovereignty analysis in the Stafford
dissent, later wrote that sovereignty was not a basis of the personal jurisdiction restriction on
judicial power. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 52 U.S.L.W. 4346, 4349 (U.S. March 20, 1984)
(Brennan, J., concurring). See supra note 56.
143 See C. BLACK, DECISION ACCORDING TO LAW: THE 1979 HOLMES LECTURES (1981) (argu-
ing for an approach to constitutional analysis that emphasizes the overall structure of the
Constitution).
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over article III.144 Such confficts might materialize. Even though
grants Congress the power to create inferior federal courts, it is possible
to conceive of statutory schemes that would reorganize the courts in an
unconstitutional fashion. 145 For example, if Congress enacted a statute
requiring all federal litigation arising in the continental United States
to be pursued in the federal district court in Guam, 46 it is unlikely that
such a statute would withstand a due process challenge. Similarly, if
Congress required all federal suits arising out of actions in Florida to
be litigated in federal courts in Alaska, and vice versa, the constitution-
ality of the statute would be suspect. Other arbitrary and oppressive
court reorganization schemes are easy to imagine. Thus, although arti-
cle III does not prohibit Congress from creating one nationwide federal
judicial district, it does not follow that Congress can disregard the due
process clause in authorizing the exercise of personal jurisdiction.
Furthermore, the population growth and dispersion that has oc-
curred during the past 200 years may well limit in some respects the
broad congressional power to create courts provided in article III.
Whereas it might have seemed reasonable for an early Congress to
have created only one nationwide federal judicial district with all litiga-
tion centered in the nation's capital or in a major population center, the
premise thac Congress now can constitutionally create one nationwide
judicial district and direct that all proceedings take place in one city is
questionable.
4. The Constitutional Convention and the First Congress-The
proposition that article III should be interpreted in conjunction with
the due process clause not only is logical, but also is supported by the
fact that the "legislative history" of article III reveals that it was drafted
with the need to protect defendants from litigation at distant locations
in mind. The historical evidence indicates that organizing the federal
courts so that each court can exercise personal jurisdiction over all de-
fendants physically present in the United States is contrary to the intent
of the framers of the Constitution. During the Constitutional Conven-
tion, the existence of federal trial courts and debate over the reach of
their power sparked great controversy. 147 Many delegates, including
ardent pro-constitutionalists, vigorously opposed the creation of federal
trial courts, asserting that state courts could adequately handle all trials
144 C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, §§ 22.30-.32 (4th
ed. 1972).
145 E.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 460-90 (1944) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
146 Congress has established a federal district court in Guam. 48 U.S.C. § 1424(a)(1982).
147 J. GOEBEL, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS
AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 226 (1971); P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER,
HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 11-17 (2d ed. 1973)
[hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLER].
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arising under the federal power.' 48 Others clearly feared the power
that would accrue to a system of federal courts with authority to serve
process throughout the country.149 As a result, a version of article III
that established inferior federal courts was defeated 150 in favor of a
compromise bill that delegated to the elected legislature the responsi-
bility for determining what, if any, federal courts were necessary.' 51
Thus, the document that emerged from the Constitutional Convention
contemplated that perhaps all trials might be held in state courts.
Because the text of article III left open the possibility that Con-
gress could create federal trial courts, many of the state conventions
called to ratify the federal constitution featured sharp attacks on the
power of Congress to establish inferior federal courts.' 52 These attacks
were unsuccessful, and the compromise article III was ratified. 153 Simi-
lar debates about the desirability of federal courts occurred during the
first Congress. 154 That Congress, attended by many men who had
taken part in framing the Constitution, 155 was sensitive to complaints
that requiring defendants to litigate in distant locations was a "greater
oppression of the individual than any from which liberation had been
expected by the Revolution."' 156 Again, those who opposed the crea-
tion of federal trial courts were unsuccessful.: 57 Senate Bill No. 1,
which became known as the Judiciary Act of 1789,158 established fed-
eral trial and appellate courts.' 59 The trial courts were organized into
judicial districts drawn along state boundaries, 160 and have remained
148 See supra note 147.
149 J. GOEBEL, supra note 147, at 226.
150 H. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 124-25 (1911) citedin HART &
WECHSLER, supra note 147, at 11-12.
151 U.S. Const. art. III, § 1. See supra note 100.
152 HART & WECHSLER. supra note 147, at 21. For a discussion of the amendments to article
III proposed during the ratification debates, see Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal
Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARv. L. REV. 49, 56 (1923).
153 The process of ratification by the states is discussed in J. GOEBEL, supra note 147, at 324-
412.
154 HART & WECHSLER, supra note 147, at 22-23; J. GOEB., supra note 147, at 460-61, 473-75,
494-95, 504.
155 J. GOEBEL, supra note 147, at 459 n.8.
156 Id at 460. These sentiments were expressed by Robert Treat Paine, then Attorney General
and later a judge of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in correspondence with Caleb
Strong, a member of the Senate committee charged with organizing the federal judiciary. This
committee eventually produced the Judicary Act of 1789.
157 HART & WECHSLER, supra note 147, at 23.
158 1 Stat. 73 (1789). The correct title of the statute is "An Act to establish the Judicial Courts
of the United States."
159 Section 3 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 established district courts; sections 9 and 10 set forth
the jurisdiction of these trial courts. Section 4 established circuit courts; section II granted the
circuit courts appellate jurisdiction over the district court decisions, as well as original jurisdiction
under certain circumstances. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 3,4,9,10,11, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
160 Section 2 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 established 13 judicial districts, one in each of II
states and one each in the territories of Maine and Kentucky. Id. § 2.
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that way, with one brief exception, 161 to the present time. 162
Sensitive to complaints about oppressive litigation at distant sites,
the first Congress, in addition to drawing federal judicial districts to
correspond with state lines, placed stringent geographical restrictions
on the process and venue of federal courts. In a civil action a defend-
ant could only be served with process issued by a court for the district
in which he resided or by a court for the district in which he was actu-
ally present when served. 163 Furthermore, a civil suit could only pro-
ceed in the district that had issued process. 64 Together these
provisions strictly limited the permissible places of trial within the fed-
eral system. They ensured that a defendant could always be sued in at
least one federal trial court-in the defendant's home district. The pro-
visions allowed a plaintiff to bring a defendant to trial in another judi-
cial district, but only if the defendant had been served in that district
with process issued by the federal court for that district. Thus, occa-
sionally an individual could be required to defend suit away from
home, but only in a district in which he had been served while physi-
cally present there.' 65 In light of the limited mobility of late 18th cen-
tury society, the Judiciary Act ensured that most defendants were not
required to respond to private civil litigation instituted in a faraway
place.
As indicated above, the Judiciary Act's limits on the place of trial
within the federal court system were not accidental, but in part were
drawn to quell public fears that the federal system would impose a new
oppression on citizens by requiring them to answer suits filed a great
distance away from their homes. 166 Because the structure of the federal
court system was devised in response to concerns of inconvenience and
unfairness to defendants, 167 it is significant that the boundaries of the
federal judicial districts have remained congruent with state borders
since 1789. While 200 years of history do not render such an arrange-
ment constitutionally mandated, they do demonstrate a strong tradition
that the federal courts should be somewhat localized. In addition, the
continuous organization of federal courts along state lines may reveal a
161 The Judiciary Act of 1801, ch. 4, 2 Stat 89 (1801), established a district of Potomac which
encompassed the District of Columbia, part of Virginia, and part of Maryland. This act was re-
pealed by the Judicial Reform Act, ch. 8, 2 Stat. 132 (1802).
162 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 81-131 (1982).
163 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78 (1789). See supra note 107.
164 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78 (1789).
165 Id.
166 j. GOEBEL, supra note 147, at 461, 473; HART & WECHSLER, supra note 147, at 32-33. See
supra text accompanying note 156.
167 The Judiciary Act also responded to these fears about inconvenience to defendants by ex-
pressly providing for the district courts to meet at different cities within the state in which the
court was situated. J. GOEBEL, supra note 147, at 471.
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continuing sensitivity on the part of Congress to the potential unfair-
ness of distant litigation to defendants.
Thus, the argument that the text of article III grants Congress the
power to authorize unlimited nationwide personal jurisdiction is not
convincing. It does violence to the Constitution to interpret article III
in isolation from the fifth amendment. Furthermore, the six cases that
purportedly interpret article III as an authorization of unlimited na-
tionwide personal jursidiction provide only weak support for this tex-
tual analysis. Moreover, this approach is undermined by the historical
evidence from the Constitutional Convention and the first Congress,
and by Congress's continuous maintenance of a system of localized
federal courts.
C. The Availability of Transfer
In 1948 Congress enacted a statute authorizing the transfer of civil
actions from one federal district court to another.168 Congress directed
that motions to transfer a case to another district in which it might
originally have been filed should be granted "[flor the convenience of
parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice."' 69 It has been argued
that under this statute a defendant sued in a truly inconvenient location
can always transfer his case and that consequently there is no need for
constitutional limits on the location of litigation in federal courts. 70
Similarly, some have argued that defendants can always rely on the
discretionary doctrine offorum non conveniens, which allows a court to
decline to exercise jurisdiction when an evaluation of the public inter-
est and the private interests of the litigants convinces the court that it
would be substantially preferable that the litigation take place in an-
other forum.' 7'
168 Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-773, § 1404(a), ch. 646, 62 Stat. 869, 937 (1948) (codi-
fied at 28 U.S.C. § 1404(4) (1982)).
169 Section 1404(a) provides: "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of
justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might
have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1982).
170 E.g., Driver v. Helms, 557 F.2d 147, 157 (1st Cir. 1978); Berger, supra note 13, at 301;
Chafee, The Federal InterpleaderAct of1936 (pt.1), 45 YALE L.J. 963, 985 (1936) [hereinafter cited
as Federal Interpleader]; Chafee, Interstate Interpleader, 33 YALE L.J. 685, 721 (1924) [hereinafter
cited as Interstate Interpleadet]. Chafee's views are elaborated infra note 289. See Engineering
Equip. Co. v. S.S. Selene, 446 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (asserting personal jurisdiction over
Monaco corporation and relying on transfer provisions to remedy difficulties created by plaintiffs
choice of forum); Holt v. Klosters Rederi A/S, 355 F. Supp. 354 (W.D. Mich. 1973) (asserting
personal jurisdiction over Norwegian shipowner, but transferring case to Florida where most of
the witnesses resided); Note, Personal Jurisdiction Over Alien Corporations in Antitrust Actions.
Towarda More Uniform Approach, 54 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 330, 349 (1980) (federal statutes provid-
ing change of venue ameliorate inconvenience caused by broadened susceptibility to suit).
171 E.g., Cryomedics, Inc., v. Spembley, Ltd., 397 F. Supp. 287, 290 (D. Conn. 1975) (forum non
conveniens provides only limitation on place of trial of defendant with minimum contacts with
United States). See also Note, supra note 63, at 482-85. In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S.
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While, as a practical matter, the availability of the transfer provi-
sion and theforum non conveniens doctrine may prevent most defend-
ants in federal court from suffering serious disadvantages due to the
place of trial, these measures do not obviate constitutional inquiry. A
few observations illustrate this point. First, if protection of defendants
against an inconvenient trial location is only a matter of legislative
grace rather than constitutional requirement, then nothing prevents
Congress from repealing the transfer statute and eliminating theforum
non conveniens doctrine. In that event, if the due process clause pro-
vided no protection, a defendant would be unable to seek relief from
litigation at a distant, inconvenient forum no matter how oppressive
the circumstances.
Second, if, as is commonly believed, transfer andforum non con-
veniens dismissal lack a constitutional dimension, a defendant without
resources to travel initially to the distant place of trial could not later
attack a default judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff. The power-
ful weapon of collateral attack is reserved for those instances in which a
court acted unconstitutionally by entering a judgment despite its lack
of personal or subject matter jurisdiction. 172 Therefore, when the
plaintiff later seeks to enforce his default judgment in the defendant's
home state, the defendant who had been unable to litigate at the distant
forum would be precluded from mounting a collateral attack on trans-
fer or forum non conveniens grounds. Thus, if each federal court is
deemed to have personal jurisdiction over all defendants in the United
States, the Alaska federal court in the first hypothetical presented could
enter a valid judgment on the minimum wage claim against the Florida
employer despite the employer's inability to travel to Alaska for trial.
When the plaintiff attempted to enforce the judgment in Florida, the
employer could not collaterally attack the judgment and argue that the
suit should have been transferred to a more convenient location or dis-
missed on the basis offorum non conveniens.
501, 507-08 (1947), the Supreme Court stated that federal courts "may resist imposition upon
[their] jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is authorized by the letter of a general venue statute."
Id. at 507. To determine whether the remedy available under the forum non conveniens doctrine
should be granted or denied,
[i]mportant considerations are the relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of
compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of will-
ing, witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and
all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.
Id. at 508. Although Guf Oil was based on diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, the Supreme
Court indicated that the forum non conveniens doctrine applied to cases involving federal rights,
as well as to cases involving nonresidents or aliens. Id. at 504. While the "combination and
weight of factors" might differ somewhat in litigation based on federal law rather than on diver-
sity, many of the "practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive"
will be the same. Id. at 508.
172 E.g., Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 108- 11 (1963); Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433, 438
(1940).
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Third, even if the current law on transfer and forum non con-
veniens manages to protect defendants from most of the egregious sce-
narios, there may nonetheless be some instances in which courts deny
motions to transfer or dismiss and allow litigation to proceed at an ex-
tremely inconvenient and unanticipated location. As a practical mat-
ter, unless a due process limitation on the place of trial is recognized,
those defendants are unprotected. If the defendants have the resources
to appear in the distant locale and litigate the transfer and forum non
conveniens issues, they can, of course, seek a direct appeal of the court's
adverse rulings on those issues. The opportunity to appeal is less than
satisfactory, however, for two reasons. First, the denial of transfer or
forum non conveniens dismissal is an interlocutory order, which gener-
ally cannot be appealed until the end of litigation.1 73 As a result, the
defendant would either have to litigate at the extremely burdensome
site, which would essentially moot his later appeal as to the location, or
default, which would entail sacrificing any defense he may have on the
merits. Even if the defendant is allowed to file an interlocutory appeal,
his interests are unlikely to receive much protection. Because transfer
and theforum non conveniens doctrine both involve the exercise of dis-
cretion by the trial judge, 74 appellate courts are especially reluctant to
overturn the lower court decisions.
In sum, although the transfer statute and the doctrine offorum non
conveniens demonstrate an awareness that the place of trial in the fed-
eral system can cause major problems to defendants, they do not re-
solve the debate about the constitutional limits on the federal courts'
exercise of personal jurisdiction. Indeed, they do not on their own
terms even address the constitutional problem. Rather, courts use them
to avoid reaching the due process limitations on the assertion of per-
sonal jurisdiction. Moreover, the availability of transfer andforum non
conveniens provisions is not perceived as dispositive by either side of
the constitutional debate. Those who believe that there are no due pro-
cess constraints on nationwide personal jurisdiction view the transfer
statute andforum non conveniens doctrine as pragmatic arrangements
that merely further the efficiency of the federal court system. Those
who believe that due process in certain instances protects defendants
located in the United States from litigation in distant, inconvenient fed-
eral judicial districts within the country either perceive a constitutional
173 The final order rule, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982), limits the jurisdiction of federal
appellate courts to cases in which a final order has been entered. Limited exceptions to the final
order rule are recognized by statute, see id. § 1292, and by case law. See e.g.. Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368 (1981); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541
(1949).
174 See, e.g.; Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241. 249-51 (1981). reh'g denied, 455
U.S. 928 (1982); Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518, 524-27 (1947): Gulf
Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 504-07 (1946); Calavo Growers v. Belgium. 632 F.2d 963, 966-67
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1084 (1980); Brown v. Grimm, 624 F.2d 58, 59 (7th Cir. 1980).
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dimension to the transfer andforum non conveniens provisions or view
them as safeguards for defendants that exist in addition to those that
the due process clause affords.
In conclusion, this examination of the three rationales advanced to
support the proposition that federal courts can, consistent with the due
process clause, assert personal jurisdiction over all defendants in the
United States reveals that each argument is unpersuasive. Neither the
outmoded sovereignty analysis of personal jurisdiction nor the power
granted to Congress by article III of the Constitution nor the availabil-
ity of transfer andforum non conveniens provisions justifies the exercise
of unlimited personal jurisdiction by the federal courts. This Article
now turns to the necessary, but more difficult, task of defining appro-
priate due process limitations on the personal jurisdiction of the federal
courts.
III. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT CONSTRAINT ON THE PLACE OF TRIAL
The due process clause of the fifth amendment should be inter-
preted to limit the exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendants for
whom the place of trial is unreasonably burdensome. The historical
sensitivity of Congress and the courts to the oppression that litigation at
a distant site can cause indicates that the exercise of personal jurisdic-
tion by one federal court rather than another might, in certain circum-
stances, be constitutionally prohibited. 175 It is therefore necessary to
fashion a standard that would enable federal courts to evaluate
whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a particular defend-
ant rises to the level of a due process violation.
A. Constructing a Fairness Test
In the jurisdictional analysis outlined in International Shoe and
amplified in Shaffer and Volkswagen, the defendant is the focal
point.176 The Court's analysis emphasizes the extent of the inconven-
ience to the defendant and the reasonableness of requiring him to de-
fend in a particular locale. The Court's increasing concern with
fairness to the defendant has become the heart of the constitutional
evaluation of personal jurisdiction. In investigating the fairness of the
place of trial, the case-by-case approach mandated by the Supreme
Court examines all the circumstances of the case, evaluating the bur-
dens on the protesting defendant and the countervailing interests that
the state court has in asserting jurisdiction. 77 A similar balancing test
175 See supra text accompanying notes 147-67.
176 See supra text accompanying notes 32-58.
177 For example, in Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 52 U.S.L.W. 4346, 4347-48 (U.S. March 20,
1984), the Supreme Court examined the particular circumstances of plaintifis claim and of de-
fendant's connection with the forum state, as well as the range of legitimate state interests fur-
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should apply when federal courts inquire into the fairness of the loca-
tion of an action. Nevertheless, because the inquiry arises in a federal
rather than a state context, some of the relevant interests will vary from
those enunciated in the state court jurisdiction cases.
In evaluating a due process challenge to the location of litigation
in a federal question case, a federal court should consider two major
elements. First, the court should appraise the burden that the location
of litigation imposes on the individual defendant. As discussed below,
this burden may consist of two separate factors: inconvenience and
reasonable anticipation of litigation. Second, the court should consider
the federal interests served by placing the suit at the site chosen by the
plaintiff. While the historical purpose of the due process clause has
been to protect individuals from government oppression, 78 the legiti-
mate interests of the government have always been a factor in the due
process calculus. 179 Therefore, no matter how severe the burden on the
defendant, the burden must be weighed against the valid interests of
the federal government, a category that, of course, subsumes the "pub-
lic interest."
In evaluating whether the place of trial imposes a significant bur-
den on the defendant, a number of factors are relevant: the distance,
the additional expense due to the distance, the defendant's resources,
the extent of the defendant's activities in the vicinity of the site of litiga-
tion, and the nature of the defendant's activities in that area. Roughly,
these factors coalesce into two distinct categories: (1) the inconven-
ience to the defendant, and (2) the defendant's reasonable anticipation
of litigation at the location that the plaintiff has chosen. The Supreme
Court has recognized both aspects in the seminal personal jurisdiction
cases.' 80 It should be noted, however, that the Supreme Court has not
always treated these two factors separately. The Court has often fo-
cused on only one aspect in determining the constitutionality of the
assertion of personal jurisdiction over a particular defendant. 18' Occa-
thered by requiring defendant to litigate in the forum. See also Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186,
207, 209 (1977); DeMelo v. Toche Marine, Inc., 711 F.2d 1260, 1271-72 (5th Cir. 1983).
178 See supra text accompanying notes 29-30.
179 E.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (government's interest in avoiding the fiscal
and administrative burdens of post-termination hearings must be weighed against the individual's
loss of funds if they have been erroneously deprived); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974)
(government's interest in expeditious removal of an unsatisfactory employee must be weighed
against the interest of the affected employee in continued public employment), reh'g denied, 417
U.S. 977 (1974). See also Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 52 U.S.L.W. at 4347.48.
180 E.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-92, 297 (1980) (fair-
ness of assertion of personal jurisdiction protects defendant against burdens of litigating in incon-
venient forum and gives degree of predictability to legal system).
181 For example, in two recent cases the Court has emphasized the defendants' reasonable an-
ticipation of suit. In Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 52 U.S.L.W. 4346, 4348 (U.S. March 20, 1984),
the Court stressed that the defendant was aware of New Hampshire laws when it deliberately sold
thousands of copies of its magazines in New Hampshire, and therefore reasonably should have
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sionally, the Court has merged the two factors and taken a unified ap-
proach to evaluating the circumstances that allegedly make the place of
trial unfair for the defendant. 82 Nevertheless, these two factors, al-
though they both focus on the unique circumstances of the defendant,
are analytically distinct, and should therefore be considered separately.
When these two factors are considered along with the interests of the
federal government, a three-part balancing test emerges.
First, a court should evaluate the degree of inconvenience, if any,
that the place of trial imposes on the defendant. While distant litiga-
tion often is more bothersome than litigation at home, inconvenience
that is not substantial should be ignored for constitutional purposes; in
such a case, the court can cease its examination and exercise jurisdic-
tion. If the defendant would suffer substantial inconvenience, however,
the court must evaluate the second factor: could the defendant reason-
ably have anticipated being sued at this location? If the answer to this
second inquiry is affirmative-that is, although the location poses great
inconvenience to the defendant, his purposeful activity is such that he
should have expected to defend in that forum-then the court can cease
its examination and exercise jurisdiction over the defendant. On the
other hand, if the defendant could not reasonably have expected to de-
fend in t:.zt location, the court must then investigate the third factor:
do any important government interests justify the burden imposed on
the defendant? Again, if the answer to this third question is affirmative
the court may constitutionally exercise personal jurisdiction: Because
society's interests outweigh the inconvenience to the defendant it does
not violate due process to go forward with the litigation. On the other
hand, if the court concludes that important government interests do not
override the inconvenience to the defendant, the due process clause
prohibits the exercise of personal jurisdiction.
Although the proposed test, like most balancing tests, is imprecise,
it prescribes a reasonable method for ascertaining the constitutional
limits on federal courts' exercise of personal jurisdiction over defend-
anticipated suit there in a libel action based on the magazine's contents. In Calder v. Jones, 52
U.S.L.W. 4349. 4351 (U.S. March 20, 1984), the Court stated that based on the defendants' inten-
tional acts, which were aimed at a California resident with consequences likely to be felt in Cali-
fornia. the defendants reasonably should have anticipated suit in California. Similarly, in
Volkswagen, the Supreme Court emphasized lack of foreseeability of suit and said little about
actual inconvenience. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 297-99. In Inter-
national Shoe, on the other hand, more emphasis was placed on inconvenience. International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 317.
182 This in essence occurred in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 291-
92. 297 (unfair to subject East Coast defendants to suit in Oklahoma based on one isolated, fortui-
tous occurrence when defendants do no business in Oklahoma and do not seek to benefit from
Oklahoma law), and in Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 97-98, reh 'g denied, 438 U.S. 908
(1978) (unfair to require New York defendant to litigate in California when defendant carried on
no activities in California, controversy arose in New York, and plaintiff moved to California after
claim arose).
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ants. A pragmatic case-by-case approach, with an emphasis on the re-
alities of contemporary society and the true costs that distant litigation
imposes on defendants, is consonant with the idea that the due process
clause protects individuals from actions that are oppressive. Because
this approach is similar to the Supreme Court's jurisdictional analysis
in the context of state courts, much of the fourteenth amendment case
law is applicable, with appropriate modifications to federal interests. A
closer examination of the factors comprising the proposed jurisdic-
tional balancing test is appropriate, however, before case law is
considered.
1. Inconvenience to the Defendant.-The distance between a de-
fendant's home or business and the location of the trial is obviously a
principal factor to consider in deciding whether that location poses se-
vere inconvenience to the defendant. Furthermore, because many suits
in the federal system involve extended discovery proceedings, the place
where most of the discovery is likely to occur may be as important as
the place of the trial itself. While there is no question that the growth
of the domestic airline industry, the long-distance telephone network,
and overnight express mail has eased the problems of cross-country liti-
gation, 18 3 barriers do remain. The most obvious burden imposed by
transcontinental litigation is its financial cost. Litigation at a distant
forum is almost always more expensive than local litigation. Above
and beyond the costs of the litigation itself, the defendant will incur
additional expenses connected with: (1) travel by parties, witnesses, at-
torneys, and staff to and from the forum for court appearances, discov-
ery, and other trial preparations, (2) lodging and meals for these
individuals while they are away from home, (3) transportation of docu-
ments and exhibits, (4) time the defendant must spend away from work
due to the time consumed by travel, (5) missed business opportunities
at home, and (6) retention of local counsel. 18 4
Non-financial factors might also make litigation in one federal
court rather than another extremely burdensome to a defendant. The
unavailability of witnesses is one such consideration. There may well
be instances in which a defendant has witnesses willing to testify but
unwilling to go to a distant place to do so. There may also be witnesses
important to the defense who are unwilling to testify and who are be-
yond the compulsory process of the distant court, 185 or third-party de-
183 See, e.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-23 (1957) ("[with] the
fundamental transformation of our national economy over the years . . . has come a great in-
crease in the amount of business conducted by mail across state lines. At the same time modern
transportation and communication have made it much less burdensome for a party sued to defend
himself in a State where he engages in economic activity.").
184 See Gottlieb, In Search of the Link Between Due Process and Jurisdiction, 60 WASH. U.L.Q.
1291, 1325 (1983).
185 FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f) limits the process other than a subpoena of a federal court to the state in
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fendants who are not subject to the court's jurisdiction. 8 6 Such
problems may greatly hinder the defendant's ability to mount an ade-
quate defense in a distant forum.
In addition, other more subjective factors may bear on the diffi-
culty of litigating in a distant forum. These include the difficulty of
selecting attorneys in a community far from home' 8 7 as well as the
emotional distress induced by travel and the necessity of spending ex-
tended time away- from home. Such factors, while difficult to quantify,
may compound the burdens imposed on the defendant by distant
litigation.
Obviously, in many cases, the financial resources of the defendant
should be considered. The inability to pay the extra costs imposed by
litigation in a distant forum may force some poorer defendants to de-
fault, while wealthier defendants may be able to absorb those expenses
without much difficulty. In order to prevent the creation of a potent
weapon for plaintiffs, there must be some protection for defendants of
limited means. The defendant's ability to shoulder the added costs of
distant litigation should not be the sole criterion, however, in determin-
ing fairness to the defendant. If it were, wealthy individuals and corpo-
rate defend ants could be required to appear repeatedly before federal
courts in the far reaches of the country, despite their lack of connection
with such locations.
The factors listed above do not comprise an exhaustive list. It
would be wise for courts assessing the inconvenience to a defendant to
look also to the body of case law developed regarding transfer' 88 and
which the court is located. In addition, Rule 4(f) allows process to be served beyond the state
borders but within 100 miles of the courthouse in third-party complaints, see FED. R. Civ. P. 14,
and in instances in which defendants are joined as necessary parties under Rule 19. See FED. R.
Civ. P. 19.
Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit depositions by written questions, FED.
R. Civ. P. 31, and by telephone, FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(7), and authorize subpoenas to compel
witnesses to attend depositions in the district in which they reside, are employed, or transact busi-
ness, FED. R. Civ. P. 45(d), defendants still may be disadvantaged by their inability to require
witnesses to appear and testify in person at trial.
186 FED. R. Civ. P. 19. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 511.
187 Gottlieb, supra note 184, at 1325.
188 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1982), which permits transfer to another district court "[tior the con-
venience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice," has been interpreted by a large
number ofcourts. The statute is silent as to whether the plaintiffor defendant should shoulder the
burden of proof in change of venue motions and as to the appropriate standard of proof. The
courts have generally taken a pro-plaintiff attitude, in that they are reluctant to deprive the plain-
tiff of his choice of forum, e.g., United States Barite Corp. v. M.V. Haris, 534 F. Supp. 328, 330-31
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("A plaintiffs choice of forum is entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed
except upon a clear-cut showing by defendant that convenience and justice for all parties demands
that the litigation proceed elsewhere."), and require the defendant to make a very strong showing
of inconvenience and unavailability of witnesses in order to succeed on his motion. Eg., Bolton v.
Gramlich, 540 F. Supp. 822, 847 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("The defendants must show that the interests of
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forum non conveniens' 89 motions. Although these cases should not be
controlling because the law in those areas has developed according to
the perceived intent of Congress and notions of efficient judicial ad-
ministration rather than according to a constitutional fairness test, 90
the factors described in those cases nonetheless should provide valua-
ble guidance.
2. Reasonable Anticpation of Litigation.-The second factor in
the evaluation of whether the place of trial imposes an unfair burden
on a defendant-the defendant's reasonable anticipation of suit at the
place chosen by the plaintiff-has been heavily emphasized by the
Supreme Court in state court jurisdiction cases. The Court has stressed
that personal jurisdiction cannot be asserted over a nonresident defend-
ant based on unilateral activity initiated by the plaintiff in the forum
state. Rather, the defendant must have purposefully availed himself of
convenience and justice weigh strongly in their favor before the Court will disturb the plaintiffs'
choice of forum.")
189 Perhaps the most renowned forum non conveniens case is Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330
U.S. 501 (1947). See supra note 170. In holding that the doctrine offorum non conveniens applied
in federal courts, the Supreme Court listed a number of factors that district courts should consider
in deciding aforum non conveniens motion:
An interest to be considered, and the one likely to be most pressed, is the private interest of
the litigant. Important considerations are the relative ease of access to sources of proof;
availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining at-
tendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to
the action; and all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and
inexpensive. There may also be questions as to the enforcibility [sic] of a judgment if one is
obtained. The court will weigh relative advantages and obstacles to fair trial. It is often said
that the plaintiff may not, by choice of an inconvenient forum, "vex," "harass," or "oppress"
the defendant by inflicting upon him expense or trouble not necessary to his own right to
pursue his remedy. But unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's
choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.
Factors of public interest also have a place in applying the doctrine. Administrative diffi-
culties follow for courts when litigation is piled up in congested centers instead of being
handled at its origin. Jury duty is a burden that ought not to be imposed upon the people of a
community which has no relation to the litigation. In cases which touch the affairs of many
persons, there is reason for holding the trial in their view and reach rather than in remote
parts of the country where they learn of it by report only. There is a local interest in having
localized controversies decided at home. There is an appropriateness, too, in having the trial
of a diversity case in a forum that is at home with the state law that must govern the case,
rather than having a court in some other forum untangle problems in conflict of laws, and in
law foreign to itself.
Id. at 508-09. Since the statute permitting change of venue within the federal court system was
enacted shortly after the Gu/f Oil decision, thus obviating the need forforum non convn'nens dis-
missal in most federal cases, there has been relatively little development of the federal irum non
conveniens doctrine in recent years. The doctrine, however, survived the enactment of the transfer
provisions, 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE,
§ 3828 (1976), as the Supreme Court recently emphasized in Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S.
235 (1981), reh'g denied, 455 U.S. 928 (1982) (upholding forum non conveniens dismissal by fed-
eral district court of suit by Scottish citizens arising out of air crash in Scotland).
190 This development is clearly demonstrated by the fact that transfer and forum non con-
veniens motions have been viewed as decisions addressed to the discretion of the courts, see supra
text accompanying note 174, rather than as decisions compelled by the Constitution.
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the benefits of the forum state's laws. 19' The Supreme Court has
pointed out that this restriction on the type of conduct that should lead
a defendant reasonably to anticipate suit in a particular state "gives a
degree of predictability to the legal system that allows potential defend-
ants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance
as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit."'' 92
This kind of predictability is important to potential defendants
whether sued in federal or state court.' 93 Translating the factor of the
defendant's reasonable anticipation of suit from the state to the federal
context, however, poses the problem of determining the correct geo-
graphical frame of reference. As argued earlier, examining a defend-
ant's connection with the United States would be too lax a measure for
determining whether that defendant reasonably should have antici-
pated litigation anywhere in the country. Defining the pertinent forum
as the nation would eliminate constitutional protection for United
States citizens who are sued on the opposite side of the continent from
their totally localized operations. 194 If such a nationwide standard
were adopted, the Florida employer discussed in the first hypothetical
should not reasonably anticipate suit in any state court other than Flor-
ida's, but should reasonably anticipate suit in every federal court in the
country. r-cause this result is unsatisfactory, several alternative sug-
gestions for the appropriate geographical measure are next explored.
a. The State as Reference Point.-A number of federal courts
have resolved challenges to personal jurisdiction in federal question
cases by investigating the defendant's contacts with the state in which
the federal court is located.' 95 Although it may seem odd to rely on
191 Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 52 U.S.L.W. at 4348; World-wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. at 297; Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
192 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 297. See supra note 52.
193 While predictability is certainly an important factor that affects individuals' peace of mind
as well as their business decisions, in a sense the whole idea is circular as it is used in the context of
personal jurisdiction. Whatever the Supreme Court defines as activities that give rise to jurisdic-
tion, and as the pertinent forum in which those activities should be evaluated, will provide a basis
for predicting the location of future litigation. If the Supreme Court changes the definition, the
potential defendants will still have predictability; it will merely be based on a new standard.
194 Perhaps the idea of measuring a defendant's contacts anywhere in the United States would
be appropriate if the defendant were not a citizen or resident of the United States. In such circum-
stance: it may well be that an important government interest would warrant the assertion of per-
sonal jurisdiction by a federal court over defendants that carried on only minimal activity at each
of four or five locations in the United States. See infra notes 240-41 and accompanying text. The
applicability of due process to the analysis of personal jurisdiction over aliens, foreign states, and
international organizations is beyond the scope of this Article, however. For a discussion of appro-
priate standards for the assertion of personal jurisdiction over alien corporate defendants, see
Note, suprea note 63.
195 E.g., Stabilisierungsfonds Fur Wein v. Kaiser Stuhl Wine Distrib. Party Ltd., 647 F.2d 200
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (trademark); Chem Lab Prods., Inc. v. Stepanek, 554 F.2d 371 (9th Cir. 1977)
(patent); Fraley v. Chesapeake and Ohio Ry., 397 F.2d I (3d Cir. 1968) (Federal Employer's
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state boundaries in an analysis of the limitations the federal constitu-
tion places on federal courts, there is strong historical support for the
importance of state borders to the organization and operation of fed-
eral courts. As discussed previously, 196 beginning with the First Judici-
ary Act, Congress has ensured that federal judicial districts do not
extend across state lines, and generally has limited the process that a
federal court can issue to the state in which the federal court sits. 197 The
significance of state borders to the federal court system is also reflected
in the traditional practice whereby federal judges are largely chosen
from lawyers residing in the state in which the federal court is located.
Pragmatic reasons also favor reliance on state boundaries in the
analysis of personal jurisdiction. Viewing the states as the pertinent
areas for inquiries into whether a defendant reasonably should have
anticipated litigation at the site chosen by the plaintiff significantly nar-
rows the geographical scope of the inquiry. Accordingly, federal courts
would only need to examine the defendant's activity within one area,
and the state borders would provide a bright line to define it. More-
over, a defendant would be required to defend only in those states with
which he has a significant connection. The threat of litigation any-
where in the country when a defendant has a significant connection
with only one state would be eliminated.
It is obviously true, however, that state boundaries are not the per-
fect measure of inconvenience to a defendant. A fairness test based
solely on a defendant's minimum contacts with a state would be both
overinclusive and underinclusive. Such a test would protect defendants
who lack minimum contacts with a state but would not find it inconve-
nient to litigate there. For example, residents of Camden, New Jersey
could successfully challenge the jurisdiction of the court in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania located directly across the Delaware River in
Phildelphia so long as they lacked minimum contacts with Penn-
sylvania. On the other hand, such a test would fail to protect defend-
ants who have a significant connection with one portion of a state, no
matter how large the state or how inconvenient the site of litigation. A
defendant doing business in a small town on the Texas-New Mexico
border would be unable to challenge on constitutional grounds the ju-
risdiction of a federal court located 900 miles away in Houston.
Liability Act); Hartley v. Sioux City and New Orleans Barge Lines, Inc. 379 F.2d 354 (3d Cir.
1967) (Jones Act); Lone Star Package Car Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 212 F.2d 147 (5th Cir.
1954) (Carmack Amendment regulating interstate carriers).
196 See supra text accompanying notes 158-62.
197 See supra note 107. Since districts did not extend beyond state boundaries, see supra text
accompanying notes 160-62, the scope of process was limited to one state. In 1938 Congress
adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and expanded the scope of process to include all
judicial districts within one state. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f). See supra notes 131-34 and accompa-
nying text. For a fuller discussion of the developments affecting the scope of process, see infra
note 209.
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Because the purpose underlying the use of state borders as a refer-
ence point is to protect defendants' constitutional rights,198 the overin-
clusiveness presents less of an analytical problem than the
underinclusiveness. If some defendants are protected who do not need
198 Although the due process clause does not guarantee every defendant a convenient forum, it
does guarantee that a defendant is not forced to litigate at a site that, all circumstances considered,
is unreasonable. The proposed three-part analysis attempts to provide a structure for evaluating
the unreasonableness of a particular location. This approach preserves the pro-defendant bias that
historically has been part of due process jurisdictional analysis, yet it does not totally ignore the
plaintiff's interest in the location of litigation. Ensuring that plaintiffs have at least one forum in
which to litigate is surely a legitimate government interest, and has played a significant part in the
adoption of nationwide jurisdiction statutes. The analysis offered herein provides more than this
minimum safeguard for the plaintiff, however. Under the proposed constitutional standard, a
plaintiff's choice of forum is not displaced unless the defendant demonstrates great inconvenience
as well as lack of reasonable anticipation of being sued in that area. Nevertheless, under the
proposed analysis proposed there may be situations in which the plaintiffmust bear the burdens of
distant litigation and travel to the defendant's home if he wants to pursue his claim. For penniless
plaintiffs this may pose an insuperable obstacle.
Notwithstanding the fact that occasionally plaintiffs may lack financial resources and be un-
able to interest attorneys through a contingency fee arrangement to proceed with litigation at a
distant site, the proffered analysis is justifiable, as well as workable. Although the analysis is not
even-handed, in that it prefers the defendant over the plaintiff in those situations in which one
party must bear Lhe heavy burden of distant litigation and no countervailing interests favor main-
taining the suit in the forum chosen by the plaintiff, this approach is consonant with the Constitu-
tion and with the litigation system that has developed in this country.
A pro-defendant personal jurisdiction analysis finds support in the Constitution. The due
process clause has protected defendants from the jurisdiction of overreaching courts. It is the
defendants against whom the machinery of the government, through its courts, is activated. It is
the defendants against whom the government may enter judgments. It is the defendants whose
property may be seized by government officials and sold in order to satisfy the judgments. While
plaintiffs may have lost property due to defendants' actions or may have been injured in some way
by them, the plaintiffs' loss is caused by private parties. Because government action is not in-
volved, the due process clause is not activated.
Furthermore, the theory that a plaintiff generally should litigate where the defendant is lo-
cated has remained stable throughout the expansion in personal jurisdiction doctrine. Although
the historical justification for suing a defendant at home-the necessity of physically seizing a
defendant in order to commence a trial-is no longer pertinent, the preference for suing at the
defendant's rather than the plaintiff's home or business continues to make sense. The defendant is
an involuntary party to the suit. To the extent he remains in a defensive posture, the defendant
stands only to lose. That is, for the defendant, "winning" consists of losing nothing but his litiga-
tion expenses; the plaintiff, on the other hand, stands to gain from the action. While he too faces
litigation costs, the plaintiff will, if successful, be awarded affirmative relief from the defendant.
Thus, the plaintiff has an incentive to litigate, even if required to pursue his action at the defend-
ant's home. In addition, the pro-defendant stance regarding place of trial constitutes a deterrent
to frivolous litigation. When a plaintiff may incur some costs in initiating an action, there is a
disincentive to bringing nuisance suits.
It is true, however, that the equities that favor protecting the defendant against the plaintiff's
choice of forum will vary depending upon the particular facts of the case, including the defend-
ant's conduct and the relative resources of the parties. On the other hand, although the constitu-
tional analysis may prefer the defendant over the plaintiff if forced to make a choice between the
two, the statutory and common law provisions that regulate the place of trial above and beyond
the constitutional minimum standard do favor plaintiffs over defendants. See supra note 188.
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to be, that in itself should not invalidate the measure. Furthermore, the
proposed test makes actual inconvenience the first step of the due pro-
cess analysis, which effectively eliminates any problem of
overinclusiveness.199
The underinclusive aspect of using state borders as a measure of
inconvenience is more problematic, however. If fairness to defendants
in terms of the site of litigation warrants constitutional protection, it
does not seem appropriate to ignore such unfairness just because the
defendant should reasonably anticipate litigation in another portion of
a very large state. Although the state court jurisdiction cases have not
addressed this issue, their constitutional analysis countenances under-
inclusiveness. Because the focus initially was on sovereignty, and states
were considered sovereign over all persons within their borders, a de-
fendant's location within a state was deemed irrelevant so long as he
was somewhere within the state. Even International Shoe, which intro-
duced inconvenience to defendants into the due process analysis, re-
tained sufficient notions of sovereignty to ignore intrastate
inconvenience. Thus, there is precedent for tolerating a certain degree
of underinclusiveness.
Despite the flaw of underinclusiveness, there are practical advan-
tages to having the courts of a nation that spans a continent look to
state boundaries to determine whether it would be fair to require de-
fendants to appear and litigate in a particular location. As mentioned
earlier, a state border furnishes a bright line delineating the relevant
area. Notwithstanding the sense of arbitrariness that might be exper-
ienced in cases close to either side of the line, such a test is useful be-
cause it increases the ability to predict and plan, and thus results in a
certain decrease in litigation.
In addition to the clear boundaries that state lines provide, states
have historically been perceived as distinctly delineated geographical
and political entities. Individuals generally pay some attention to the
states they visit and to the states in which they carry on commercial
activity. This is because states pride themselves on their unique history
and publicize their comparative advantages over sister states; because
laws vary from state to state, so that individuals or companies that
spend substantial time in a state often take steps to comply with state
law;20 0 and because states literally post signs at their borders and air-
199 The defendant in Camden, New Jersey will be unable to show that litigation in Philadephia
will be truly burdensome. Therefore, the court can exercise personal jurisdiction over him without
ever reaching the issue of the defendant's reasonable anticipation of litigation in Pennsylvania.
200 For example, in California, there is a two year statute of limitations on contracts that are
not founded on a written instrument, CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 339 (West 1982), while in Florida
the analogous statute of limitations is four years, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 9511(3) (West 1982), and in
Kansas it is three years, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-512 (1983). Under Pennsylvania contracts law
consideration is not required for a written release or promise that contains an express statement
that the signer intends to be bound, 33 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6 (Purdon 1967), while Indiana
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ports welcoming travelers to their territory. As a result of such factors,
people are cognizant of state boundaries. Accordingly, even though lit-
igation may be based on federal law, it seems workable and reasonable
to conclude that a defendant who has a substantial connection with a
state should be able to anticipate that he might be sued in a federal
court in that state.20'
There are also some obvious disadvantages to the use of state lines
to determine the geographical areas in which defendants reasonably
should anticipate litigation. First, as indicated above, state borders
often do not provide an accurate measure of inconvenience to defend-
ants. Second, the standard imposes state territorial limits as a constitu-
tional restraint on a federal system. The measure requires units of the
federal government to function in as circumscribed a manner as units
of the constituent state governments, and forecloses the possibility of
federal courts responding to litigation problems that are national in
scope. Because it essentially limits federal courts "by the due process
restrictions imposed on the states by the fourteenth amendment as op-
posed to those imposed on the federal government by the fifth amend-
ment,"20 2 this approach presents a jarring anomaly.
Furthermore, this standard might impede congressional experi-
ments with multistate districts. While no such legislation is pending,
federal judicial districts that cover more than one state might be partic-
ularly appropriate in some instances. For example, if Congress created
a set of specialized federal courts to hear water pollution cases, a sensi-
ble organization would be to assign one court to each of the major river
basins in the United States. Under such a scheme, the district for the
Colorado River basin would cover territory in Colorado, Utah, Ari-
law provides that consideration is an essential element of every contract. Poetz v. Cozmas, 237
Ind. 500, 147 N.E.2d 227 (1958). In California, strict liability in tort does not extend to economic
losses, Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 403 P.2d 145 (1965), while New
Jersey permits strict liability for commercial losses as well as for physical harm to person and
property, Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
Differences in state laws also loom large in noncommercial activity. For example, in Nevada
noncompatibility is a recognized ground for divorce, Nav. REV. STAT. § 125.010 (1983), and the
statute requires only that one party to the marriage reside in Nevada for at least six weeks preced-
ing the commencement of the action, NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.020 (1983). Incompatibility is not a
ground for divorce in Ohio, see OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.01 (1983), and the law requires that
the plaintiff in a divorce proceeding have resided in Ohio for a minimum of six months, OHIo
Rav. CODE ANN. § 3105.03.
201 For a discussion of the circularity involved in defining reasonable anticipation of suit, see
supra note 193. The priority is to select a standard and identify it publicly, so that people and
businesses can plan their affairs accordingly. Yet, selecting the state as the appropriate territory
has the advantage of symmetry. Based on the same type of activities in the same area, the defend-
ant can reasonably anticipate suit in state or federal court.
202 DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 284 (3d Cir.), cer. denied, 454 U.S.
1085 (1981).
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zona, Nevada, and California.203 Thus, a constitutional test that lim-
ited a federal court's assertion of personal jurisdiction by only
questioning whether a defendant carried on activity in the state in
which the federal court was located would be too restrictive.
b. The Judicial District As Reference Point-Rather than using
state borders as the pertinent measure of whether a defendant's activity
should have led him to anticipate being sued in the court chosen by the
plaintiff, it may be more appropriate to rely on the boundaries of the
federal judicial districts. In fact, some courts have responded to juris-
dictional challenges by investigating whether the defendant has mini-
mum contacts with the federal judicial district in which the court is
located.204 Under the current organization of the federal courts the ju-
dicial district approach is often identical to the state approach. Indeed,
twenty-six of the federal judicial districts are statewide districts. 205 The
other twenty-four states are divided into sixty-three districts, with two
to four districts per state.20 6 Under a judicial district approach, when
faced with a constitutional challenge to personal jurisdiction that ne-
cessitates an evaluation of a defendant's reasonable expectation of liti-
gation, approximately one-third of the federal courts would examine
the defendant's statewide activity, while two-thirds of the districts
would examine his activity in a portion of a state.
As discussed earlier,20 7 the judicial district approach has some his-
torical support. Although the Constitution does not require that the
federal courts be arranged into any particular system of judicial dis-
tricts, throughout the history of the nation the federal judicial districts
have always been organized so that none is larger than a single state.208
203 Similarly, a district that encompassed the Mississippi River basin might include the states of
Minnesota, Wisconsin, Iowa and Illinois.
204 See Hartley v. Sioux City & New Orleans Barge Lines, 379 F.2d 354, 359 (3d Cir. 1967);
Lone Star Package Car v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 212 F.2d 147, 152 (5th Cir. 1954).
205 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 81-131 (1982). The statewide judicial districts include: Alaska, Arizona,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Min-
nesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota,
Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, and Wyoming. In addi-
tion, the District of Columbia comprises one judicial district, 28 U.S.C. § 88 (1982), as does Puerto
Rico, 28 U.S.C. § 119 (1982). There are also federal district courts in Guam, 48 U.S.C. § 1424
(1976). the Northern Mariana Islands, 48 U.S.C. §§ 1694-94a (1976 & Supp. V 1981), and the
Virgin Islands. 48 U.S.C. §§ 1611-12 (1982).
206 There are two federal judicial districts in the following states: Arkansas, Indiana, Iowa,
Kentucky. Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Ohio, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wis-
consin. There are three federal judicial districts in the following states: Alabama, Florida, Geor-
gia, Illinois, Louisiana, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania and Tennessee. There are four
federal judicial districts in the following states: California, New York, and Texas. See 28 U.S.C.
§§ 81-131 (1982).
207 See supra text accompanying notes 163-65.
208 The one brief exception is described in supra note 161. See also supra text accompanying
note 160.
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In addition, for 150 years Congress limited federal courts' process to
their own districts. 20 9 Both the creation of localized judicial districts
and the limitations on process served to ensure that defendants sued in
the federal system would not be required to litigate at a great distance
from home.
Using judicial districts as reference points for measuring a defend-
ant's reasonable anticiption of suit has many of the advantages and
disadvantages of the state approach. Again, the judicial district bound-
aries provide a bright line, clearly defining a limited geographical area
within which to evaluate the nature and extent of the defendant's activ-
ity. Again, the measure is not perfectly correlated to the defendant's
convenience; instances of overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness
would still occur. Because many judicial districts are smaller than the
states in which they are located, the judicial district approach is likely
to be more overinclusive and less underinclusive than the state ap-
proach. Thus, the defendant's potential exposure is more limited, as is
his potential inconvenience. Since, as explained above,210 the extent of
underinclusiveness is more troubling than the extent of overinclusive-
ness, in this regard the judicial district approach is superior to the state
209 Sectioi. ! I of the Judiciary Act of 1789, quoted in pertinent part supra note 107, limited the
process issued by a federal court to the district in which the court was located. See supra text
accompanying note 163. When the Judiciary Act was revised in 1887, service of process was
limited to the district where the defendant resided. Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 1, 24 Stat. 5521.
The Judicial Code of 1911, Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, 36 Stat. 1087, retained the general
rule that process was limited to the district where the federal court was located (§ 5 1), but permit-
ted five exceptions (§§ 52, 54-57). Three of the exceptions permitted process to be served in other
districts within the same state: (1) in non-local suits when the defendants lived in different districts
within the same state (§ 52); (2) in local suits when the defendant lived in the same state but in a
different district from the one in which suit was filed (§ 54); (3) in local suits when the claim
concerned land or other subject matter of fixed character lying in more than one district within the
same state (§ 55). Service of process was permitted beyond the state but within the judicial circuit
in which the court was located when the claim concerned land or other property of fixed character
lying in different states within the same judicial circuit (§ 56). In addition, service of process was
permitted throughout the country in in rem suits filed to enforce or remove a lien on the title to
real or personal property when the defendant was not an inhabitant of the district in which the
property was located (§ 57). 36 Stat. 1099-1103. Thus, throughout the nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries a federal court generally could not issue effective process beyond the boundaries of
the federal judicial district in which it was located. On rare occasions, however, process was
authorized beyond the state in certain limited areas of the law. See infra text accompanying notes
253-79 (discussion of nationwide service of process statutes).
The adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938 significantly expanded the
scope by allowing process to be served anywhere within the state in which the federal court is
located. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(0. The Rules also allowed a federal court to rely on state statutes
authorizing process on out-of-state defendants. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e). In 1963, the Federal
Rules were amended to allow process on defendants located beyond the state (1) when a state
long-arm statute would permit it or (2) when certain defendants are within 100 miles from the
federal courthouse. Consequently, in terms of federal service of process, the current geographical
focus tends to be on the state.
210 See supra text accompanying note 198.
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approach. In addition, as mentioned earlier,211 overinclusiveness
would not be a problem because the constitutional analysis is not trig-
gered unless the defendant demonstrates that the place of trial would
present a significant inconvenience.
Viewing the federal judicial district rather than the state as the
pertinent territory for evaluating whether a defendant could reasonably
anticipate the place of trial selected by a plaintiff avoids the anomaly of
endowing state borders with constitutional significance in the context of
fifth amendment due process analysis. Instead, the assessment of the
fairness of the exercise of a federal court's power would depend on
boundaries defined by federal statute. Furthermore, focusing on judi-
cial districts rather than states would permit greater flexibility for rear-
rangement of the federal court system to meet special federal needs. 21 2
On the other hand, there is a major disadvantage in viewing the
federal judicial district as the appropriate reference point. In contrast to
state borders, the boundaries of federal judicial districts are largely in-
visible to the general population. More important, federal judicial dis-
tricts generally are not perceived as separate government entities, with
distinct histories and laws that differ from those of neighboring judicial
districts.21 3 Therefore, people, organizations, and businesses have little
reason to pay attention to the federal judicial districts in which they are
active. Accordingly, their reasonable expectations regarding the poten-
tial location of litigation are much more likely to be framed in terms of
the states, rather than the judicial districts, in which they carry on their
activities.
c. The Regional Approach.-)Whatever bright line is chosen-
the state or the federal judicial district-instances of overinclusiveness
and underinclusiveness may occur. In metropolitan areas that stretch
across state lines and encompass more than one judicial district,214 dis-
tinctions based on state or judicial district boundaries are particularly
unsatisfactory as elements of a test for evaluating the constitutionality
of assertions of jurisdiction over defendants. An alternative method of
211 See supra text accompanying notes 198-99.
212 This is not a concession that a reorganization of the federal courts into one nationwide
district or even three or four districts that encompass the whole country would necessarily lead to
constitutional assertions of personal jurisdiction over all defendants within the district or districts.
Again, distance might magnify the inconvenience to a defendant to such an extent that, in the
absence of overwhelming federal interests, there would be instances of unconstitutional assertions
of personal jurisdiction even by the federal court in its own district. This is a problem to be left to
the future since no such rearrangement is pending now.
213 Although federal judicial districts often adopt local court rules, these largely concern ad-
ministrative and procedural technicalities that do not affect the general public.
214 For example, the metropolitan area surrounding New York City stretches into three states
(New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut) and five federal judicial districts (Southern District of
New York, Eastern District of New York, Northern District of New York, District of New Jersey,
and District of Connecticut).
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investigating the defendant's reasonable anticipation of litigation is to
eschew political divisions and adopt a regional approach. Under this
approach, which takes a commonsense view of the realities of contem-
porary society and recognizes the increase in widespread commercial
activity and in personal mobility, courts would evaluate the extent of
the defendant's activity in the general region where the federal court is
located. Relying on public perception and economic and social reali-
ties to define the pertinent region, courts could decide on a case-by-case
basis whether the nature and quality of the defendant's activity in a
particular region make it reasonable to require a defendant to litigate
there. A regional approach would allow federal courts situated in a
megalopolis to exercise personal jurisdiction over defendants from the
nearest two or three states.21 5 In addition, it might yield rare situations
in which a federal court could not exercise jurisdiction over a defend-
ant located in the hinterlands of the state in which the court is
located.216
The greatest disadvantage to the regional approach is its lack of
bright lines. The standard has the potential to generate a great deal
more constitutional litigation. Litigants would no doubt dispute the
definition of the pertinent region as well as the extent of the defendant's
activity wi&.in the region. Yet, while these disputes may be time-con-
suming, they do not present insoluble problems. The courts have
proven themselves competent to resolve similar arguments that arise in
other contexts, such as quarrels concerning the relevant labor. market in
employment discrimination suits. 217 Therefore, leaving the determina-
tion of the appropriate region with regard to a particular case to the
courts is not unworkable.
The more serious problem posed by the lack of bright lines in the
regional approach is the possibility that the pertinent region may not be
well enough defined in advance that one can accurately say that a de-
fendant's acts in that region should have led him to anticipate litigation
in that region. For example, while a defendant who carries on activity
in Newark, New Jersey, probably would not dispute a statement char-
215 See supra note 214.
216 For example, the federal court for the Eastern District of Texas in Beaumont might lack
jurisdiction over a defendant who resides in El Paso, which is located across the state in the West-
ern District of Texas. The distance between Beaumont and El Paso is further than the distance
between Portland, Maine and Raleigh, North Carolina-a distance that incidentally traverses the
borders of 12 states. Cf. Oxford First Corp. v. PNC Liquidating Corp., 372 F. Supp. 191, 201
(E.D. Pa. 1974).
217 In discrimination cases based on statistical proof, a number of factors affect the definition of
the proper scope of the statistics. "The relevant geographic area may be the city or county in
which the employer is located, the standard metropolitan statistical area [SMSA] or, in unusual
circumstances, an entire state, region or nationwide. [sic]" B. SCHLEt & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOY-
MENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 326 (1979 Supp.). See Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433
U.S. 299, 308, 312 (1977); Lim v. Citizens Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 430 F. Supp. 802 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
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acterizing his activity as occurring within the New York City metropol-
itan region, a defendant whose activity is limited to Trenton, New
Jersey, might be quite surprised to discover that his acts occurred
within either the New York City or the Philadelphia metropolitan re-
gion or both. Similarly, it might be unclear whether actions taken in
Portland, Maine, 120 miles from the Boston city hall, fall within the
Greater Boston region. On the other hand, as the case law developed,
the definitions of appropriate regions for certain types of defendants
and cases would probably become quite well-known. Therefore, most
defendants would be able to forecast accurately the pertinent region in
which they should anticipate suit.218
Despite its disadvantages, the regional standard may be the most
satisfactory approach. It accurately reflects the amount of contempo-
rary interstate commerce and travel. It ignores artificial boundaries, a
step that is appropriate to an analysis that attempts to protect defend-
ants against actions that are fundamentally unfair. Further, since
courts would not examine a defendant's reasonable anticipation of liti-
gation in a region unless the defendant had satisfied the first require-
ment by demonstrating that the site of litigation is truly inconvenient,
whatever difficulties the regional approach entails would be raised in
relatively few instances. In those instances the courts would be able to
take into account the nature and extent of the defendant's activity, as
well as the particular circumstances of the case, in defining the appro-
priate region.219
If courts are uncomfortable with the regional approach, it would
be possible to combine two different approaches to yield an alternative
measure for determining the geographical area in which a defendant
218 See supra note 193.
219 Although the issue of constitutional limitations on state court assertion of personal jurisdic-
tion in federal question cases is beyond the scope of this Article, adopting a regional standard for
the proposed test raises the possibility that this test could only be applied to litigation in the
federal court system. But see DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 292-93 (3d
Cir. 1981) (Gibbons, J., dissenting) ("[W]ere a state court adjudicating a federal claim, the rele-
vant due process standard should remain the fifth amendment. The nature of the claim, not the
identity of the court, should determine the appropriate due process test. . . . [If the New Jersey
legislature has placed no] restriction on the constitutionally exercisable scope of jurisdiction, ...
a New Jersey court need consider only the issue of fifth amendment fairness in determining
whether to assert personal jurisdiction over the foreign defendant.").
If a state court hearing a suit arising under the federal law cannot constitutionally assert
jurisdiction over a defendant who is beyond the state's borders but within the region that encom-
passes a state, then selection of a regional approach or a hybrid state-regional analysis, see infra
text accompanying notes 220-21, would yield jurisdictional disparities between federal and state
courts. Such disparities could, lead to forum shopping. On the other hand, disparities in the scope
of personal jurisdiction exercised by federal and state courts currently exist, and have not been
identified as major factors in forum shopping. Furthermore, it may be appropriate that the consti-
tutional standard for jurisdiction asserted by state courts differs from that applied to federal
courts, which form one branch of a larger and more powerful national government.
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should reasonably anticipate ligitation. For example, a court could use
the state territory as the floor and the regional territory as the ceiling
for determining the appropriate area. That is, if a defendant reason-
ably could have anticipated litigation in the state in which the federal
court is located, then an assertion of personal jurisdiction would satisfy
due process and the court would not need to concern itself with deter-
mining the pertinent region. If the defendant could not reasonably
have anticipated litigation in the state in which the court is located,
however, the court would not automatically conclude that it would be
unconstitutional to exercise personal jurisdiction. Instead, the court
would then determine the appropriate region, given the nature and ex-
tent of the defendant's activities and the type of claim asserted, and
evaluate whether the defendant's activities in that region should have
led the defendant to anticipate litigation in that region. For example, if
a defendant headquartered in California whose only out of state activ-
ity entails an extensive amount of business with a local concern in
Trenton, New Jersey, could show that litigation in New Jersey would
impose a real hardship, the New Jersey federal court would nonetheless
be able to assert personal jurisdiction because the defendant should
reasonably have anticipated litigation in New Jersey. If the same de-
fendant were sued in a federal court located in New York City, how-
ever, before the court exercised personal jurisdiction, it would have to
examine whether the defendant should reasonably have anticipated be-
ing sued in the region that included New York City.220 If the defend-
ant could not reasonably have had such an expectation, thenf the court
should refuse to assert jurisdiction unless the third factor of the due
process test came into play and countervailing government interests
overrode the inconvenience and surprise to the defendant.
Although this hybrid approach relies in part on state boundaries, it
would avoid the anomaly of imposing state territorial limits as a consti-
tutional restraint on federal courts. The state borders would not limit
the fifth amendment due process analysis. Instead, by serving only as a
minimum definition of the territory in which a defendant should rea-
sonably anticipate litigation, the state borders would merely furnish a
convenient bottom line to assist federal courts in resolving constitu-
tional challenges to personal jurisdiction.
It should be noted that such a hybrid state-regional approach has
already been adopted by the federal courts in certain limited contexts.
When third-party claims are filed and when parties are joined pursuant
to Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4(f) allows
federal courts to exercise personal jurisdiction not only over defendants
220 Because the facts of this hypothetical indicate that the defendant had no connection at all
with New York, the first inquiry of the hybrid approach-whether the defendant reasonably could
have anticipated suit in the state in which the federal court is located-would be answered in the
negative. Thus, the regional evajuation would be necessary.
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within the state, but also over defendants who are beyond the state, as
long as they are within 100 miles of the courthouse.221 In those circum-
stances, the federal courts essentially rely on state boundaries, but also
can reach out into the surrounding 100 mile region. While the 100 mile
radius is probably too small to be used in a fifth amendment analysis of
personal jurisdiction,222 the adoption of a hybrid state-regional ap-
proach under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is a useful prece-
dent for the constitutional analysis proposed in this Article.
Finally, it should be emphasized that Congress can reduce due
process challenges to federal courts' assertions of personal jurisdiction
by setting precise guidelines that localize the site of litigation more than
the due process clause requires. 223 If Congress followed such a course,
and, for example, only permitted federal courts to exercise personal ju-
risdiction in the federal judicial districts in which the claim arose, in
which the defendant does business, or in which the defendant resides-
all of which are places where the defendant should reasonably antici-
pate suit-the constitutional challenges to personal jurisdiction would
drastically diminish.224 The due process test proposed here would then
221 FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f) provides:
(f) Territorial Limits of Effective Service. All process other than a subpoena may be
served anywhere within the territorial limits of the state in which the district court is held,
and, when authorized by a statute of the United States or by these rules, beyond the territorial
limits of that state. In addition, persons who are brought in as parties pursuant to Rule 14, or
as additional parties to a pending action or a counterclaim or cross-claim therein pursuant to
Rule 19, may be served in the manner stated in paragraphs (1)-(6) of subdivision (d) of this
rule at all places outside the state but within the United States that are not more than 100
miles from the place in which the action is commenced, or to which it is assigned or trans-
ferred for trial; and persons required to respond to an order of commitment for civil contempt
may be served at the same places. A subpoena may be served within the territorial limits
provided in Rule 45.
222 Nevertheless, since factors such as ease of transportation so significantly affect the burden
that geographical distance may impose on litigants, even a 150 mile trip might be onerous in some
circumstances. Consenquently, in developing a constitutional fairness test it is unwise to place
great emphasis on distance alone.
223 Some commentators have suggested federal legislative schemes to regularize the exercise of
personal jurisdiction by federal courts and to ensure a reasonably convenient federal forum. See,
e.g., Barrett, Venue and Service of Process in the Federal Courts-Suggestionsfor Reform, 7 VAND.
L. Rav. 608, 627-35 (1954); Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute (pt. 2), 36
U. C Hi. L. REv. 268, 299-311 (1969); Foster, Judicial Economy,; Fairness and Con venience of Place
of Trial.- Long-Arm Jurisdiction in District Courts, 47 F.R.D. 73, 105-11 (1968). See also
Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "'Power" Myth and Forum Con-
veniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956) (proposing legislation to allow interstate transfer of cases, regu-
lated by venue rules based on the reasonable connection of the lawsuit to the forum); von Mehren
& Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1121 (1966)
(proposing rules to guide assertion of personal jurisdiction, emphasizing litigation convenience
and relationship of parties and underlying controversy to forum).
224 The general venue provisions currently in effect limit the site of a suit based on a claim
arising under federal law or based on other non-diversity grounds to the district in which all
defendants reside or in which the claim arose. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1982). Corporations are
deemed to reside in any judicial district in which they are incorporated, licensed to do business, or
doing business. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(1982). Thus, when these sections are applicable, they limit
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
be needed only in those instances in which Congress authorized per-
sonal jurisdiction over defendants who lacked such a connection with
the district in which the federal court is located.
As this discussion indicates, the second factor of the proposed test
is not without difficulty. The Supreme Court has emphasized the de-
fendant's reasonable anticipation of litigation in the state court juris-
diction cases because of the importance of providing potential
defendants with a degree of predictability about the site of future litiga-
tion. While predictability is also important to litigants in the federal
court system, selecting the appropriate frame of reference is problem-
atic. Adopting either a regional measure or a hybrid state-regional ap-
proach, however, appears to present a satisfactory solution.
3. Government Interests-Despite the great inconvenience to a
particular defendant and the fact that he could not have anticipated
being sued in the place chosen by the plaintiff, significant government
interests may be furthered by allowing the suit at the challenged loca-
tion. Yet to date, few federal interests have been identified that would
justify imposing a seriously burdensome place of trial on a defendant.
Congress has not enacted an extensive legislative scheme regulating the
personal juisdiction of federal courts.225 As a result, federal courts
generally rely on the long-arm statute of the state in which they sit
when they assert jurisdiction over defendants located great distances
from the site of the litigation.226 These statutes reflect the views of state
legislatures as to the necessity and wisdom of obtaining personal juris-
diction over nonresidents,227 and consequently reveal nothing about
the federal interests that might be futhered by permitting litigation in
the site of litigation to one that a defendant could reasonably anticipate. The provisions of 28
U.S.C. § 1391(a)(1982), however, permit diversity suits to be filed in the district in which all the
plaintiffs reside, as well as the one in which all the defendants reside or in which the claim arose.
Obviously under this provision suits may be filed in areas of the country where the defendant
could have had no reasonable expectation of litigation.
225 Other than in the relatively few instances in which nationwide personal jurisdiction statutes
enacted in certain specified areas of the law apply, see infra notes 253-81 and accompanying text,
the only regulation guiding the exercise of personal jurisdiction by the federal courts is Rule 4(f)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 4(f) limits process to the territorial limits of the
state in which the federal court is held unless a federal statute or rule provides otherwise. See
supra notes 133 & 185. Rule 4(e) permits a federal court to rely on state long-arm statutes to serve
process beyond the territory of the state.
226 FED. R. Civ. P. 4. See, e.g., DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 284 (3d
Cir.) (New Jersey federal district court hearing admiralty claim relied on New Jersey long-arm
rule), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1085 (1981); Stabilisierungsfonds Fur Wein v. Kaiser Stuhl Wine
Distrib. Party Ltd., 647 F.2d 200, 204 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (federal court in District of Columbia relied
on District of Columbia's long-arm statute in suit alleging violation of federal trademark law).
227 See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 440 (1952) (" 'Provisions for
making foreign corporations subject to service in the State is a matter of legislative discretion
.... ") (quoting Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Clarendon Boat Oar Co., 257 U.S. 533, 535 (1922)). See
also Stabilisierungsfonds Fur Wein v. Kaiser Stuhl Wine Distrib. Party Ltd., 647 F.2d at 204
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certain locations. Nonetheless, since Congress has expressed little dis-
satisfaction with this arrangement,22 8 it appears that in its view the in-
terests of the federal government are in general adequately served
when federal courts are subject to the same personal jurisdiction stan-
dards as state courts. This state of affairs provides strong evidence that
federal courts should be reluctant to exercise personal jurisdiction over
defendants who reside at distant locations when the place of trial would
seriously inconvenience those defendants and they could not reason-
ably have anticipated being sued there.
Congress has, however, enacted statutes on occasion that authorize
federal courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over defendants located
beyond the state in which the federal court sits.229 Indeed, a few fed-
eral statutes, examined below, allow personal jurisdiction over defend-
ants located anywhere in the United States.230 Only in relatively rare
instances has Congress indicated that it believes important government
interests necessitate a broad exercise of personal jurisdiction by federal
courts. The infrequency of nationwide personal jurisdiction statutes
during the 200 years since the federal court system was organized pro-
vides further evidence that federal courts should hesitate before assert-
ing personal jurisdiction over defendants located far beyond the region
surrounding the court.
This is not to say that significant government interests should be
ignored under the proposed due process test. There may be occasions
when the interests of the federal government outweigh the burden im-
posed on a defendant. If a plaintiff makes such a contention, the court
should afford it due consideration, evaluating both the importance of
the government interests23t asserted and the extent to which they would
be thwarted by a denial of personal jurisdiction.
Although it is difficult to identify all pertinent federal interests in
("[T]he local long-arm statute. . . was drafted from the point of view of the District [of Colum-
bia] community, not from the perspective of the nation as a whole.").
228 Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has been in effect since the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure were promulgated in 1938. See supra note 209. When the Rules were amended in
1963, Rule 4(e), which had only referred to service on nonresidents of the state pursuant to a
federal statute, was revised to include express authorization for federal courts to rely on state long-
arm statutes for service on nonresidents. The rule's proscription against service of process beyond
the state was retained. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f). The revisions of the Rules of Civil Procedure in
1966, 1970, 1980, and 1983 made no substantive changes in Rule 4(e) or 4(f). But see infra notes
318-29 and accompanying text.
229 See supra note I1. For a description of the historical development of the expansion of
federal court process, see supra note 209.
230 See infra notes 252-75 and accompanying text.
231 See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 347 (1976) ("[E]xperience with the constitu-
tionalizing of government procedures suggests that the ultimate additonal cost in terms of money
and adminstrative burden would not be insubstantial."). Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168
(Powell, J., concurring) ("[Tlhe Government's interest in being able to act expeditiously to remove
an unsatisfactory employee is substantial."), reh'g denied, 417 U.S. 977 (1974).
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the abstract, surely one such interest would be the desire to provide a
forum for suits beyond the effective reach of any state.~2 For example,
the current federal interpleader statute permits a broad exercise of per-
sonal jurisdiction in order to circumvent the difficulties that state courts
confront in multi-party, multi-state controversies.233
The interest of the federal courts in judicial economy also would
be an important factor to consider.2 34 As a general proposition, the
duplication that occurs in having parts of the same lawsuit conducted
in different federal courts should be avoided.235 In addition, the ad-
verse impact on litigation caused when no court hears the whole con-
troversy should be taken into account.236 These very concerns
prompted the oldest nationwide personal jurisdiction statute, which
was enacted to allow the United States to sue all members of a nation-
wide business monopoly in a single court.237 The concern for judicial
economy has never been deemed absolute, however. If it were, due
process protection for defendants would vanish, in contravention of the
Supreme Court's admonition in Shaffer that the objective of simplify-
ing litigation cannot be allowed to override the objectives of fair play
232 See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 437-41 (1969).
233 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (1982) provides:
In any civil action of interpleader or in the nature of interpleader under section 1335 of this
title, a district court may issue its process for all claimants and enter its order restraining them
from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in any State or United States court affecting
the property, instrument or obligation involved in the interpleader action until further order
of the court. Such process and order shall be returnable at such time as the court or judge
thereof directs, and shall be addressed to and served by the United States marshals for the
respective districts where the claimants reside or may be found.
Such district court shall hear and determine the case, and may discharge the plaintiff
from further liability, make the injunction permanent, and make all appropriate orders to
enforce its judgment.
The genesis of the federal interpleader provisions is described infra notes 25 8-62 and accompany-
ing text.
234 The federal interest in judicial economy has been clearly expressed in the liberal joinder of
claims and parties provisions contained in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See FED. R. Civ.
P. 18, 20.
The underlying policy of the Rules of Civil Procedure is the settlement at one time of all
controversies between all parties whose disputes involve common questions of law and fact,
and such objective cannot be achieved without proceeding in civil cases beyond some of the
limitations once associated with equity's rules ofjoinder.
6 CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE § 20.18 (3d ed. 1981)(footnote omitted).
235 See, e.g., Oxford First Corp. v. PNC Liquidating Corp., 372 F. Supp. 191, 202 (E.D. Pa.
1974) ("The work of this Court in managing this piece of litigation will be substantial, whether or
not the St. Claire defendants are part of the suit before us. In terms ofjudicial economy, would it
not be shamefully wasteful to require what is all part of a single litigation to proceed in two
districts at once?"), discussed infra text accompanying notes 243-49.
236 See, e.g., id. at 202 ("[Allowing] what is part of a single litigation to proceed in two districts
at once. . . would markedly impair the present litigation by shearing off an integral part thereof,
as well as lead to duplication of effort by counsel and the courts."). See also supra note 234.
237 The Sherman Act of 1890, 26 Stat. 209, contained a provision authorizing unlimited per-
sonal jurisdiction. See infra notes 253-57 and accompanying text.
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and substantial justice.238
The federal government's interest in suits involving other nations
and their citizens, an interest fraught with diplomatic and international
law overtones, is another significant factor that could justifiably affect
the scope of personal jurisdiction authorized by Congress. For exam-
ple, Congress might decide that this interest justifies limiting the asser-
tion of personal jurisdiction over a foreign state or ambassador to the
federal court in Washington, D.C., the nation's capital.239 Similarly,
the interest of the federal government in regulating activity undertaken
in the United States by foreign nationals or foreign corporations is also
a factor that might affect the scope of personal jurisdiction authorized
by Congress. Congress might deem it important that federal courts, in
determining whether to assert personal jurisdiction, examine the aggre-
gate of an alien defendant's contacts with the United States, 240 thus
ensuring that a foreign defendant who carried on a small amount of
activity in a number of different states could be sued in at least one
federal court in the United States.24'
No doubt other legitimate federal interests will be identified by
courts and advanced by Congress. 242 Because the protection of indi-
238 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 211. See supra text accompanying note 86.
239 In fact, Congress adopted a different approach in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976. The Act confers jurisdiction on the federal district courts of suits involving foreign states
that conduct commercial activity in the United States or elsewhere, if the activity causes a direct
effect in the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2)(1982). The Act also confers jurisdiction over
foreign states in other limited circumstances. Id. § 1605 (a)(l)-(5). The Act authorizes the federal
courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over all foreign states subject to suit under the Act, id.
§ 1330(b), and permits suit to be filed in any district in which a substantial part of the relevant
activity occurred or the property is located, id. § 1391(0(1); in any district in which the instrumen-
tality of a foreign state is doing business or is licensed to do business, id. § 1391(f) (3); or in the
District of Columbia. Id. § 1391(0(4).
240 Holt v. Klosters Rederi, 355 F. Supp., 354, 358 (W.D. Mich. 1973) (district court exercised
personal jurisdiction over Norwegian corporation that had no contacts with Michigan because
"[t]aken as a whole, defendant's contacts with the United States, both qualitatively and quantita-
tively are constitutionally sufficient. . . . It has promoted its product on a national scale ... ").
See also Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 416 (9th Cir. 1977) (Con-
gress must adopt nationwide approach to personal jurisdiction). See also Note, supra note 63.
241 See Centronics Data Computer Corp. v. Mannesmann, A.G., 432 F. Supp. 659, 664
(D.N.H. 1977) (in antitrust suit by U.S. corporation against multinational conglomerate head-
quartered in Germany, New Hampshire federal court upheld personal jurisdiction after finding
that the place of trial posed no inconvenience to the defendant despite defendant's lack of pur-
poseful activity in New Hampshire, stating: "[I]t is possible for a foreign corporation to have very
substantial contacts with the nation as a whole in different states without having sufficient contacts
with any one state so as to give that state jurisdiction. Such a corporation could commit serious
torts or contract breaches without ever having enough contacts with any one forum to give those
injured an opportunity to seek redress."). See also Marc Rich Co. v. United States, 707 F.2d 663,
667 (2d Cir. 1983); Note, supra note 63, at 474-78.
242 See infra text accompanying notes 253-81 for a discussion of federal interests that are fur-
thered when federal courts are allowed to exercise personal jurisdiction over defendants in a
broad geographical area.
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viduals from government oppression is at the heart of the determina-
tion of the proper exercise of personal jurisdiction, it is impossible to
evaluate these interests in advance. As federal courts are faced with
actual challenges to statutes or rules permitting assertions of jurisdic-
tion over defendants for whom place of trial is inconvenient and unan-
ticipated, they will be able to develop guidelines based on concrete
factual situations.
B. Case Law
The one reported decision that attempted to formulate a detailed
test for evaluating the fifth amendment limitations on the exercise of
personal jurisdiction by federal courts fashioned an analysis that is sub-
stantially similar to the balancing test proposed in this article. In Ox-
ford First Corp. v. PNC Liquidating Corp.,243 Judge Becker of the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
reasoned that the International Shoe requirement of minimum contacts
between a defendant and the state in which the court is located does
not apply directly to the exercise of federal court jurisdiction. 244 Never-
theless, the court concluded that International Shoe mandates that fed-
eral courts 2pply a broad fairness standard in exercising jurisdiction
over defendants located beyond the state in which the court sits.245 To
give content to its constitutional fairness test, the court listed five fac-
243 372 F. Supp. 191 (E.D. Pa. 1974). A Pennsylvania corporation, Oxford First Corporation
(Oxford), contracted to purchase the assets of Paragon National Corporation (Paragon), an auto
leacing business. This contract was based in part on Paragon's planned acquisition of another
auto leasing concern, St. Claire Finance Corporation (St. Claire). Oxford later filed suit in federal
court in Pennsylvania alleging violations of the federal securities laws, and naming as defendants
some St. Claire shareholders who resided in California. The defendants were served pursuant to
the federal statute authorizing nationwide service of process in securities cases, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa
(1970). Asserting that they had no connection with Pennsylvania, the California defendants chal-
lenged the jurisdiction of the federal court in Pennsylvania on statutory and constitutional
grounds.
The district court ruled that the due process clause of the fifth amendment places some limita-
tions on nationwide service of process. Although other federal question cases have adopted a
fairness standard in evaluating constitutional challenges to the assertion of personal jurisdiction
over defendants who are beyond the boundaries of the state in which the federal court is located,
see supra notes 88-97 and accompanying text, Oxford First is the only reported opinion that at-
temptcd to fashion explicit criteria to guide such a fairness inquiry. The Third Circuit was not
presented with an appeal of the Oxford decision. The Third Circuit has indicated, however, that
it also takes a fundamental fairness rather than sovereignty view of the scope of personal jurisdic-
tion that may be exercised by the federal courts. See DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654
F.2d 280, 284 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1085 (1981); Fraley v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 397
F.2d 1.3 3d Cir. 1968); Hartley v. Sioux City & New Orleans Barge Lines, 379 F.2d 354 (3d Cir.
1967).
244 Oxford First Corp. v. PNC Liquidating Corp., 372 F. Supp. at 203.
245 Id. The court's approach specifically evaluated the inconvenience to the defendant caused
by the litigation site as well as the interests related to the orderly administration of justice. See
infra note 246.
79:1 (1984) Personal Jurisdiction
tors that a federal court should evaluate before exercising personal ju-
risdiction: (1) the extent of the defendant's contacts with the site of the
litigation; (2) the inconvenience the site imposes on the defendant; (3)
the effect, from a judicial economy perspective, of dismissing the de-
fendant from the suit; (4) the likely location of discovery proceedings in
the case, and (5) the impact of the defendant's activity beyond his state
of residence. 246
The second and fourth factors enumerated in Oxford First both
relate to the amount of inconvenience a defendant would suffer due to
the location of litigation. The first and fifth factors can be subsumed
under the reasonable anticipation of litigation category of the three-
part test proposed in this Article. The third factor, which focuses on
judicial economy, falls within the government interests component dis-
cussed here.
The court in Oxford First did not assign weights to the various
factors, nor did it prescribe a sequence in which they should be consid-
ered. The court did, however, in its inventory of subsidiary considera-
tions affecting each of the factors,247 indicate that careful attention
should be paid to the practical concerns of contemporary litigation.248
246 The court stated:
First, a court should determine the extent of the defendant's contacts with the place where the
action was brought; i.e., the International Shoe type criteria. Second, a court should weigh
the inconvenience to the defendant of having to defend in a jurisdiction other than that of his
residence or place of business. Subsidiary considerations here might include the nature and
extent and interstate character of the defendant's business, the defendant's access to counsel,
and the distance from the defendant of the place where the action was brought. Third, the
matter of judicial economy should be evaluated. In particular, a court should gauge: (a) the
potentiality and extent of any adverse impact upon the litigation that may result from having
a part of the action sheared off; and (b) the prospect of duplication of effort by counsel and
the courts in conducting two parts of the same lawsuit in different jurisdictions at the same
time. As a barometer of the potential scope of the litigation in this regard, a court should also
examine whether the case might involve a class action including far flung plaintiffs or defend-
ants. Fourth, a court should consider the probable situs of the discovery proceedings in the
case and the extent to which the discovery proceedings will, in any event, take place outside
the state of defendant's residence or place of business, thus muting the significance of his
claim that he is inconvenienced by the distant forum. Ffifh, a court should examine the nature
of the regulated activity in question and the extent of impact that defendant's activities have
beyond the borders of his state of residence or business.
Id. at 203-04.
247 See supra note 246.
248 For example, the court reiterated that the fifth amendment limits the personal jurisdiction
of federal courts, but stated:
[The] practical considerations emanating from the realities of contemporary litigation, espe-
cially in the securities and antitrust areas, are, for the reasons which follow, persuasive justifi-
cation for upholding the view that any constitutional due process limitations upon a federal
extraterritorial (nationwide) service of process statute must be broadly defined.
Anyone with experience in handling or managing litigation today in fields like securities
and antitrust law knows that the place of trial is usually less important than the place of
discovery. The present case is no exception: a recent conference with counsel revealed that
the discovery contemplated in what is only a medium-sized lOb-5 case is massive and will
consume weeks at a time for many months. Moreover, even if the St. Clair defendants' mo-
tions were granted and they had to be sued in California where they have their places of
business or reside, most of the discovery in the case against them would still have to be done
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Applying its approach to the securities fraud claim before it, the Ox-
ford court found that the inconvenience to the defendants due to the
distance between their home in California and the court in Penn-
sylvania was outweighed by the following factors: (1) the defendants
benefited from the transactions in Pennsylvania and knew that their
financial statements would be relied on in Pennsylvania, (2) the bulk of
discovery would take place in Pennsylvania and New York, (3) there
would be substantial duplication of litigation if these defendants were
severed from the case, and (4) severing these defendants would ad-
versely affect the ongoing suit.249 Therefore, the defendants' jurisdic-
tional challenge was overruled. Without more details as to the
defendants' activities and resources, it is difficult to apply the due pro-
cess test proposed by this Article to the Oxford facts, but it seems likely
that under this test the federal court also would have been permitted to
exercise personal jurisdiction.
IV. THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE AND THE NATIONWIDE PERSONAL
JURISDICTION STATUTES
Although nationwide personal jurisdiction statutes are relatively
rare, Cong'ess has enacted legislation that authorizes federal courts to
exercise personal jurisdiction over defendants located anywhere in the
nation, as well as over defendants who have minimum contacts with
the United States. An examination of these statutes identifies a number
of federal interests that in the view of Congress justify reqiiiring de-
fendants to appear for trial far away from home or business. Scrutiny
of these statutes also reveals, however, that Congress on most occasions
has attempted to protect defendants from trial at fundamentally unfair
locations by simultaneously enacting restrictive venue provisions.
250
Sometimes, however, the legislation does not contain any significant
limits on the place of trial.25' Unfortunately, Congress has demon-
strated greater willingness to omit such restrictions on the location of
litigation in recent years.252 As a result, there are an increasing number
in this district or in New York. The importance of the fact that the place of trial does not
necessarily govern the place of discovery is that the alleged inconvenience or unfairness to a
party extraterritorily [sic] summoned cannot be measured by the distance from his home to
the place of the trial.
Oxford First Corp. v. PNC Liquidating Corp., 372 F. Supp. at 201-02 (footnotes omitted).
249 Id. at 204-05.
250 See infra notes 287-91 and accompanying text.
251 For example, under the Federal Interpleader Act an interpleader action may be filed in any
judicial district in which any claimant resides. 28 U.S.C. § 1397 (1982). The bankruptcy code also
has broad venue provisions. 28 U.S.C. § 1473 (1982). See infra notes 292-93 and accompanying
text.
252 For example, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C. §§ 151-160, 771-775, 1471-
1482 (1982) established a bankruptcy court in each judicial district as an adjunct to the district
court. Id. § 151. The Act provides that the proper venue for all proceedings arising in or related
to a bankruptcy case is the bankruptcy court in which the case is already pending. 28 U.S.C.
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of circumstances in which a federal court's assertion of personal juris-
diction pursuant to a congressional authorization of nationwide juris-
diction may be unconstitutional.
A. The Objectives of the Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction Statutes
The nationwide personal jurisdiction statutes, which can be
grouped into five categories for the sake of convenience, by and large
were passed in response to intractable procedural problems that made
it impossible for a court with jurisdiction limited to one state to grant
complete relief in a controversy. This can be seen quite clearly in the
federal antitrust laws, which contain the oldest nationwide jurisdiction
statute. 25 3 Believing that the nationwide nature of monopolies and car-
tels could only be dealt with effectively by litigation that included all
§ 1473(a) (1982). There are only two exceptions to this venue provision: (1) a proceeding com-
menced by a trustee to recover property worth less than $1,000 or a consumer debt of less than
$5,000 must be filed in the bankruptcy court for the district in which the defendant resides, see id.
§ 1473(b); (2) a proceeding commenced by a trustee based on a claim arising from the operation of
the debtor's business after the bankruptcy petition was filed must be brought in the judicial district
in which the claim would have been brought under applicable nonbankruptcy venue provisions,
see id. § 1473(d).
Although the Supreme Court in Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458
U.S. 50 (1982), declared that the jurisdictional provisions of the Act established an unconstitu-
tional delegation of judicial power to article I bankruptcy courts, this ruling did not invalidate the
venue provisions of the Act. The bankruptcy courts are currently operating as adjuncts to the
district courts under an interim emergency rule proposed by the Judicial Conference of the United
States. White Motors Corp. v. Citibank, 704 F.2d 254,256-57 (6th Cir. 1983) ("Each of the eleven
Judicial Councils of the circuits ordered the district courts to adopt the interim rule with only
minor modifications."). The proposed emergency rule, only in effect in those district courts that
adopt it, has been adopted by the majority of district courts. Id. Four appellate courts have
upheld its constitutionality. In re Kaiser, 722 F.2d 1574 (2d Cir. 1983); In re Braniff Airways, Inc.,
700 F.2d 214 (5th Cir. 1983); White Motor Corp. v. Citibank, 704 F.2d 254 (6th Cir. 1983); In re
Hansen, 702 F.2d 728 (8th Cir. 1983). See also In re Color Craft Press 27 Bankr. 962 (Bankr. D.
Utah 1983) (Federal district courts retain bankruptcy subject matter jurisdiction despite invalidity
of Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978's delegation of broad jurisdiction to article 1 bankruptcy
courts); In re Northland Point Partners, 26 Bankr. 860 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983) (same). But see
In re Conley, 26 Bankr. 885 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1983) (adoption of emergency rule is unconstitu-
tional and does not confer subject matter jurisdiction on bankruptcy courts); In re Motion to
Dismiss: Constitutionality of Jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court, 23 Bankr. 334 (Bankr. N.D.
Ga. 1982) (invalidity of jurisdiction provisions of Bankruptcy Reform Act 1978 deprives bank-
ruptcy court of all subject matter jurisdiction, requiring dismissal of all bankruptcy proceedings);
In re Shear Realty & Investment Co., 25 Bankr. 463 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982) (in absence of
legislative authorization, circuit judicial council cannot confer jurisdiction on district courts or
bankruptcy courts). The courts are continuing to apply the venue provisions contained in the 1978
Act. Under these provisions the hypothetical discussed infra in text accompanying notes 295-301
would be allowed to proceed in Alaska.
253 Although the revelations of the Credit Mobilier scandal, see supra note 121, led Congress to
authorize suit in one judicial district against all those involved in the fraud, see supra notes 122-25
and accompanying text, this legislation was limited to suits brought by the attorney general to
recover for fraud practiced on the United States. Seventeen years later Congress authorized na-
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members of a business combination,254 Congress added a provision to
the Sherman Act that allows federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over
defendants anywhere in the country if "the ends of justice" so re-
quire.255 The legislative history clearly indicates that Congress wanted
to ensure that federal courts would have the power to order effective
remedies through nationwide injunctions, if necessary. 256 Furthermore,
it reveals Congress's recognition that the federal government would
tionwide personal jurisdiction in federal antitrust suits. The personal jurisdiction provisions con-
tained in § 5 of the Sherman Act of 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209, are still in effect.
Whenever it shall appear to the court . . . that the ends of justice require that other parties
should be brought before the court, the court may cause them to be summoned, whether they
reside in the district in which the court is held or not; and subpoenas to that end may be
served in any district by the marshal thereof.
15 U.S.C. § 5 (1982).
In 1914 when Congress passed its second antitrust law, the Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730
(1914) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1982)), it inserted a jurisdictional provision identical to that
in the Sherman Act for suits filed by the United States. See 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1982). Congress also
included a provision allowing federal courts to exercise jurisdiction beyond their state borders in
antitrust suits filed against corporations. See id. § 22. The latter provision addressed venue and
service of process in one sentence:
Any suit, action or proceeding under the antitrust laws against a corporation may be brought
not only in the judicial district whereof it is an inhabitant, but also in any district wherein it
may be found or transacts business; and all process in such cases may be served in the district
of which it is an inhabitant, or wherever it may be found.
Id. Although written in terms of service of process, as are many of the nationwide jurisdiction
statutes, this statute has been interpreted as authorizing federal courts to gain personal jurisdiction
over defendants located anywhere in the nation. Eg., Stabilisierungsfonds Fur Wein v. Kaiser
Stuhl Wine Distrib. Party Ltd., 647 F.2d at 204 n.6; United States v. Asbestos Corp, 34 F.2d 182
(S.D.N.Y. 1929) (relying on § 12 of Clayton Act for jurisdiction over defendant not doing business
in New York).
254 See 21 CONG. REc. 2640 (1890). Senator Spooner (Wis.) stated:
Most if not all of the combinations, however they may be called, aimed at by the bill, are
detrimental to the public interest. I think of them all it will be agreed that two of them, whose
ramifications extend throughout the whole country and who directly affect the people gener-
ally in the country, the sugar trust and what is called the beef combine, are infamous in their
oppression, the sugar trust dealing with an article which goes into the daily consumption of
the people, which goes into every house, to every family. I believe 52 pounds per year per
capita are used by the people of the United States. The object of this trust is to keep up to
consumers the price of sugar. The beef combine. . . has been so successful as to maintain at
the war rate the price of beef to cofisumers throughout the United States, and to depress it
among those, the farmers and others, who raise cattle, so as to render that industry no longer
a profitable one.
The sugar trust is made up, as I understand it, of seventeen different corporations, some
of them citizens of different States. Manifestly to deal sufficiently with a trust or combination
of that character it must be possible to bring into one action, into one court, the essential
parties defendant.
255 15 U.S.C. § 5 (1982). See supra note 253.
256 See 21 CONG. REc. 2640-41 (1890). Senator Spooner (Wis.) also stated:
For myself, I think the efficacious remedy will be found to be, not the criminal prosecution
provided for by the Senator from Texas [Sen. Reagan], but the vigorous and drastic use of the
writ of injunction. Under the law as it stands to-day [sic] that writ can only be served and
punishment for its disobedience enforced within the district over which the court has jurisdic-
tion. By the amendment which I have sent to the desk, this writ of injunction may be served
anywhere within the United States, and if it is disobeyed the attachment for contempt may be
served anywhere within the United States. I think the amendment ought to be adopted.
Id.
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have to initiate multiple identical suits in separate judicial districts un-
less it could join the relevant defendants in a single suit.2 57 Both rea-
sons-the desire for an effective remedy and the attempt to conserve
government resources by avoiding duplicative litigation-convinced
Congress to expand federal court jurisdiction.
The second nationwide personal jurisdiction statute was the Fed-
eral Interpleader Act, passed in 1917.258 Since interpleader actions by
definition involve a number of claims against one fund,2 59 the most
efficient way to handle such litigation is to join all potential claimants
against the fund in one suit. Otherwise, separate suits might lead to
inconsistent judgments imposing multiple liability on the stake-
257 See 21 CONG. REC. 2642 (1890). Senator Spooner (Wis.) further stated:
[A]II of these trusts, or nearly all of them, are made up of different firms, of corporations, and
of citizens of different States. . . . [A]s the law now stands,. . . the statutory rule is that no
man shall, with a single exception or so, be sued in the United States courts except in the
district where he happens to reside or where he happens to be found. So, then, in prosecuting
the sugar trust under the provisions of this act, made up of seventeen distinct corporations, as
I understand it, only one of which, if you please, is a citizen of the State of New York, there
would be no power to obtain jurisdiction in a single suit except over one. Seventeen different
suits would be necessary, possibly. That, it seemed to me, was a weakness in this bill which
ought to be remedied.
258 Act of February 22, 1917, ch. 113, 39 Stat. 929 (1917). The Act authorized insurance com-
panies and fraternal beneficial societies to file bills of interpleader in federal district courts when
the claimants were citizens of different states, and provided that the process of those courts might
run into all parts of the United States.
The Act was amended on February 25, 1925,see ch. 317, 43 Stat. 976 (1925), to allow, among
other improvements, insurance associations to file bills of interpleader. See H.R. REP. No. 1428,
68th Cong., 2d Sess. (1925). On May 8, 1926, the Act was repealed and a new and improved
statute enacted, see ch. 273, 44 Stat. 416 (1926), extending benefits to casualty and surety compa-
nies. See H.R. REP. No. 719, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926). Finally, the Act was amended on
January 20, 1936, see 49 Stat. 1096 (1936), to extend its coverage further, simplify its provisions,
and make other improvements. See S. REP. No. 558, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935); H.R. REP. No.
1437, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. (1935).
The Act was originally codified as § 24(26) of the Judicial Code, and was later placed in title
28 of the United States Code. Under the Judicial Revision Act of 1948, its provisions were redis-
tributed so they appear in Title 28 as follows: § 1335 deals with jurisdiction; § 1397 with venue;
and § 2361 with process and procedure. They appear this way today. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1335,
1397. 2361 (1982). Section 2361, see supra note 233, which by its terms refers only to service of
process, has been interpreted as a grant of personal jurisdiction. See Stabilisierungsfonds Fur
Wein v. Kaiser Stuhl Wine Distrib. Party Ltd., 647 F.2d at 204 n.6; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Chase. 294 F.2d 500, 502 (3d Cir. 1961).
Prior to the enactment of this legislation, interpleader actions could be filed in state or, if
diversity of citizenship existed, in federal court. In either instance, however, the court could only
exercise personal jurisdiction over defendants who resided or were located in the state where the
court was located.
259 Black's Law Dictionary defines interpleader as follows:
When two or more persons claim the same thing (or fund) of a third, and he laying no claim
to it himself, is ignorant which of them has a right to it, and fears he may be prejudiced by
their proceeding against him to recover it, he may file a bill in equity against them, the object
of which is to make them litigate their title between themselves, instead of litigating it with
him, and such a bill is called a "bill of interpleader."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 953 (4th ed. 1958).
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holder.260 A court in one state can successfully exercise personal juris-
diction over all defendants residing or located within that state, but
often lacks power over those potential claimants residing in different
states.26' Thus, in cases with far-flung claimants no state court-and
no federal court limited to state-wide jurisdiction-can conclusively
determine the rights to a fund. In order to alleviate this recurring prob-
lem that was beyond the ability of any single state to solve, Congress
enacted a statute allowing federal courts in interpleader actions to exer-
cise personal jurisdiction over claimants located throughout the United
States.262
Another thorny litigation problem prompted Congress in 1936 to
enact a statute allowing federal courts to exercise personal jurisdiction
in shareholder derivative suits over defendant corporations located
anywhere in the United States.263 Plaintiffs who filed shareholder de-
rivative suits often found their cases dismissed and no alternative fo-
rum available.264 The dismissals were based on the plaintiffs' failure to
260 Indeed, the Federal Interpleader Act of 1917 was a direct response to the injustice of the
Supreme Court's decision in New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 519 (1916). See H.
REP. No. 677, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. (1916). In that suit the proceeds of the same insurance policy
were the sub.;,ct of litigation in two separate proceedings, one in Pennsylvania and one in Califor-
nia. In the Pennsylvania suit the claimants were Gould and a creditor of Dunlevy, who was
Gould's daughter and had alleged the policy had been assigned to her. Notice of the suit was
given to Dunlevy in California, but she did not respond. The court determined that the policy had
not been assigned and directed the proceeds be paid to Gould. Meanwhile, Dunlevy initiated suit
in California against Gould and the insurance company. The California court cbncluded that
there had been a valid assignment, and directed that the proceeds be paid to Dunlevy. Although
the insurance company protested that it had already paid the proceeds to Gould pursuant to a
valid judgment, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the California decision.
261 In New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 518 (1916), the Supreme Court ruled that
the Pennsylvania court lacked jurisdiction over Dunlevy, who resided in California.
262 For a discussion of the history of federal interpleader legislation, see supra notes 258-60. In
order to make the federal courts easily accessible in interpleader cases, Congress reduced the
requisite jurisdictional amount to $500, and in diversity cases changed the requirement from com-
plete diversity (all plaintiffs must be diverse from all defendants) to minimal diversity (at least two
adverse claimants must be diverse). 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1982). See State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.
v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967). In addition to the Federal Interpleader Act, Fed. R. Civ.
P. 22 also authorizes interpleader actions. Litigants in Rule 22 actions must satisfy the $10,000
jurisdictional amount and complete diversity requirements, and are bound by the general venue
provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1982) rather than by the extremely broad provision of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1397 (1982). 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1703, 1712
(1972); Georgia Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Sims, 321 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Pan Ameri-
can Fire & Casualty Co. v. Revere, 188 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. La. 1960).
263 Act of April 16, 1936, ch. 230, 49 Stat. 1213 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1695 (1982)). This
statute provides: "Process in a stockholder's action in behalf of his corporation may be served
upon such corporation in any district where it is organized or licensed to do business or is doing
business." Id.
264 E.g., Busch v. Mary A. Riddle Co., 283 F. 443 (D. Del. 1922). Plaintiff, a citizen and resi-
dent of Florida and a shareholder in the Riddle Company of Pennsylvania, sued in the District of
Delaware the Riddle Company of Pennsylvania, the Riddle Company of Delaware, to which the
Pennsylvania Company's assets had been transferred, and certain individuals. There was coin-
79:1 (1984) Personal Jurisdiction
join both the parent and subsidiary corporations, each deemed an in-
dispensable party to the suit.265 If the parent and subsidiary were incor-
porated and doing business in different states, however, each would be
beyond the personal jurisdiction of the courts located in the other
state.266 The federal statute closed a "loophole in judicial procedure
through which holding companies and parent corporations are [able] to
strip a subsidiary corporation of all of its assets to the loss of minority
stockholders of the subsidiary corporations without the possibility of
being brought to account in any court. '267
The Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962,268 which is limited to suits
seeking mandamus relief against the United States, federal agencies,
and federal officers or employees, 269 also had its origins in the problem
of jurisdiction over indispensable parties. Prior to the Act, litigants su-
ing federal officers for actions taken in the litigant's home state often
discovered that superior federal officers whose official residence was
Washington, D.C. were considered indispensable parties. 270 As a re-
sult, such suits could only be filed in federal court in Washington,
D.C.27t After investigating this problem, Congress changed the law.
Realizing that mandamus actions against federal officers and agencies
are, in reality, defended in each federal judicial district by the local
United States Attorney's office,272 and that federal officials stationed in
Washington, D.C. travel at government expense if required to litigate
plete diversity between plaintiff and defendants, but no state could exercise personal jurisdiction.
Delaware courts could not assert jurisdiction over the Pennsylvania defendant; Pennsylvania
courts could not assert jurisdiction over the Delaware defendant; and Florida courts could not
assert jurisdiction over either. Because the process of federal courts did not extend beyond the
federal judicial district, the plaintiff could not gain relief in either federal or state court.
265 Busch v. Mary A. Riddle Co., 283 F. at 444.
266 Id.
267 H. REP. No. 2257, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1936).
268 Act of October 5, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-748, 76 Stat. 744. Section 1(a) of the Act is codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1982); section 2 of the Act, which is pertinent here, is codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(e) (1982).
269 Section 1(a) of the Act expressly limits suits to "action[s] in the nature of mandamus to
compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed
to the plaintiff." 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1982).
270 E.g., Williams v. Fanning, 332 U.S. 490,493 (1947). ("[T]he superior officer is an indispen-
sable party if the decree granting the relief sought will require him to take action, either by exer-
cising directly a power lodged in him or by having a subordinate exercise it for him.'). See
Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 534 (1980).
271 The Supreme Court has stated:
Because of the legal fiction that officers of such rank resided only where they were sta-
tioned-usually the District of Columbia-effective service could be obtained only there.
And with the restrictive venue provisions then in effect, joinder of such an official required
that the action be brought in the District of Columbia. . . .The net result was that persons
in distant parts of the country claiming injury by reason of the acts or omissions of a federal
officer or agency were faced with significant expense and inconvenience in bringing suits for
enforcement of claimed rights.
Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. at 534 (citation omitted).
272 Id. at 543-44.
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in their official capacity elsewhere,273 Congress authorized mandamus
actions in the plaintiffs judicial district.274 Accordingly, plaintiffs may
initiate litigation in local federal courts, and courts may exercise na-
tionwide personal jurisdiction over federal defendants.
Congress has also provided the federal courts with nationwide per-
sonal jurisdiction in cases arising under the federal securities laws.
Like the antitrust legislation passed a generation earlier, this legislation
was a congressional response to a nationwide economic problem. 275
Each of the six federal statutes enacted between 1933 and 1940 to regu-
late securities contains a provision authorizing federal courts to exer-
cise nationwide personal jurisdiction. 276 Although the legislative
history of the securities laws is silent as to the government interests
furthered by nationwide personal jurisdiction, one can easily assume
that Congress believed that allowing investors to litigate securities
273 Id.
274 Section 2 of the Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (1982), provides:
A civil action in which a defendant is an officer or employee of the United States or any
agency thereof acting in his official capacity or under color of legal authority, or an agency of
the United States, or the United States, may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought
in any judicial district in which (1) a defendant in the action resides, or (2) the cause of action
arose, or (3) any real property involved in the action is situated, or (4) the plaintiff resides if
no real property is involved in the action. Additional persons may be joined as parties to any
such action in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and with such other
venue requirements as would be applicable if the United States or one of its officers, employ-
ees, or agencies were not a party.
The summons and complaint in such an action shall be served as provided b.y the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure except that the delivery of the summons and complaint to the
officer or agency as required by the rules may be made by certified mail beyond the territorial
limits of the district in which the action is brought.
28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (1982). Although it is titled a venue provision and is silent about personal
jurisdiction, this statute, which provides for delivery of summons and complaint by certified mail
beyond the territorial limits of the federal judicial district, has been interpreted as a grant of
nationwide personal jurisdiction in mandamus actions. See Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d 147, 154-57
(lst Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527 (1980); Smith v.
Campbell 450 F.2d 829, 833-34 (9th Cir. 1971). See also Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. at 534
(Congress passed 1962 Mandamus and Venue Act to cure inability of plaintiff injured by federal
action at home to gain jurisdiction over federal officials who officially resided in the District of
Columbia).
275 The legislation regulating securities was passed in the aftermath of the stock market crash
of 1929 and the attendant revelations of stock manipulations and fraud. By regulating securities,
Congress attempted to restore investor confidence in the national stock markets. L. Loss, SECURI-
Tins REGULATION 119-21 (1961).
276 Section 22 of the Securities Act of 1933 grants jurisdiction of offenses and violations of the
Act to the federal district courts. It provides:
Any such suit or action may be brought in the district wherein the defendant is found or is an
inhabitant or transacts business, or in the district where the offer or sale took place, if the
defendant participated therein, and process in such cases may be served in any other district
of which the defendant is an inhabitant or wherever the defendant may be found.
15 U.S.C. § 77v(a)(1982).
Section 27 of the Securities Act of 1934 provides:
Any suit or action to enforce any liability or duty created by this chapter or rules and regula-
tions thereunder, or to enjoin any violation of such chapter or rules and regulations, may be
brought in any such district or in the district wherein the defendant is found or is an inhabit-
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fraud issues anywhere in the nation was a beneficial approach to polic-
ing the stock market, and an important step in furthering the public
interest in a stable financial community.
Although no statute authorizes nationwide personal jurisdiction
in bankruptcy cases,277 the Bankruptcy Rules provide that process may
be served anywhere within the United States. 278 Equating service of
ant or transacts business, and process in such cases may be served in any other district of
which the defendant is an inhabitant or wherever the defendant may be found.
15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1982).
Section 25 of the Public Utility Act of 1935 provides:
Any suit or action to enforce any liability or duty created by, or to enjoin any violation of,
this chapter or rules, regulations, or orders thereunder, may be brought in any such district or
in the district wherein the defendant is an inhabitant or transacts business, and process in
such cases may be served in any district of which the defendant is an inhabitant or transacts
business or wherever the defendant may be found.
15 U.S.C. § 79y (1982).
Section 322 of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. § 77vvv (1982), incorporates by
reference the service and venue provisions of the Securities Act of 1933.
Section 44 of the Investment Companies Act of 1940 (1982), provides:
Any suit or action to enforce any liability or duty created by, or to enjoin any violation of,
this subchapter or rules, regulations, or orders thereunder, may be brought in any such dis-
trict or in the district wherein the defendant is an inhabitant or transacts business, and process
in such cases may be served in any district of which the defendant is an inhabitant or trans-
acts business or wherever the defendant may be found.
15 U.S.C. § 80a-43 (1982).
Section 214 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, provides:
Any suit or action to enjoin any violation of this subchapter or rules, regulations, or orders
thereunder, may be brought in any such district or in the district wherein the defendant is an
inhabitant or transacts business, and process in such cases may be served in any district of
which the defendant is an inhabitant or transacts business or wherever the defendant may be
found.
15 U.S.C. § 80b-14 (1982).
277 The jurisdictional provisions of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C. § 1471
(1982), refer only to subject matter jurisdiction.
Section 1471. Jurisdiction
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the district courts shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under title 11.
(b) Notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers exclusive jurisdiction on a court
or courts other than the district courts, the district courts shall have original but not exclusive
jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to cases under
title 11.
(c) The bankruptcy court for the district in which a case under title 11 is commenced
shall exercise all of the jurisdiction conferred by this section on the district courts.
(d) Subsection (b) or (c) of this section does not prevent a district court or a bankruptcy
court, in the interest of justice, from abstaining from hearing a particular proceeding arising
under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title 11. Such abstention, or a decision
not to abstain, is not reviewable by appeal or otherwise.
(e) The bankruptcy court in which a case under title 11 is commenced shall have exclu-
sive jurisdiction of all of the property, wherever located, of the debtor, as of the commence-
ment of such case.
28 U.S.C. § 1471 (1982). Some courts have read into these provisions a grant of personal jurisdic-
tion. See, e.g., In re Coby Glass Prods. Co., 22 Bankr. 961, 962-63 (E.D. Tenn. 1981). There
appears to be no support for this view. The legislative history gives no indication that Congress
intended this Section of the statute to authorize personal jurisdiction.
278 Bankruptcy Rule 7004(d) provides: "The summons and complaint and all other process
except a subpoena may be served anywhere in the United States." Bank. R. 7004(d), reprinted in
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process with jurisdiction, many bankruptcy courts have construed this
provision as a grant of nationwide jurisdiction.279 Because there is no
statutory grant of personal jurisdiction, there is, of course, no record of
congressional intent. Nonetheless, important substantive policies of
bankruptcy law may be furthered by nationwide personal jurisdiction.
The orderly and speedy administration of the bankrupt's estate280 and
the ability to conserve his remaining assets28' are both enhanced by
consolidating bankruptcy proceedings before one court and by limiting
the number of suits the bankrupt or trustee must litigate in different
states.
In summary, the federal interests in the exercise of nationwide per-
sonal jurisdiction by federal courts that Congress has recognized to
date include the following:
1) the need to provide a forum for litigation to correct and control
severe problems in the national economy that are likely to involve de-
fendants across the nation acting in a concerted fashion; 282
2) the need to provide a forum for litigation involving defendants
in different states that can only be completely resolved in one proceed-
ing, where no single state has the power to adjudicate;283
3) the need to provide a convenient forum for litigation involving
local actiois taken by federal officers who are represented by govern-
ment attorneys stationed in the local judicial district;284
4) the need to provide a forum for litigation to regulate securities
problems affecting the national economy that are likely to involve de-
fendants whose actions have affected many plaintiffs in distant
locations; 285
5) the need to provide a convenient forum for litigation to mar-
shal and conserve the assets of an insolvent party.286
Although the third category only applies to suits against the fed-
eral government, its genesis is nevertheless instructive in devising a
fairness standard that should apply in suits against private litigants.
Congress decided to permit nationwide personal jurisdiction in certain
suits involving the federal government because Congress recognized
that in those situations the defense of federal officials would in reality
11 U.S.C.A., Bankruptcy Rules and Official Forms (1983). This rule took effect August 1, 1983,
replacing an identical provision in Bankruptcy Rule 704(0, which had been enacted in 1976.
279 E.g., In re Coby Glass Prods. Co., 22 Bankr. 961 (E.D. Tenn. 1981); In re G. Weeks Securi-
ties, Inc., 3 Bankr. 215 (W.D. Tenn. 1980); In re Fotochrome, Inc., 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 861
(E.D.N.Y. 1978).
280 See I COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 3.02 (L. King, 15th ed. 1982).
281 Id.
282 See supra notes 253-57 and accompanying text.
283 See supra notes 258-67 and accompanying text.
284 See supra notes 268-79 and accompanying text.
285 See supra notes 275-76 and accompanying text.
286 See supra notes 277-81 and accompanying text.
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be provided by federal attorneys stationed in the local district, and that
the federal government would pay the expenses of any officials from
other areas who might need to be present for litigation. Thus, the spec-
ter of extremely burdensome litigation at distant locations compounded
by the difficulty of selecting and hiring local counsel would be unlikely
to materialize. This type of pragmatic view of the consequences of na-
tionwide personal jurisdiction should inform courts' analyses under the
constitutional test proposed in this Article.
B. The Limits Imposed by the Venue Statutes
While these nationwide personal jurisdiction statutes and regula-
tions indicate an intent to protect the government interests identified,
Congress did not intend that these interests should always override
concerns about hardship and inconvenience to defendants. In fact,
many of the nationwide personal jurisdiction statutes were opposed ini-
tially by members of Congress who feared they would cause great in-
justice to defendants who could be compelled to stand trial anywhere
in the United States.287 The congressional debates on this aspect of the
legislation were impassioned.2 88 Although not framed in constitutional
terms, the discussions expressly addressed the potential unfairness to
defendants caused by litigation at distant locations.289 Congress at-
tained a compromise: in order to ameliorate unfairness, yet further the
government interests underlying the statutes, Congress enacted venue
287 See, for example, the remarks of Rep. Volstead, infra note 288, and remarks of Sen. Pomer-
ene, infra note 289, in opposition to the Federal Interpleader Act.
288 In objecting to the nationwide service of process provisions ofthe Federal Interpleader Act,
Rep. Volstead of Minnesota stated:
We rebelled against England because she compelled us to go beyond the seas to try our cases,
where we could not go without great loss. Why should we now change our policy and insist
that a man has no right to try his case at home, no matter how poor or otherwise unable he
may be to prosecute his claim at a great distance away from home?
53 CONO. REC. 9444 (1916). Rep. Volstead indicated that he did not oppose nationwide service of
process in all instances, but he was wary of such authorization in suits initiated by private individ-
uals:
Unless the Government is a party we have never in any instance, so far as I am aware,
permitted the Federal courts to extend their jurisdiction beyond the State or a hundred miles
beyond the place where the court is held. That is the policy we have uniformly pursued ever
since the beginning of our Government. This changes that policy and permits jurisdiction to
be taken no matter where the persons may be located. Suppose here is a person with a small
claim of $500 and there is another claimant to that money possibly a thousand or two thou-
sand miles away. If this bill becomes a law, the district court can take jurisdiction of them. It
seems to me this should not be permitted.
Id. at 9443.
289 Antilrus
During the debate on the Sherman Act, the sponsor of the amendment authorizing the broad
exercise of personal jurisdiction by federal courts responded to objections by emphasizing:
I would not agree to that in any ordinary case; I would not agree to it in controversies be-
tween citizens of different States [to recover damages for antitrust violations]; but it has
seemed to me, as it was necessary to make this an efficient bill in view of the fact that we were
dealing with a set of combinations of great power whose oppressions are criminal, that we
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standards limiting the places where defendants can be sued at the same
time that it adopted the nationwide personal jurisdiction statutes.
ought to make these writs of injunction run throughout the country and to be served any-
where.
21 CONG. REc. 2642 (1890) (remarks of Sen. Spooner (Wisc.)).
Similar concerns were raised during the debate over the Clayton Act in 1914. Rep. Dickinson
of Missouri offered an amendment to restrict the venue provisions so that antitrust suits against
corporations would be proper in the districts in which the corporation "is an inhabitant. . . or
may be found doing business and the cause of action may accrue" rather than in the districts in
which the corporation "is an inhabitant.., or may be found." See 51 CONG. REc. 9414, 63rd
Cong., 2nd Sess. (1914). In defense of his amendment, Rep. Dickinson stressed: "My amendment
seeks to be fair both to the corporation and to the person and to the plaintiff." Id. at 9417. He
amplified his comment with an example:
Take a New Jersey corporation doing business in Texas and doing business in Illinois. It may
commit no violation of the law, no wrong, no damage in Texas; and if so, a suit ought not to
be brought there. If this same corporation does some one an injury, does do damage in
Illinois, ought not the suit to be brought there? I give the widest liberty of bringing suits
where the damage is done and where the action arose.
Id. Rep. Dickinson later withdrew his amendment in favor of the amendment proposed by the
Judiciary Committee, which provided for venue where the defendant is an inhabitant, has an
agent, or is found. Id. at 9466.
In opposition to another Clayton Act measure seen as broadening the permissible locations of
trial, Rep. Scott of Iowa stated:
The amendment enlarges the present interpretation of the word "found" as applied to the
corporate jurisdiction, and permits suit to be brought, with absolute discretion on the part of
the plaintiff, in any district in which the defendant may have an agent, without defining the
character of the agent.
Now, we all know that there is an almost infinite number of characters of agents. Corpo-
rations transacting interstate business have agents, we may say, in practically every State of
the Union for some purpose. Surely it can not be possible that the gentleman would attempt
to confer jurisdiction and venue upon the Federal court in every district in the United States
where any agent can be found, regardless of the question whether the corporation is domi-
ciled in that State or district, or whether it is doing business there.
. . . If we are to open this venue or jurisdiction to any district in the United States where
any agent may be found, we are going to have a great deal of confusion and great injustice is
to be done. It is going to open the door wide for annoyances to business, if any man can go
anywhere in the United States and institute his action, if he can obtain any colorable service
and compel the business institutions of the country to follow him about.
Id. at 9467.
Rep. Graham of Pennsylvania also was concerned about proposed legislation that would impose
great hardship on defendants. In a colloquy with two other congressmen, Rep. Graham urged
that subpoenas in antitrust cases be limited to the judicial district in which the court is located plus
100 miles from the courthouse:
Mr. GRAHAM. . . . Mr. Chairman, § [sic] 11, as I understand it, has been introduced for
the purpose of enlarging the scope of the service of a subpoena. By its terms as the Section
stands the subpoena will run now throughout the whole of the United States without any
limit or hindrance; and when one remembers that a subpoena is a writ of right and that upon
paying the fee a subpoena may issue one can readily see how this bill puts it in the power of a
person to summon an individual from California to come to New Jersey and vice versa, or
rom one end of the country to the other. Now, that is an extraordinary power that would
expose all of our citizens to a severe hardship. It might lead to the ruin and destruction of a
man's business, besides the severe inconveniences to which it would subject him.
Mr. CARLIN. I think if the gentleman would change the amendment so as to read the writ
should run to the judicial district the committee might accept it.
Mr. GRAHAM. . . . I want to say in answer I am perfectly willing although the existing law
permits service of a subpoena . . . for. . . 100 miles from the court.
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The pertinent venue provisions are on the whole quite restrictive.
Mr. FLOYD. ... I understand the existing law permits the running of a subpoena 100 miles
outside of the State. If it was limited to 100 miles within the State, there are plenty of judicial
districts in the United States-
Mr. GRAHAM .... I beg leave to say that I am correct in my statement about the service.
Mr. FLOYD ... . Anywhere in the judicial district?
Mr. GRAHAM. . . . And 100 miles from the courthouse for citizens living outside of the
district. That is the law as it stands to-day [sic]. It may be necessary in some cases.. . in
which the power given in this bill ought to be exercised; but while we grant this power we
should put a certain limitation upon it, that it must be made upon proper application and
cause shown. It seems to me to be in the interest of all our citizens that this amendment
should be allowed.
Id. at 9675.
Interpleader
In debate on the Federal Interpleader Act in 1916, Sen. Pomerene of Ohio protested that the
insurance societies
seek to have all of this litigation in the Federal courts, and it will compel poor litigants who
may be beneficiaries under this legislation to go perhaps a hundred or two hundred or three
hundred miles in order to litigate their claims, and in my judgment it will operate as a sub-
stantial denial of justice to many of these people.
53 CONG. REC. 12,150 (1916).
In response to the comment that the suit must be brought in the district where the beneficiary
named upon the face of the policy resided, Sen. Pomerene replied:
[E]ven in that instance, Mr. President, in my own State, for example, many of these poor
people-who may be workmen, or may be widows, or may be orphans-will have to go 200
miles to court to have their claims adjudicated. Now, I realize that the associations are put to
some inconvenience; but they have their staffs of attorneys and agents all over the country
everywhere.
Id.
Rep. Volstead, whose impassioned objections to the Federal Interpleader Act, see supra note
288, was concerned with unfairness toward small claimants, particularly since insurance compa-
nies were being given the "special privilege" of nationwide service. For this reason, Rep. Volstead
advocated raising the jurisdictional amount from $500 to $2,000, as the House Committee on the
Judiciary had recommended. A person with a $2,000 claim, he argued, can better afford to spend
money on litigation than one who has only a $500 claim, thus lessening the injustice of forcing the
former to litigate away from home. 53 CONG. REC. 9444 (1916). The amendment to raise the
jurisdictional amount was defeated.
Neither Rep. Volstead nor Sen. Pomerene referred in their criticisms to constitutional limita-
tions. The House Report pronounced the law constitutional: "Congress has the authority to do
this, as there are no constitutional prohibitions to the contrary, and it is given power under the
Constitution to establish courts without limitation as to service of process." H. REP. No. 677, 64th
Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1916). Although the original federal interpleader statute limited suits to the
district where the named beneficiary resided, problems arose when beneficiaries resided in more
than one district and when policies were assigned. Therefore, the statute was amended in 1936 to
broaden venue and permit suit in any district in which any one claimant resides. Act of 1936, ch.
13, § 1, 49 Stat. 1096. That provision, with slightly different language, is still in effect. See 28
U.S.C. § 1397 (1982).
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., who drafted the federal interpleader statutes, noted that the venue
provision enacted in 1936 was criticized for causing "occasional injustice to the particular claim-
ant who lives outside the district in which the interpleader is brought." Chafee, Federal Inter-
pleader, supra note 170 at 984. Discussing the example of a California claimant forced to litigate
in a Massachusetts district court because another claimant resides in Massachusetts, Chafee ar-
gued that "the court having statutory jurisdiction may occasionally decline, in the interests of
justice, to exercise jurisdiction. ... Id. He stated that district courts are "free to use their
discretionary powers to refuse relief and send the stakeholder to another forum," adding that
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In most instances the venue limitations only permit suits to be filed
under the federal nationwide personal jurisdiction statutes in those ju-
dicial districts in which the defendant resides, transacts business, does
business, is licensed to do business, or is found.290 These restrictions
ensure that the place of trial, even if inconvenient to a defendant, will
"[t]he judge's discretion will depend upon the facts of each particular case, which make his forum
more or less inconvenient for the various claimants and the stakeholder." Id. at 985. In an earlier
article, Chafee addressed a similar hypothetical and directed the courts to weigh the competing
hardships on the litigants:
In oppositon to this proposed legislative extension of power over parties and witnesses, it may
be urged that it would be . . . [too] much of a hardship on [a claimant] in California to
compel him to appear in the United States Court in Pennsylvania .... Our answer must be
that.. . the Pennsylvania Federal Court would have to balance the hardship on the Califor-
nia claimant against the hardship of the stakeholder if he is subjected to double vexation and
the possibility of double recovery; and grant or deny relief accordingly. Sometimes the Penn-
sylvania Federal Court could tell the stakeholder to transfer his interpleader to the United
States Court in California, if the distance would bear less hardly on the Pennsylvania claim-
ant than on the California claimant. In other words, these difficulties should go to the exer-
cise of the undoubted jurisdiction inpersonam.
Chafee, Interstate Interpleader, supra note 170 at 721. In short, Chafee urged that the doctrine of
forum non conveniens would satisfy any concerns about unfairness. It should be noted that the
broad venue provision of the Federal Interpleader Act does not apply to interpleader actions
initiated pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 22. See supra note 262.
Shareholder ZD:'ivative Suits.
In amending the venue provisions in 1936 regarding derivative actions, Congress authorized
shareholders to file derivative suits in any district in which the corporation could have fied suit
against the named defendants. See Act of April 16, 1936, ch. 230, 49 Stat. 1213-14 (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1401 (1982)). Congress clearly intended to broaden venue in order to provide a forum
for derivative suits that were beyond the reach of any state court. See supra notes 263-67 and
accompanying text. For the same reasons Congress expanded the service of process provisions.
Congress limited service of process on corporations in stockholder derivative actions, however, to
the districts in which a corporation is organized, doing business, or licensed to do business. See 28
U.S.C. § 1695 (1982). Furthermore, if a plaintiff brings a derivative suit and utilizes the general
venue provisions, see 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) to (c), discussed supra note 224, rather than the special
venue provision described above, she may not invoke the broadened service provisions of 28
U.S.C. § 1695. See Greenberg v. Giannini, 140 F.2d 550, 552 (2d Cir. 1944) (discussing predeces-
sor to § 1695); Norte & Co. v. Huffmes, 222 F. Supp. 90 (S.D.N.Y.)appealdimissed, 319 F.2d 336
(2d Cir. 1963); Clay v. Thomas, 185 F. Supp. 809 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). This limitation indicates con-
cern that the extraterritorial service provision be restricted to those cases in which the evil it was
intended to remedy is present. See Developments in the Law-Multoparty Litigation in the Federal
Courts, 71 HARV. L. REV. 874, 961-63 (1958).
290 Securities
For a description of the venue provisions in the securities laws, see supra note 276. One of the
securities laws contains venue provisions that differ from the terms mentioned in the text. The
Securities Act of 1933 allows a suit to be filed in the district where the offer or sale took place if the
defendant participated in the offer or sale. In addition, the 1933 Act allows a suit to be com-
menced in the district in which the defendant is an inhabitant, transacts business, or is found. 15
U.S.C. § 77v (1982). The venue provisions of the 1933 Act are incorporated by reference in the
Trust Indenture Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 77vvv (1982).
Antitrust
The venue provision applicable to the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act is codified at 15
U.S.C. § 22 (1982). It provides:
Any suit, action, or proceeding under the antitrust laws against a corporation may be brought
not only in the judicial district whereof it is an inhabitant, but also in any district wherein it
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be one in which he reasonably could have anticipated suit. Thus,
under the proposed due process test for personal jurisdiction in the fed-
eral courts, the second factor would be satisfied. Because a defendant's
activity in the region surrounding the location of litigation would be
substantial enough that he should not be surprised at the place of trial,
may be found or transacts business; and all process in such cases may be served in the district
of which it is an inhabitant, or wherever it may be found.
Id. In addition, antitrust suits may be filed under the general venue provisions contained in 28
U.S.C. § 1391 (1982), which provides in pertinent part:
(c) A corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it is incorporated or licensed
to do business or is doing business, and such judicial district shall be regarded as the resi-
dence of such corporation for venue purposes.
Id See, eg., Board of County Commissioners v. Wilshire Oil Co., 523 F.2d 125 (10th Cir. 1975);
New York v. Morton Salt Co., 266 F. Supp. 570 (E.D. Pa.), a 'd, 385 F.2d 122 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 995 (1967).
Shareholder Derivative Suits
When Congress amended the general venue statute in 1936 in order to provide a stockholder
with at least one proper forum for his derivative suit, see H.R. REP. No. 2257, 74th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1936), it added the following language to the existing venue provision, section 51 of the Judicial
Code of 1911, then codified at 28 U.S.C. § 112 (1940):
[S]uit by a stockholder on behalf of a corporation may be brought in any district in which suit
against the defendant or defendants in said stockholders' action, other than said corporation,
might have been brought by such corporation and process in such cases may be served upon
such corporation in any district wherein such corporation resides or may be found.
Act of April 16, 1936, ch. 230, 49 Stat. 1213, 1214 (1936).
In the Judiciary Revision Act of 1948, the former section 51 of the Judicial Code of 1911, as
amended in 1936, 28 U.S.C. § 112 (1940), was subdivided into several sections. The general venue
provision became section 1391 of title 28, see supra note 224, the special venue provision for
stockholders suits became section 1401, and the extraterritorial service provision for stockholders
suits became section 1695. Section 1401 provides: "Any civil action by a stockholder on behalf of
his corporation may be prosecuted in any judicial district where the corporation might have sued
the same defendants." 28 U.S.C. § 1401 (1982). Section 1695 provides: "Process in a stock-
holder's action in behalf of his corporation may be served upon such corporation in any district
where it is organized or licensed to do business or is doing business." 28 U.S.C. § 1695 (1982).
Suits Against Federal Officials
The venue provision added to the Judicial Code by the Act of Oct. 5, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-
748, § 2,76 Stat. 744 (1963) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1982)), applies to suits in the nature of
mandamus filed against federal officials. See Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527 (1980). The original
§ 1391(e) provided in part:
(e) A civil action in which a defendant is an officer or employee of the United States or any
agency thereof acting in his official capacity or under color of legal authority, or an agency of
the United States, or the United States, may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought
in any judicial district in which (1) a defendant in the action resides, or (2) the cause of action
arose, or (3) any real property involved in the action is situated, or (4) the plaintiff resides if
no real property is involved in the action.
28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (1982). Section 1391(e) was amended in 1976 to emphasize that the broad
venue provisions did not extend to suits against non-government defendants. The 1976 revision,
Pub. L. No. 94-574, § 3, 90 Stat. 2721 (1976), added the following sentence to the end of the
sentence quoted above:
Additional persons may be joined as parties to any such action in accordance with the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure and with such other venue requirements as would be applicable
if the United States or one of its officers, employees, or agencies were not a party.
28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (1982).
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the federal court can constitutionally assert personal jurisdiction.291
Two nationwide personal jurisdiction measures do not follow this
pattern, however. Instead they contain very broad venue provisions.
In interpleader actions venue is permitted in any district in which a
claimant resides. 292 The bankruptcy code allows debtors, with two mi-
nor exceptions, to bring all proceedings arising in or related to a bank-
ruptcy matter in the bankruptcy court in which the bankruptcy petition
is pending.293 As the next section demonstrates, the breadth of the in-
terpleader and bankruptcy provisions may result in unconstitutional
exercises of personal jurisdiction.
C. The Limits Imposed by the Due Process Clause
Because the venue provisions of most federal nationwide personal
jurisdiction statutes protect defendants from litigation in locations with
which they have no meaningful connection, it will rarely be necessary
for courts to undertake a due process analysis when challenges to per-
sonal jurisdiction are made in cases arising under the current statutes.
In contrast, the permissive venue standards for interpleader and bank-
ruptcy actions yield a number of circumstances that pose difficult con-
stitutional questions. These potential problems and their resolution
under the clue process test proposed in this Article can best be ex-
amined by means of two hypothetical cases.294
291 See supra note 274. Because the Mandamus and Venue Act permits mahidamus suits
against federal officials to be litigated in the judicial district in which the plaintiff resides, such
litigation may proceed in a region in which the official could not reasonably have anticipated suit.
The location of litigation, however, will rarely, if ever, be extremely burdensome to the defendant
because the local United States Attorney's office will defend the suit and the government will pay
all the travel costs that the litigation entails. Thus, the first factor of the proposed due process test
would not be satisfied. Accordingly, it appears that federal courts exercising personal jurisdiction
over distant defendants pursuant to this Act will not transgress constitutional limits.
292 The Federal Interpleader Act provides:
Any civil action of interpleader or in the nature of interpleader under section 1335 of this title
may be brought in the judicial district in which one or more of the claimants reside.
28 U.S.C. § 1397 (1982).
293 Section 1473 of the Bankruptcy Code provides:
(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (d) of this Section, a proceeding arising in or
related to a case under title 11 may be commenced in the bankruptcy court in which such case
is pending.
(b) Except as provided in subsection (d) of this Section, a trustee in a case under title I 1 may
commence a proceeding arising in or related to such case to recover a money judgment of or
property worth less than $1,000 or a consumer debt of less than $5,000 only in the bankruptcy
court for the district in which a defendant resides.
(d) A trustee may commence a proceeding arising under title I I or arising in or related to a
case under title I 1 based on a claim arising after the commencement of such case from the
operation of the business of the debtor only in the bankruptcy court for the district where a
State or Federal court sits in which, under applicable nonbankruptcy venue provisions, an
action on such claim may have been brought.
28 U.S.C. § 1473 (1982).
294 Under current venue and jurisdiction provisions the hypothetical lawsuits posed at the be-
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Suppose a small struggling corporation in Alaska responds to a bid
solicitation issued by the New York office of the Defense Communica-
tions Agency for production of 40,000 electronic tool kits.295 The cor-
poration represents that it can produce 20,000 kits quickly, but its bid is
rejected because it lacks the capacity to perform the entire contract, and
the corporation is informed of that decision. Unable to meet its pay-
roll, and with no other prospective contracts, the corporation files a
petition for bankruptcy in the federal bankruptcy court in Anchorage,
Alaska.296 A few weeks later, the corporation's president discovers that
ginning of this Article, see supra text accompanying notes 1-3, would not be permitted to proceed
in the district in which the plaintiff filed suit. Congress has not provided nationwide personal
jurisdiction in the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982), see supra note 1, or in
the Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2083 (1982), see supra note 2. Under the
Fair Labor Standards Act an employee may sue his employer for violating the minimum wage
standard in "any court of competent jurisdiction." 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Because the Act contains
no special venue provisions, the general venue provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391 apply. Goldberg v.
Wharf Constructers, 209 F. Supp. 499 (N.D. Ala. 1962). This general venue statute provides that
cases arising under federal law may be filed in the judicial district in which all the defendants
reside or in which the cause of action arose. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Thus, in the minimum wage
hypothetical the only permissible venue would be in Florida.
The Consumer Product Safety Act permits enforcement actions against manufacturers who
produce products in violation of established safety standards in the district in which "any act,
omission, or transaction constituting the violation occurred, or in... the district wherein the
defendant is found or transacts business." 15 U.S.C. § 2071(a). Thus, the current law appears to
limit venue in the second hypothetical to Guam.
If the venue provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Consumer Product Safety
Act were changed to allow suits in any judicial district in the United States, then the constitutional
dimension of the two hypothetical cases could not be avoided. In order to apply the test proposed
in this Article to these hypotheticals, it would be necessary to develop more facts about the de-
fendants' activities and resources and about the government interests that might be at stake. From
the sketchy facts provided it appears likely that each defendant could demonstrate that the site of
litigation chosen by the plaintiff would be seriously burdensome and that the defendant could not
reasonably have anticipated suit at that site. Therefore, the third factor of the proposed test, the
federal interests furthered by allowing the suit to proceed at the challenged location, would proba-
bly be dispositive. In the absence of any legislative history or other evidence about the potential
government interests involved in the not yet existent nationwide personal jurisdiction and venue
statutes that might affect these hypotheticals, it is impossible to evaluate this third factor. Thus,
the ultimate resolution of the due process problems raised by the initial hypotheticals must await
changes in the law and more extensive factual development.
295 See B.K. Instrument, Inc. v. United States, 715 F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1983). Although none of
the litigants were involved in bankruptcy proceedings, in this action an unsuccessful bidder from
New York filed suit in the Eastern District of New York against the United States, various federal
officials, and the successful bidder, a California corporation. The Second Circuit directed on re-
mand that the district court determine whether the successful bidder was an indispensable party
under Rule 19(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, id. at 730-32, indicating that it might be
impossible for the district court, relying on Rule 4, to exercise general personal jurisdiction over
the California corporation, which apparently carried on no activity in New York. Id. at 731-32.
If this suit had been filed by an unsuccessful bidder who had filed a petition for bankruptcy,
however, as in the hypothetical in the text, the nationwide service of process provision would have
overcome that hurdle. See supra notes 277-79 and accompanying text.
296 An individual or a corporation may initiate bankruptcy proceedings by filing a bankruptcy
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the contract for electronic tool kits was awarded to two corporations,
one in Florida and one in Guam, each of which had agreed to produce
20,000 tool kits. Outraged, the president files an adversary proceeding
on behalf of the Alaska corporation in the federal bankruptcy court in
Alaska,297 naming as defendants the government and both successful
bidders. The United States, the Florida corporation, and the Guam
corporation each is properly served pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule
7004.298 The defendant corporations, never having been informed of
the competing bid, are surprised by the suit. Although the United
States Attorney for the District of Alaska will represent the government
in the litigation, neither of the corporations has local counsel in Alaska.
Indeed, neither has ever had any connection at all with Alaska or the
Pacific Northwest. Accordingly, they decide to challenge the jurisdic-
tion of the Alaska court.
When the bankruptcy court, faced with two motions to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction, turns to the case law, it will discover that
many bankruptcy courts have interpreted the Bankruptcy Rule permit-
ting nationwide service of process 299 as an authorization of personal
jurisdiction over all defendants in or having minimum contacts with
the United States.300 It will also discover that the venue provisions per-
mit the lit'Zation to proceed in Alaska.30 1 Accordingly, the current law
allows the Alaska federal court to assert jurisdiction over all of the
defendants.
Under the three-part analysis advanced by this Article,- however,
the exercise of jurisdiction over the Florida and Guam corporations
would almost certainly violate due process. First, it is likely that both
of the corporations could demonstrate that litigation in Alaska would
cause them substantial inconvenience. 30 2 Second, they could show that
they could not reasonably have anticipated suit in Alaska or the sur-
rounding region. Third, they would probably be able to convince the
petition. 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1982). The proper venue for filing the petition is the federal judicial
district where the debtor is domiciled, resides, has its principal place of business, or has had its
principal assets in the United States in the 180 days immediately preceding the filing. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1472 (1982).
297 The Supreme Court's decision in Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,
458 U.S. 50 (1982), which invalidated the broad congressional grant of subject matter jurisdiction
to non-article III bankruptcy courts, see supra note 252, has left some confusion concerning which
matters related to bankruptcy proceedings may be referred to bankruptcy judges and which must
be adjudicated by district judges. Whether the hypothetical case were assigned to a bankruptcy
court or a federal district court, however, the personal jurisdiction analysis would be identical.
298 See supra note 278.
299 See supra note 278.
300 See supra notes 277-79 and accompanying text.
301 See supra note 289.
302 It is possible, of course, that an assessment of the particular circumstances of corporate
defendants might convince the court that litigation in Alaska would not be very burdensome to
either or both of the parties. See supra text accompanying notes 182-89.
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court that any federal interests that favored holding the litigation in
Alaska were insufficient to overcome their inconvenience and surprise.
Here the government interests that might justify bringing the con-
tract action in Alaska, where the bankruptcy petition was filed, would
be two: furthering the orderly and speedy administration of a debtor's
estate by consolidating all bankruptcy and related proceedings before
one tribunal,30 3 and conserving the assets of a debtor in order to maxi-
mize compensation to the creditors. 304 If the Alaska court refused to
exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendants, the trustee in bank-
ruptcy would still be able to litigate the contract claim but to do so
would likely have to go to New York, Florida, Guam, or to some other
place where the defendants could reasonably have anticipated being
sued. Although inconvenient for the trustee, this would not pose a ma-
jor obstacle to the orderly administration of the debtor's estate because
litigating an isolated contract claim is tangential to the central tasks
involved in administration, such as marshalling the major assets of the
debtor and ranking the creditors. Clearly, though, if the trustee were
required to file suit someplace-or in two separate places-other than
Alaska, the distance would make the litigation more time consuming
and more costly. As the extra expense would diminish the debtor's es-
tate, this course of action would thwart to some extent the objective of
conserving the debtor's assets. Similarly, it would make the proceed-
ings less speedy.
The denial of personal jurisdiction in this situation would not en-
tail the total obstruction of the legitimate federal interests, however.
Therefore, the Alaska court should weigh the hardship on the defend-
ants of litigation in Alaska against the degree to which prohibiting the
litigation from proceeding against the Florida and Guam defendants in
Alaska would have a negative effect on federal interests. Because it
appears that the major negative impact that the denial of jurisdiction
would have on the pertinent government interests would be the addi-
tional costs occasioned if the trustee must litigate outside of Alaska, the
effect of denying personal jurisdiction is quite small. Weighing this mi-
nor impact against the burden that litigating in Alaska would impose
on the defendants who had no reasonable expectation of suit there, the
court should conclude that the due process clause prohibits the exercise
of personal jurisdiction over the defendants.
On the other hand, a similar hypothetical might lead to a different
result under the Federal Interpleader Act.30 5 Suppose a resident of
New York dies in New York leaving the proceeds of a substantial life
insurance policy to her sister, who had assigned it to two creditors.
Suppose the sister, a resident of Alaska, files a suit in federal court
303 See supra note 280.
304 See supra note 280.
305 28 U.S.C. §§ 1335, 1397, 2361 (1982).
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there against the insurance company, a New York corporation with a
branch office in Anchorage, Alaska. The insurance company inter-
pleads the creditors, who reside in Florida and Guam, respectively. Of
course, neither of the creditors has ever had any connection with
Alaska or the Pacific Northwest.
The Federal Interpleader Act provides for nationwide personal ju-
risdiction,3°6 and provides that venue is proper in each judicial district
in which any claimant resides.307 Because the sister lives in Alaska, the
venue requirement is satisfied. Accordingly, so long as the creditors are
properly notified and served, the statute permits the Alaska federal
court to assert jurisdiction over them.
Under the due process test proposed in this Article, the court's ex-
ercise ofjurisdiction in this situation probably would be deemed consti-
tutional. A brief evaluation of the pertinent factors will illustrate this
point. First, unless the creditors are wealthy individuals or corpora-
tions with far-flung enterprises, it is likely that litigation in Alaska
would pose substantial burdens on them. Second, the creditors' lack of
connection with Alaska or any part of the United States near Alaska
indicates that neither of them reasonably could have anticipated suit in
Alaska. Third, the creditors would have to demonstrate that the fed-
eral intere.ts furthered by permitting litigation in Alaska did not out-
weigh the hardship imposed on them.
The federal interests underlying the interpleader act are clear.
Congress intended to provide a forum for suits beyond the effective
reach of state courts and thus to prevent potentially inconsistent judg-
ments leading to multiple liability against the stakeholder.308 These in-
terests are legitimate and clearly are at stake in this hypothetical suit. It
appears that there is no state in which all three claimants could be sued
in one proceeding. It appears that there is no mutually convenient fo-
rum. Yet, if the insurance company were required to initiate separate
proceedings for each claimant, it might be faced with separate verdicts,
each awarding the total proceeds to a different claimant. If the federal
court refuses to exercise personal jurisdiction in this interpleader hypo-
thetical, the legitimate government interests would be totally thwarted.
Therefore, the court could justifiably conclude that the federal interest
at stake outweighs the inconvenience and surprise to the defendants
occasioned by the place of trial and could, consistent with the due pro-
cess clause, exercise personal jurisdiction.
D. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4
Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which prescribes
306 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (1982). Section 2361 is reproduced supra note 233.
307 28 U.S.C. § 1397 (1982). Section 1397 is reproduced supra note 292.
308 See supra notes 258-62 and accompanying text.
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the issuance and delivery of process, contains no reference to personal
jurisdiction.30 9 According to the weight of authority, it merely regu-
lates the mechanics of service of process, and does not itself provide
any basis for the assertion of jurisdiction.31° Some commmentators
and courts, however, have interpreted Rule 4 as a grant of power au-
thorizing the federal courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over de-
fendants.31 Because Rule 4 is silent on the issue of jurisdiction, the
minority who view it as a jurisdictional grant have exhibited some con-
fusion as to the pertinent bases of amenability to jurisdiction under
Rule 4. At least one scholar has suggested that Rule 4 authorizes juris-
diction based on the physical presence of defendants within the United
States.312 In a similar fashion a number of courts have read into Rule 4
a federal standard regarding corporate presence, and have concluded
that federal courts are authorized to assert personal jurisdiction on this
basis.313 These courts are split as to the appropriate geographical meas-
ure for this corporate presence standard; most of them indicate that
Rule 4 grants jurisdiction to federal courts over those corporations
present in the state in which the court is located,314 but a few interpret
309 The titles of FED. R. Civ. P. 4 and its subsections illustrate its focus on the mechanics of
service of process:
Rule 4
Process
(a) Summons: Issuance
(b) Same: Form
(c) Service
(d) Summons and Complaint: Person to be Served
(e) Same: Service Upon Party Not Inhabitant of or Found Within State
(f) Territorial Limits of Effective Service
(g) Return
(h) Amendment
(i) Alternative Provisions for Service in a Foreign County
(j) Summons: Time Limit for Service
310 Eg., 2 J. MOORE, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 4.25[7], at 4-282 n.9 (2d ed. 1981); 4 C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1063-64 (1969); KaplanAmend-
ments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 1961-63 (pt. 1), 77 HARv. L. REv. 601, 619-42
(1964); Note, supra note 63, at 478 nA8. As most succinctly stated to generations of law students,
"Rule 4(d)(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure tells how service of process is to be made upon a
corporation which is subject to service; but does not tell when the corporation is so subject."
HART & WECHSLER, supra note 147, at 959. But see DeMelo v. Touche Marine Inc., 711 F.2d
1260, 1265 (5th Cir. 1983) ("Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 [is] the general statutory basis for assertion of
personal jurisdiction in the federal courts").
311 E.g., Jim Fox Enter. v. Air France, 664 F.2d 63, 64-65 (5th Cir. 1981); Donald Manter Co.
v. Davis, 543 F.2d 419, 420 (1st Cir. 1976); Koupetoris v. Konkar Intrepaid Corp., 535 F.2d 1392,
1395 (2d Cir. 1976); Berger, supra note 13, at 290-92; Foster, Long-Arm Jurisdiction in Federal
Courts, 1969 Wis. L. REv. 9, 16-17 n.28.
312 Berger, supra note 13, at 290-92.
313 See, e.g., Fraley v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 397 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1968); Scott v. Middle East
Airlines Co., 240 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Goldberg v. Mutual Readers League, Inc., 195 F.
Supp. 778 (E.D. Pa. 1961); Clifton Prods., Inc. v. American Universal Ins. Co., 169 F. Supp. 842
(S.D.N.Y. 1959); Hedrick v. Canadian Pac. Ry., 28 F. Supp. 257 (S.D. Ohio 1939).
314 See, e.g., Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972);
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Rule 4 as a grant of jurisdiction to federal courts over corporations
present anywhere in the United States.315 Each view finds a scintilla of
support in the terms of Rule 4: in describing the adequate methods of
serving process and the appropriate persons to receive service, Rule 4
sets forth federal standards, 316 but also authorizes federal courts to fol-
low the standards used by the local state courts. 317
In 1983 Congress amended Rule 4(c), which sets forth the permis-
sible methods of delivering the process issued by federal courts. The
amendment greatly liberalized the acceptable manner of service.
Whereas the old rule required personal delivery of process, 3 18 the new
rule allows a plaintiff to initiate suit against an individual or a corpo-
rate defendant by simply placing a copy of the summons and complaint
in the regular mail.319 This section of the Rule obviously simplifies the
commencement of litigation by eliminating the requirement that a fed-
eral marshal or a specially appointed process server deliver the sum-
mons and complaint. It has been asserted, however, that this provision
does more than modify the mechanics of delivery of process.320 Under
the minority view that Rule 4 is a grant of jurisdiction, it follows that
the 1983 amendment not only streamlines the method of serving pro-
cess, but also further simplifies the initiation of federal court litigation
Fraley v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 397 F.2d I (3d Cir. 1968); Scholnick v. National Airlines, Inc.,
219 F.2d 115 (6th Cir. 1955); Lone Star Package Car Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 212 F.2d 147
(5th Cir. 1954); Scott Paper Co. v. Scott's Liquid Gold, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 184 (D. Del. 1974); Scott
v. Middle East Airlines Co., 240 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
315 Holt v. Klosters Rederi, 355 F. Supp. 354 (W.D. Mich. 1973); First Flight Co. v. Bowman
Transp., Inc., 209 F. Supp. 730 (E.D. Tenn. 1962).
316 See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(1), 4(c)(2)(A), (B) & (C)(ii), 4(d)(l) & (3).
317 See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2)(C)(i), 4(d)(6), 4(e).
318 Before the 1983 amendments took effect, FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c) provided:
Service of all process shall be made by a United States marshal, by his deputy, or by some
person specially appointed by the court for that purpose, except that a subpoena may be
served as provided in Rule 45. Special appointments to serve process shall be made freely
(when substantial savings in travel fees will result). Service of all process may also be made
by a person authorized to serve process in an action brought in the courts of general jurisdic-
tion of the state in which the district court is held or in which service is made.
319 FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) provides:
(c) A summons and complaint may be served upon a defendant of any class referred to in
paragraph (1) or (3) of subdivision (d) of this rule-
(ii) by mailing a copy of the summons and of the complaint (by first-class mail, postage
prepaid) to the person to be served, together with two copies of a notice and acknowledgment
conforming substantially to form 18-A and a return envelope, postage prepaid, addressed to
the sender. If no acknowledgment of service under this subdivision of this rule is received by
the sender within 20 days after the date of mailing, service of such summons and complaint
shall be made under subparagraph (A) or (B) of this paragraph in the manner prescribed by
subdivision (d)(l) or (d)(3).
320 See Berger, supra note 13, at 290-92. See also William B. May Co. v. Hyatt, 98 F.R.D. 569
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (rejecting view that in absence of authorization by federal or state statute service
of process by mail pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2)(E)(ii) on defendant located beyond forum
state provides basis for personal jurisdiction); San Miguel & Campania v. International Harvester
Export Co., 98 F.R.D. 572 (D.P.R. 1983).
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by authorizing federal courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over all
defendants who receive the mailed summons and complaint. In other
words, Rule 4 can be interpreted as a congressional grant of personal
jurisdiction to the federal courts over all defendants within reach of the
United States mail.
Two justifications for this interpretation have been advanced.
First, this view of Rule 4 ensures uniformity in the federal courts.321
Because federal courts would no longer need to rely on state long-arm
statutes, the situation in which a federal court in one state could not
exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant while a
federal court in a third state could reach the same out-of-state defend-
ant would no longer occur. Second, this interpretation eliminates the
anomaly of federal courts relying on state jurisdictional statutes to hear
cases arising under federal law. Because a federal standard would al-
ways be available, all federal courts could hear all federal question
cases filed, no matter what limitations the state legislatures had im-
posed on state court long-arm jurisdiction.322
Despite any surface appeal that the uniformity and federal stan-
dard arguments may have, a number of reasons counsel against inter-
preting the newly amended Rule 4 as a grant of nationwide personal
jurisdiction. First, the language of the Rule refers only to service of
process, not to jurisdiction.32 3 While the "plain meaning" of a statute or
regulation is often elusive, the canons of statutory construction require
courts to give effect to the intent actually expressed by Congress. 2 4
Second, the legislative history of the 1983 amendments to Rule 4 indi-
cates that the whole impetus behind the revision was to relieve federal
marshals from the task of serving process. 325 There is no indication of
321 Berger, supra note 13, at 293-98.
322 Berger, supra note 13, at 329-31. In Berger's view there is no need to worry about a defend-
ant's due process rights under such a scheme because the federal question itself would provide a
sufficient nexus among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation. Id. at 336. So long as the
claim is appropriate for a federal court to consider, Berger believes that due process would not be
violated by an exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant. This constitutional analysis equates
subject matter jurisdiction with personal jurisdiction, and eliminates from the due process analysis
all concern that the place of trial might be fundamentally unfair to the defendant.
323 See supra notes 309 & 319.
324 See C. SANDS, supra note 144, §§ 46.01 & 46.03.
325 Pursuant to the grant of authority in the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982), the
Supreme Court, on April 28, 1982, transmitted to Congress several proposed amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including a proposed revision of Rule 4(c), which was described
as primarily intended to relieve the federal marshals from serving process in private civil suits.
H.R. REP. No. 662, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-4 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 596. Congress postponed the effective date of the proposed amendments to Rule 4, Act of
Aug. 2, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-227, 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 246, and subsequently
drafted and enacted legislation significantly changing Rule 4(c), Act of March 22, 1983, Pub. L.
No. 97-462, § -, 51 U.S.L.W. 202 (1983). This statute, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Amendments Act of 1982, took effect on February 26, 1983. It contains provisions regarding
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any congressional intent to use the 1983 amendments to Rule 4 as a
vehicle for a sweeping grant of personal jurisdiction to the federal
courts.
Third, if the recent revisions of Rule 4 were interpreted as a grant
of nationwide personal jurisdiction, this would conffict with another
provision of the Rule. Rule 4(f) expressly limits the scope of process
issued by a federal court to the territorial limits of its home state or, in
limited circumstances, to places beyond state borders but within 100
miles of the courthouse.326 Exceptions to Rule 4(f) are permitted when
a federal statute or rule authorizes wider service.327 If the 1983 amend-
ments to Rule 4(c) allow personal jurisdiction wherever a defendant
can be reached by the United States mails, the territorial limits of Rule
4(f) would be totally nullified. The legislative history provides no sup-
port for such a result.328
Last, and most important, Rule 4 should not be interpreted as a
grant of nationwide personal jurisdiction because this view would in-
crease the likelihood of litigation at locations distant from the defend-
ant's residence and embroil the courts in a great deal of litigation
concerning the place of trial. It would likely lead to frequent unconsti-
tutional exercises of personal jurisdiction. In addition, such an inter-
pretation ;.-ould create enormous opportunities for harassment. If the
1983 amendments do authorize nationwide personal jurisdiction, a
plaintiff can effectively activate the power of the federal government
against defendants anywhere in the United States, no matter how little
connection the defendant has with the site chosen by the plaintiff. If
service of summons and complaint by first-class mail. The background report to the Amendments
Act of 1982 stated:
The Supreme Court's proposed modifications of Rule 4 were designed to alleviate the burden
on the Marshals Service of serving summonses and complaints in private civil actions. Ap-
pendix II, Report of the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure and Advisory Com-
mittee Note. While the Committee received no complaints about the goal of reducing the
role of the Marshals Service, the Court's proposals simply failed to achieve that goal. See
House Report No. 97-662, at 2-3 (1982).
The Court's proposed Rule 4(c)(2)(B) required the Marshals Service to serve summonses
and complaints "pursuant to any statutory provision expressly providing for service by a
United States Marshal or his deputy." One such statutory provision is 28 U.S.C. 569(b),
which compels marshals to "execute all lawful writs, process and orders issued under author-
ity of the United States, including those of the courts .... " (Emphasis added.) Thus, any
party could have invoked 28 U.S.C. 569(b) to utilize a marshal for service of a summons and
complaint, thereby thwarting the intent of the new subsection to limit the use of marshals.
The Justice Department acknowledges that the proposed subsection did not accomplish its
objectives.
HR 7154 cures this problem and achieves the desired reduction in the role of the Mar-
shals Service by authorizing marshals to serve summonses and complaints "on behalf of the
United States." By so doing, HR 7154 eliminates the loophole in the Court's proposed lan-
guage and still provides for service by marshals on behalf of the Government.
1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4438-39 (footnotes omitted).
326 See supra note 221.
327 See supra note 221.
328 See William B. May Co. v. Hyatt, 98 F.R.D. 569, 570 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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the defendant fails to appear or to make a timely objection based on
any protection that venue statutes might provide, the court can enter a
valid default judgment against the defendant. The harassment that
might arise from this interpretation of Rule 4 would truly aggravate the
flood of litigation protesting an unreasonable place of trial that such a
nationwide jurisdiction scheme would engender. Harassment is espe-
cially likely in light of the ease-a letter sent by first-class mail-with
which service can now be accomplished. 329 When these costs are calcu-
lated and the significance of the legislative history and the plain mean-
ing of the words selected by Congress are considered, the case against
interpreting the 1983 amendments to Rule 4 as a grant of nationwide
personal jurisdiction is overwhelming.
V. CONCLUSION
The due process clause of the fifth amendment limits the exercise
of personal jurisdiction by federal courts. In addition to requiring that
all defendants be provided notice and an opportunity to be heard by an
impartial tribunal, the clause forbids a court from exercising personal
jurisdiction if the site of the litigation is unreasonably burdensome to
the defendant. The mere fact that a defendant resides in, is located in,
or has minimum contacts with the United States does not make it rea-
sonable for all federal courts to exert personal jurisdiction over him in
all cases arising under federal law. A defendant must be afforded the
opportunity to demonstrate that the location of the litigation is funda-
mentally unfair to him. If the defendant can make such a showing, it
would violate due process to force him to litigate in the federal forum
chosen by the plaintiff.
To determine whether the location of litigation places an unrea-
sonable burden on a defendant, courts should evaluate the place of trial
in light of three factors: (1) the severity of the inconvenience, if any, to
the defendant; (2) the defendant's reasonable anticipation of litigation
at the site chosen by the plaintiff, (3) the federal interests furthered by
permitting litigation to proceed at that location. Only if the interests of
society outweigh the substantial inconvenience suffered by the defend-
ant can a federal court, consistent with the due process clause, exercise
personal jurisdiction over a defendant who has demonstrated that the
place of trial imposes a heavy, unanticipated burden on him.
In applying this analysis to the circumstances of a particular case,
the courts should take a pragmatic view of the burdens imposed by
distant litigation in contemporary society. Courts must evaluate a de-
fendant's constitutional challenge to the place of trial in light of today's
complex, interdependent economy, improved transportation and com-
munication networks, and great increase in personal mobility and in
329 See supra note 319.
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the amount of litigation undertaken. In the final analysis, however,
courts must be sensitive to the circumstances of a particular defendant.
They must weigh the hardship to the defendant as realistically as possi-
ble against the nature and extent of the relevant federal interests, and
against the degree to which those interests would be thwarted if the
litigation were not allowed to proceed at the challenged location.
If Congress continues to restrict the territorial jurisdiction of fed-
eral courts to their local state boundaries plus the 100 mile bulge area,
and to enact nationwide personal jurisdiction statutes that limit the
place of trial to locations with which the defendant has had a signifi-
cant connection, courts will rarely need to engage in the constitutional
analysis set forth above. If, however, Congress countenances nation-
wide personal jurisdiction provisions that do not restrict the site of the
litigation, as it has in the interpleader and bankruptcy statutes, the
courts will be confronted with legitimate due process challenges by de-
fendants who reside far from the place of trial. To avoid such difficult
constitutional questions, the 1983 amendments to Rule 4 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure should not be interpreted as an unrestricted
grant of nationwide personal jurisdiction to the federal courts.
Unrestricted nationwide personal jurisdiction provisions would
work sweeping changes in the federal court system that are uncalled for
by 200 years of experience. They would permit harassment by plain-
tiffs, and greatly increase the amount of litigation regarding the statu-
tory and constitutional limitations on the place of trial. While the test
proposed in this Article would equip the courts to resolve due process
challenges arising in litigation initiated under expansive personal juris-
diction statutes, a heightened awareness in Congress of the potential
difficulties defendants face may lead to more carefully delineated stan-
dards of jurisdiction and venue.
